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Introduction
The nymph, though in this mangled plight,
Must every morn her limbs unite.
But how shall I describe her arts
To recollect the scattered parts?
Or show the anguish, toil, and pain,
Of gathering up herself again?
The bashful muse will never bear
In such a scene to interfere.
Corinna in the morning dizened,
Who sees, will spew; who smells, be poisoned.
—Jonathan Swift, "A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed.
Written for the Honour of the Fair Sex"
Although Jonathan Swift's "A Beautiful Young Nymph" has painfully de-
tailed every disgusting, disease-ridden part of Corinna's body before com-
ing to this conclusion, the poem's last couplet tells us that it is the "dizened"
or dressed Corinna who will make us nauseous. What disgusts Swift is not
the female body but its cultural baggage: clothes.1 Moreover, Corinna's body
is, the poem tells us, constituted by a heap of prosthetic devices: "a crystal
eye," a set of teeth, "rags" to prop up her breasts, "bolsters" for hips.2 The
poem sees as nauseating the things that Corinna uses to plug up holes and
prop up organs as a way of masking bodily decay. Mary Douglas has shown
that cultural practices surrounding bodily orifices function symbolically as
a way of representing a society to itself.3 And, in the wake of her work,
critics have shown that misogyny in representations is not about women
but rather about society: representations that inspire passionate hatred of
women and disgust with the female body provide a place for people to work
out passionate feelings about changes in economic and social structure.4
Douglas's work and recent criticism make it impossible to see Swift's
1
scatology any longer as a personal psychic problem.5 Swift does not hate
Corinna; rather, Corinna gives him the opportunity to master anxieties about
social changes, felt by Swift to augur the decay of a paternalist social order:
enclosure,6 the blurring of demarcations that separate aristocrats (the peer-
age) from the merchant, trading, and professional classes,7 the alienability
of property8—profound and troublesome changes accompanying the shift
from agrarian and mercantile capitalism at the beginning of the eighteenth
century to industrial or "full" capitalism at the beginning of the nineteenth
century.9 Since dress, as sumptuary laws indicate,10 had long marked a
person's status, it is no wonder that it would become an affectively charged
(nauseating) object to members of a society changing in structure from a
hierarchy based on status to a class society regulated by ideology. And cer-
tainly members of a society engaged in transforming communal into private
property via "a parliamentary coup d'etat"11 might be obsessed, symboli-
cally, with using stones (crystal eyes and fake teeth) to plug up entrances to
a body—i.e., with closing off public access to a particular parcel of land
now imagined as having the borders, unity, and integrity of a human body.
Although the title of this book indicates that it is about eighteenth-cen-
tury economies, the book does not provide a historical account of the emer-
gence of capitalism. Rather, it is about the development of affective structures
around the emergence of capitalism: the economies discussed here are emo-
tional. The following analysis of how misogyny works in both canonical
and noncanonical literature tracks two changes in the structure of desire
that occur during the eighteenth century, changes necessary to usher in fully
capitalist modes of production. In order to desire engagement in capitalist
activities, the image of the businessman must be rendered attractive enough
for people to wish to identify with it. And, though it seems counterintuitive,
the commodity form had to be rendered desirable—it was not automati-
cally so. During the course of the eighteenth century, literature was recon-
ceived as a commodifiable, canonical object and thereby lent its prestige to
the commodity form. In both cases, new affective economies supported the
emergence of industrial capitalism. Literature is one place in which feelings
and thoughts can be circulated in new ways.
In discussing "the business of literature," then, this book is concerned
with two things: first, literature's relation to business, the work it does of
both promoting capitalism and critiquing it; and second, literary business,
the business of making texts into highly marketable canonical objects. Albert
O. Hirschman and J.G. A. Pocock offer accounts of people protesting against
rather than blithely acceding to the motive of untrammeled self-interest.12
The desire to produce profits and the desire to own commodities is not
simply "natural." Capitalist desires had to be made palatable. Literature in
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general and misogynous representations in particular performed some of
that work. By constructing ideal images of businessmen and canonical po-
ets, and by stimulating identification with them, these representations im-
planted in their readers the desire to produce capital and consume
commodities, literary objects being, as McKendrick and Plumb have shown,
among the first mass-marketed commodities.13 However, since misogynous
representations were used to stimulate capitalist desire, they also were avail-
able to contest it: misogyny is the terrain upon which the proponents of
new kinds of business, profiteering and commodification, meet their an-
tagonists, proponents of the old, precapitalist order. My book traces the
emergence of modern conceptions of business and literature in texts by au-
thors such as Dryden, Swift, Pope, Otway, George Lillo, Mary Leapor, Wil-
liam Oldys, Henry Headley, William Hazlitt, and Anna Barbauld, analyzing
how misogyny is used to work through, realize, resist, and critique new
capitalist forms.
Most of the time, eighteenth-century misogynous representations pro-
mote capitalist desires. They instill in readers the desire to accumulate prof-
its and commodities. More important, misogynous representations are able
to redirect feelings antagonistic to the newly emerging capitalist order and
to resolve those logical contradictions that it exacerbates. Their fundamen-
tal function under capitalism is to enable the desubstantialization necessary
for understanding mankind in the abstract. For capitalism to be possible,
Marx says, people must be able to think of each "man" as being, on the
highest level of abstraction, equal to every other. Aristotle could not come
up with a theory of value, Marx says, because he lived in a society that
owned slaves who were seen as human like their masters: only conceiving
all "men" as radically equal makes possible abstracting, quantifying, and
thereby commodifying human labor.14 Of course, many political theorists
from John Locke onward argued that all men are equal. But merely present-
ing such an idea is not enough. Equalizing and abstracting "man" is quite
difficult to do psychically. Cultural artifacts must perform the psychic work
necessary for forming "man" into an abstract object and sustaining the
object's status as abstract. A history-of-ideas approach to changes taking
place conceptually during the eighteenth century does not sufficiently ac-
count for the psychic processes that make large numbers of people accept
new concepts. Thus, this book uses psychoanalytic theory to show the kind
of work performed by specific structures and figures in texts.
Idealizing "man" is most often accomplished by embodying someone
else in a degrading way. We well know from recent work that imperialism
and colonialism abetted the idealizing process by portraying the colonial
other as more material, more bestial, than the allegedly universal, British,
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middle-class man and then insisting that the colonial other needs to be vio-
lently subdued and constrained. This book looks not at the violence of for-
eign but rather of domestic, literary relations. The Renaissance bequeathed
idealized portraits of women to eighteenth-century writers, who then found
representations of women available for de-idealizing. Such de-idealizing made
idealizing male humanity possible.
To violently expel from an image all that threatens its ideal status has
been called "abjection." As the work of Stallybrass and White has shown,
abjection is not just a personal psychic mechanism but a kind of communal
activity in which cultural representations are deployed in order to emotion-
ally charge new concepts that are becoming current in the culture at large.15
In two major works, The Powers of Horror and Tales of Love, Julia Kristeva
describes the abjection/idealization dialectic.16 As a developmental process,
abjection accompanies the institution of primary narcissism: the infant abjects
what is both its mother's and its own body in order to adequate himself to
the ideal ego, the image of himself that he sees in the mirror which appears
to be in control, unified, and contained. In order for the child to see the
image as himself, he must separate from what he feels, since he feels out of
control, heterogeneous, and borderless. In order for the image to stand for
the child, the child must establish some distance from his own body (indis-
tinguishable, from the child's point of view, from its mother's body), thereby
creating a space that the ideal image can inhabit. Abjection is rejection or
expulsion of the drive's body, later (after Oedipalization) seen as separation
from and rejection of the mother, but in these early stages, before gender
difference, what is actually being expelled is body and drive as such. As a
rejection of the sheerly fascist domination of the drives, abjection estab-
lishes the difference between body and psyche necessary for the "triumph"
of the image in the mirror stage:17 that is, the image's ability to dominate the
child's sense of himself depends upon the child's ability to disown as "not
self," as an abject (m)other, whatever felt experience of his body does not
correspond to the image.
Primary narcissism is therefore instituted by primary repression that takes
place via the mechanism of abjecting. In "Repression," Freud describes the
process of idealization as accompanying the repression of a desire that arouses
disgust: " [T]he objects to which men give most preference, their ideals, pro-
ceed from the same perceptions and experiences as the objects which they
most abhor, and that were originally distinguished from each other through
slight modifications."18 Ideals erected in the process of repression, he ar-
gues, are minimally different from objects for which desire has been re-
pressed, and it is precisely disgust and abhorrence that renders those objects
markedly different from ideal objects. Kristeva gives us an account of the
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constitution of the first ideal object, which happens to be the child's own
ideal ego, through the constitution of an abject. The disgust that the child
feels is the affective sign of repression. The child represses the love he feels
for his mother's body, indistinguishable from his own. Via disgust, he re-
presses his love for the materiality that is to be abjected and transports that
love to the ideal image that now "refers" not to the body as experienced,
but to an absence created by disavowal.
Although the creation of a human psyche necessarily requires abjection
of the body, abjection does not require expelling or hating women: one
abjects embodiedness as such. It is only a misogynous culture that codes the
body "female," thereby rendering the process of abjection a sexist act. Fur-
thermore, abjection is a rhetorical process as well as a psychic one.19 It is a
process of figuration: the use of recognizable and repeatable literary devices
to arouse and channel passions of disgust and abhorrence. Texts that en-
gage in the process of abjection manipulate the figure of gender to allow for
identification and disidentification. In a text successfully establishing dis-
tinctions, the process of abjection requires readers first to identify with
women and then to disidentify: the text first undermines gender differences
at certain points, so that saying "woman" means "all of us," and then aug-
ments those differences, usually through suddenly representing women as
completely disgusting and utterly different. Thus, while the repression of
one's felt sense of materiality via abjection is necessary to the establishment
of any psyche—universally, throughout history—the use of gender to un-
dermine and promote abjection is historically specific, depending on how
any given culture represents woman's relation to the body as such.
This dialectic of abjection and idealization was visible to early modern
writers such as Jonathan Swift. In A Tale of a Tub, Swift gives us a passage
similar to Freud's description of repression: "[Man's] first flight of fancy
commonly transports him to ideas of what is most perfect, finished, and
exalted; till having soared out of his own reach and sight, not well perceiv-
ing how near the frontiers of height and depth border upon each other; with
the same course and wing, he falls down plumb into the lowest bottom of
things."20 Like Freud, Swift describes the usually insensible proximity of the
ideal and the abject, but, instead of describing it as Freud does in the pro-
cess of repression, Swift uncovers their proximity in a scenario of the break-
down of repression.
According to the story this book wishes to tell about the change in forms
of abjection over the course of the eighteenth century, Swift sees the modern
ego's incomplete formation, Freud and Kristeva its breakdown. Freud and
Kristeva are witnessing the breakdown of the primary repression that estab-
lishes the ego in particular individuals—"borderline cases"—during a mo-
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ment in history when social, cultural, and economic forms promote the ego's
establishment.21 In contrast, those forms are not yet securely in place when
Swift is writing, so that he can readily see the ego's inability to establish
itself, the failure of primary repression. What Freud and Kristeva can see
because of their analyses of pathology, Swift can see because of his moment
in history.
During Swift's historical moment, insufficiently established differences
are breaking down. Chapter 2, on Thomas Otway's Orphan, provides an
analysis of that moment in history. From the time of the Exclusion Crisis to
the South Sea Bubble, an incompletely formed market system, emerging
into an increasingly secular society, stimulates what Rene Girard has called
a "sacrificial crisis."22 The concept of abjection is deepened by connecting it
to Girard's notion of mimetic violence. If, as Freud and Swift argue above,
people are disgusted with things whose "frontiers . . . border upon each
other," with things that "were originally distinguished from each other [only]
through slight modifications," then the violent expulsion of these barely
distinct things is an intrapsychic version of the public scapegoating ritual
described by Girard.
In this ritual, someone who is similar to all the others must be sacrificed
in order to stop the series of violent acts that equal "men" are committing
against each other (the sacrificial crisis). Whereas each man's violent acts
mimetically reproduce the other's, thereby rendering them identical, sacri-
fice of this one who is the same makes him utterly different. Disgust with
another taken to its extreme—to the point of actually murdering the other,
as disgust becomes utter hatred—makes that other who was at first the
same different by virtue of being inanimate matter because no longer alive.
To "abject" woman is to feel intensely disgusted with the female body. But
abjection does not spring from an originary hatred of women. Rather, one
abjects to be rid of things that one hates about oneself: women are origi-
nally hated not because different but because too much the same. Disgust
with another who is visibly the same is, of course, self-hatred projected
outward. If acted upon with violence, this self-hatred can thus transform
this same-other into something different and separate; the self thereby dis-
owns whatever it hates about itself. Abjection, scapegoating, sacrificing some-
one who is the same to one's own hatred—this is the process of erecting
differences, of making other the one who was the same. It is not essence but
rather the violence perpetrated against her that renders woman different
from man.
Abjection involves two contradictory steps: first projecting one's bad
qualities onto woman by recognizing one's similarity to her, and second,
hating woman in order to establish oneself as distinct from her. Abjection is
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thus not simply a process of exclusion but actually an internalized
scapegoating ritual, as Girard defines it, in that it requires first recognizing
and then violently disavowing one's identity with the scapegoated figure.
What one hates about oneself and violently disavows in religious ritual is
one's own mortality. To represent men as transcendent, with immortal souls,
requires some kind of scapegoating ritual, a ritual of transubstantiation, be
it holy communion, in which Christ takes on the body and dies with it, or
what came in eighteenth-century literature to serve the function of such a
ritual: the abjection of women. Misogyny recurs in representations through-
out the eighteenth century because it acquires those ritualistic immortaliz-
ing and idealizing functions that an increasingly rationalized Christianity
can no longer support. In misogynous representations, a female body dies
so that a male body can live forever. Because of the power misogynous texts
have to evoke fears of mortality through representations of decaying flesh,
and then their peculiar capacity to make mortality other, to make it female,
they produce an ideal purged of all that one hates, especially the body's
mortality. Misogyny is thus one element in the process of abjection that
instills in people love of a masculinized, immortal ideal.
Liberal political and economic idealism perpetrates violence against those
people—women, colonial others, slaves—in order to render them different
(unequal, inhuman); their bodies can thus serve as a scapegoat for material-
ity and mortality. Abjection is the mechanism underlying the processes of
desubstantialization pervasive in eighteenth-century thought: in philosophical
discourses; in discourses constituting political economy; in concepts of fic-
tion necessary both to notions sustaining the new finance (paper money and
credit) and to notions of authorship; and in the construction of the novel as
a genre.23 The imperative to desubstantialize the conceptual entities "hu-
manity" and "authorship," to abstract those notions from particularities
that threatened to make generalizing about them impossible, was met dur-
ing this period through idealizing "Man" by abjecting woman.
Furthermore, misogynous representations promote newly emerging capi-
talist practices by creating new ideal objects available for identification.
Two of these ideals, this book shows, are the businessman (chapters 2 and
3) and the poet (chapter 5). One wants to be like the businessman and the
poet because such identifications promise immortality; identifying with them
means incorporating their desires to profiteer and commodify. Eighteenth-
century misogynous representations induce abjection in order to make profi-
teering, consuming, and canonizing into desirable ideals. However, while
this book shows that eighteenth-century misogynous representations turn
the businessman and poet into ideal, immortalized images, it also shows
that such representations also sometimes subvert the idealizing process, ei-
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ther inadvertently or intentionally. Usually idealization of men is success-
fully accomplished through de-idealizing women: in George Lillo's London
Merchant (1731) and Bernard Mandeville's "Modest Defence of Public
Stews" (1724), discussed in chapter 3, the capitalist is idealized by virtue of
scapegoating female courtesans and prostitutes as immoral kinds of busi-
nesswomen in contrast to the virtuous male profiteer. These two texts there-
fore participate in the cultural work necessary for the advent of capitalism,
as Hirschman's Passions and the Interests has shown: they transform Chris-
tian vice into capitalist virtue.24
However, misogynous representations that formulate the ideals neces-
sary for promoting bourgeois ideology do not always succeed. Thus, in
Thomas Otway's Orphan (1680), discussed in chapter 2, misogynous rep-
resentations fail to secure entrepreneurship as an ideal: the figure of the
woman in this she-tragedy is too sympathetic to allow the audience to com-
pletely sever its interests from hers. If the subversion of emergent ideals is
inadvertent in Otway, the use of misogynous representations to contest capi-
talist ideals is sometimes quite conscious. In the poetry of Jonathan Swift
and Mary Leapor (chapter 4), the female body is portrayed as disgusting in
order to criticize idealizations of women: for Swift, such an exposure en-
ables him to critique new scientific and mercantilist modes of objectifica-
tion that make use of those idealizations; most paradoxically, Leapor uses
her misogynous portraits to critique antifeminism itself. Their antiblasons
thus partake of the "counter-movement" against pastoral idealizations that
were marshaled throughout the eighteenth century to promote a new capi-
talist ethic.25
The analysis of the workings of misogyny as serving to promote and
critique capitalism extends to representations of the poet as a commodifiable
object. In order to become canonical objects, poems must be conceived as
the eternal property of an immortal poet. Conceiving of the poet and his
works as canonical is possible only through the abjection of women. To say
that women are abjected from the canon is not to say, simply, that they are
excluded; abjection involves more than simple rejection. For readers,
abjecting women in order to establish the canon requires first identifying
with them so that what pertains to all poets—their materiality or imma-
nence and historicity—can be projected onto women poets, and, only after
this identification has taken place, excluding them in an act of disavowal.
Thus, when disciplinary anthologies come into existence as purveyors of
the canon, at precisely that moment, there is also a proliferation of miscel-
laneous collections of verse containing women poets that do not claim to
offer The Great British Poets.26 Women are cordoned off in their own mis-
cellanies, cultural productions designed to assert that women have what
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transcendent male poets do not: body (the poets collected in Poems by
Eminent Ladies,17 by definition, are embodied, because the title establishes
them as a collectivity on the basis of having female bodies) and historicity
(women poets are collected in antiquarian miscellanies, showing how people
wrote during a certain historical moment). When critics say that women
write poetry that is valuable only because of its specific location in time,
they in fact transport to it a historical materiality that is thereby trans-
ported away from "great" (male) poets, "great" works seen as transcending
time. Women's poetry is scapegoated for being materially bound, so that
canonical works can live forever.
As Terry Eagleton points out, the ability to abstract "a universal subject"
out of the individual, concrete, and particular is a tremendous feat, and the
emerging middle class turned to aesthetics for help with the process.28 Pro-
jecting historicity and physicality onto women's poems, collected in miscel-
lanies, and then excluding them from disciplinary anthologies, is what creates
the canon as we know it: it is what makes possible seeing works of litera-
ture and poetic identities as eternally and universally valuable objects. John
Guillory rightly argues that canonical works cannot be seen as simply
"endorsing] the hegemonic or ideological values of dominant social groups"
and, conversely, that noncanonical works cannot simply "be seen to ex-
press values which are transgressive, subversive, antihegemonic."29 Thus,
some of the noncanonical literary works discussed in this book are shown
to promote hegemonic points of view. These works were excluded from the
canon because they are propagandistic rather than literary, because they
come down too heavily on the side of one, emerging ideology rather than
reflecting, as does genuinely good literature, the play of competing ideolo-
gies and interests. Put another way: since language itself is never sheerly an
instrument of ideology, what makes any work of literature "bad" is the
formalistic extremes it has to go to in order to refuse to interrogate the
ideology it purveys.30 But although it is true, then, that some literary works
were not included in the canon because they too stridently promote a cer-
tain political point of view and are consequently more like propaganda than
like literature, it is nonetheless by now obvious that works have been ex-
cluded from the canon based on sexism. That is, Guillory is certainly right
that canonical works do not need to express sexism in order to get into the
canon, and noncanonical works written by women are not necessarily femi-
nist.31 Nonetheless, sexual difference has been harnessed to structure the
aesthetic field itself. The process of constituting "the field of restricted pro-
duction" or high culture32 has required abjection of a materiality coded in
Western culture as feminine.
Despite the fact that this book systematically exposes the ideologies that
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shape the list of canonical works, sexism most prominent among them, it
does discuss "good" and "bad" (propagandistic) literature. The book pro-
poses criteria for determining literary value. In contrast to critiques or re-
valuations of the canon that see "literariness" as a mystified concept,
literariness is here defined as a value. To claim that certain works have
literary value is not to ignore but on the contrary to expose the "social
determinants of literary value."33 There are some works that can be demon-
strated to have literary value and were excluded from the canon despite
having that value. These works should not have been included in the canon
simply because they were written by Mary Leapor and Anna Barbauld, two
women poets, but because they were written by these poets and are great.
One can only say that anthologies contain some "great" poetry, poetry de-
termined to be valuable based on social rather than aesthetic criteria, be-
cause some great poetry has been systematically left out. This book itself
exposes the notion of aesthetic value that developed during the eighteenth
century as faulty insofar as, out of structural necessity, it blinds us to a
specific kind of literary value. But exposing what was at stake in calling
certain literary works "great" is not the same as rejecting any attempt to
value certain cultural products over others. We should adopt other criteria
of value rather than to abandon the project of valuation altogether. If, as
Cora Kaplan maintains in the epigraph to this book, the aesthetic will re-
turn,34 some feminist work ought to be dedicated to consciously negotiating
the terms of that return. We need to formulate various feminist aesthetics.
Is the enterprise of valuing literariness retrograde? Only if one were to
say that whether a cultural product has literary value determines whether it
has any value, whether it is worth writing or thinking about at all—an idea
I certainly reject, since two chapters of this book are devoted to works that,
according to the specific criteria for literary value developed here, are bad
art. As it turns out, texts described here as "bad art" are works that have
also not been canonized, suggesting some overlap between canonical valua-
tions of the literary and the definition of literariness, given below, used in
this study. Aesthetic determinations have been ideological, but they have
not been only that: the aesthetic exceeds ideology.35 What has been canon-
ized, for the most part, does have the quality of literariness valued here. But
many works written by women and excluded from the canon also have that
quality. As I show in chapters 4 and 6, these authors have managed to write
feminist, profoundly literary poems by relying on traditional aesthetic val-
ues, in the case of Mary Leapor, and by fabricating their own aesthetics, as
does Anna Barbauld. Leapor's work is parasitic on literary conventions, but
if read properly it can be seen to resist misogyny inhering in them. Barbauld
avoids the debilitating equation of female matter with historically situated,
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expungeable material, by formulating her own aesthetic, incompatible with
the dominant aesthetic that ultimately devalued most of her poetry and re-
duced her "canonical" work to a few lines from one poem, "Life."36 It is
progressive to show that works by women authors excluded from the canon
do in fact meet traditional standards of aesthetic value as well as promote
their own.
This analysis is progressive in another way as well. Distinguishing quali-
tatively among cultural artifacts can in fact disrupt a misogyny latent in
critical approaches to cultural artifacts that do not distinguish good from
bad literature. To value literariness is important at this moment in literary
history.37 Now that it has finally become possible to talk about works by
women writers, we do not want to invalidate aesthetic criteria that attest to
their importance. Proposing new reasons to value the literary need not re-
suscitate the distinction between "high" and "low" culture as it was consti-
tuted during the Enlightenment, which, as this book demonstrates, is
grounded in sexism. I argue that women cannot be canonical authors be-
cause the task of canonizing is grounded in a sexism that designates women's
writings as historically interesting rather than aesthetically pleasing. It is
not because men hate women that Anna Barbauld's works are excluded
from the canon. Excluding Barbauld's works from the canon and including
them in myriad miscellaneous collections of contemporary (rather than eter-
nally interesting) poetry serves the fundamental function of distinguishing
the historicity of her writing from the transcendence of (male) canonical
poets. But such structural sexism is not in fact abrogated merely by taking a
cultural studies approach to literary texts. The sexism designating Barbauld
a noncanonical writer is in fact carried over into an analysis that calls her
work interesting only as a cultural artifact—only as material. Deconstructing
the opposition between "high" and "low" cultural artifacts can in fact re-
peat the sexist gesture that structures the canon itself. In the absence of any
reason for studying Barbauld's works, a feminist/cultural studies approach
presumes it is interesting because written by a woman poet—a poet with a
body—and/or fails to distinguish between Barbauld's works and Thomas
Bowdler's "translations" of Shakespeare (for instance)—both are interest-
ing material artifacts. If such approaches render her work interesting only
because embodied, they are as sexist as was canonizing itself. Paying atten-
tion to women poets is therefore an incomplete feminist gesture: to be com-
plete, one must recognize works by women as poetically valuable.38 The
literary must be distinguished from the popular without demoting the popular
to the uninteresting; one can thereby refuse to oppose high to low art as a
means for establishing disciplinary boundaries. But, to avoid repeating the
sexism analyzed here, this book defines "the literary" and determines two
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women's abilities to construct it. Poems by Leapor and Barbauld are aes-
thetically valuable according to very specific criteria that can be shown to
apply to much canonical literature as well.
What determines aesthetic value is a work's literariness. "Literariness"
differs from literature—the latter being the disciplinary object that is
commodified and canonized. Any commodified object of literature may or
may not be literary, depending on its structure, but also partly depending
upon what kinds of ideological pressures have been put on readers, visible
in their ways of handling texts.
My definition of literariness comes not from the field of aesthetics, al-
though it has something in common with definitions proposed by literary
critics.39 Rather, it comes from the field of psychoanalysis, in particular from
D.W. Winnicott's notion of "potential space."40 Play occurs in "a potential
space between the baby and the mother" (41), and this "playground" (47)
later becomes a space of "shared playing," of "cultural experiences" (51),
and of psychotherapy itself (46): "The place where cultural experience is
located is in the potential space between the individual and the environ-
ment" (100). Potential space is the place where what the child identifies as
"me" because of his or her sense of fusion with the mother, and indeed
everything in the world, gets sorted out via introjective and projective iden-
tifications into the "me" and the "not me" (88, 130). The "good-enough
mother" and the good-enough work of art are able to present objects to the
child or the reader that gratify his or her sense of omnipotence (I created the
object with which I am playing) while simultaneously calling that omnipo-
tence into question (I found the object already created by another) based on
inter subjective intimacy (47, 71, 100-101): it's my mother's/the author's
object, although she thinks just the way I do.
Because the mother or the artwork both grants and contests the child's or
the reader's omnipotence, the potential space that mother and artwork cre-
ate connects subjective fantasy to objects in the world (a person or a text).
At first, play is, like fantasy, purely subjective or internal. In play, as in
fantasy, a child fabricates a scene and identifies with multiple positions in it.
As Judith Butler puts it, "Fantasy . . . is not to be understood as an activity
of an already formed subject, but of the staging and dispersion of the sub-
ject into a variety of identificatory positions." Butler is explaining Laplanche
and Pontalis's notion of the "original fantasy," in which "the subject... is
himself represented as participating in [a] scene, although in the earliest
forms of fantasy, he cannot be assigned any fixed place in [that scene]."41
But ultimately the child connects fantasy to external reality—or, put an-
other way, creates external reality out of fantasy—by the process of fixing
identifications. In potential space (play or art), there is a dynamic of identi-
12 Misogynous Economies
fication and disidentification, introjection of a (loved) object and projection
or expulsion of the (hated) abject. Finally the play of identifications ceases:
the fixing of identification marks the child's move out of the potential space
that contains a combination of hallucinated self-objects and real objects
(52) and into a shared reality or intersubjectively constructed world.42 The
cessation of play is temporary, of course; child and reader can eventually
begin playing again.
What can be said of play and fantasy can be said of reading literature.
"Literariness" is a valuable quality in texts that allows reading to be a "play-
ground" for adults in which, like children playing cowboys, one is invited
to engage in multiple identifications, to switch from one to another (white
to black hat) and back again at various moments. Such play reveals the
nature of identification itself: "[identification is the phantasmatic staging
of [a desired] event. In this sense, identifications belong to the imaginary;
they are phantasmatic efforts of alignment, loyalty, ambiguous and cross-
corporeal cohabitation;... Identifications are never fully and finally made;
they are incessantly reconstituted and, as such, are subject to the volatile
logic of iterability. They are that which is constantly marshaled, consoli-
dated, retrenched, contested, and, on occasion, compelled to give way."43
Identifications are unstable and discursive, dependent upon "iterability," as
good literature reveals. A text is literary (i.e., it counts as good literature)
insofar as it constitutes potential space, a playground: features of that text
allow a reader to identify with multiple positions rather than getting stuck
in any one position.44 By identificatory positions in a text, I do not necessar-
ily mean "characters." Reading is a matter of identifying with positions
generated by a sentence: one considers oneself as able to utter such a sen-
tence, or the one who listens to it, or the one whom it addresses. Multiple
points of identification constitute multiple possibilities of interpretation. As
Diana Fuss puts it, there is a "play of identification in every act of interpre-
tation."45
Literariness is a structure in text allowing people to explore and play
with identities, try them all on. The pleasure of reading comes from the
mobility of identifications, from moving from one to another, back, moving
onto a third position, and so forth. What Butler says of people actually
applies much more to texts: "Identifications are multiple and contestatory,
and it may be that we desire most strongly those individuals [those texts!]
who reflect in a dense and saturated way the possibilities of multiple and
simultaneous substitutions."46 Mobility of identifications is generated by
structures in a text promoting such substitutions, but multiple identifica-
tions must be actuated by an economy of reading—by the way a reader
invests her interest, allowing or prohibiting the play of substitutions.47 This
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book discusses two economies of reading, two ways that readers move
through texts, which are related to the ways that affect moves when some-
one fantasizes.
The first reading economy resembles what a person does when having a
sadomasochistic fantasy. In "A Child Is Being Beaten," Freud describes sa-
domasochistic fantasies that all human beings have at a certain stage of
development. If we forget the element of pain operating in sadomasochism
and think about it instead as the name for an economic system, then "sado-
masochism" names an economic structure that differs from getting and spend-
ing, from credit and debit; it names an economy of unmitigated expenditure.
This economic organization describes a reader's investment in texts in which
literariness operates: the reader invests in one identification, then another,
then another, without getting any investment back; the reader continually
spends by expending interest. People get pleasure from literariness in the
same way as does the person who fantasizes a sadomasochistic scene, de-
scribed by Freud: from continuously shifting "perspective"—or to put it in
formal terms, from continuously imagining oneself as the one who is writ-
ing and/or addressed by specific sentences in a text, and then other specific
sentences that contest the former, and then others, and so on. To say "get
pleasure from" is, however, to misconstrue the sadomasochistic economy:
pleasure is not a return on the investment; it comes from the activity of
spending or investing psychic energy, from expending interest.
Literariness is indeed a structure like that described by Freud as the struc-
ture of sadomasochistic fantasies. It can be found in texts that offer mul-
tiple positions for a reader to identify with and that encourage the reader to
move from one to another. But literariness cannot be seen as "contained"
by a text; it has to do with the capacity of the reader as much as it does with
opportunities provided by a text. A text can proffer an identification and
nudge a reader toward it through discernible formal means, but it is up to
the reader to take the offer and move into a new position.
Whether a reader is willing to take an invitation to move from one iden-
tification to another is not a personal matter. It is instead a matter of ideo-
logical pressures. Literariness, or the playful mobility of identifications, begins
to be shut down when "literature" comes into existence as an object. It is
well known that the word "literature" meant book learning even up to the
1790s when The Life of Samuel Johnson was first published: Boswell could
still say "he had literature" and not mean "he had books on his shelves"
but rather "he was learned."48 The eighteenth century transforms literature
from a process, the activity of learning, into a thing that one can buy. When
faced with the question of what prevents readers from enjoying literariness,
we can say that it is, in fact, because a text has become "literature," both
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commodity and disciplinary object. This reduction is easiest to see when
discussing a literary work with someone who wants to use it as cultural
capital, to be able to "ace" the test or impress people over cocktails: he
wants to know what the text is saying, not to discuss a myriad of possibili-
ties about what it might be saying. One has access to a text's literariness
when all of its contradictory meanings remain open and possible. But to
know a work of literature (to own it as cultural capital) means having mas-
tery of a (more or less) univocal meaning. For example, the answer on a test
to the question "Does Swift want to eat babies" is "No, 'A Modest Pro-
posal' satirizes English oppression of the Irish." But the "answer" that would
stand in for a process of reading "A Modest Proposal" would be "Yes, at
moments Swift and I (the reader) want to eat babies; at moments I identify
with that position and enjoy its sadism; but also no, I do not want to eat
babies—I at moments identify with the author who is satirizing such a point
of view by exposing its sadism." The literariness of "A Modest Proposal"
consists in its capacity first to make it possible for a reader to identify with
certain things that the proposer says by undermining one's sense of differ-
ence from him, and second to make it possible for the reader to identify
with certain things said against him by augmenting difference. But the text's
capacity to shift the point of identification is nothing without the reader's
capacity to momentarily take up a position proffered by the text and then
move onto others, a capacity diminished by the desire to master the text.
Literature as a static object, a commodity or cultural capital, is distinct
from literariness itself. The transformation of texts into literature forecloses
on literariness, on the play of identities made possible formally within those
texts, and thus reduces their capacity to create potential space.
In addition to meeting the economic need for commodities and the disci-
plinary need for cultural capital, there were distinctively social pressures for
reducing literary play. Under a feudal socioeconomic structure and (more
or less) absolute monarchy, secure structural positions do not depend upon
the individuals who inhabit them. In contrast, under liberal, bourgeois, demo-
cratic capitalism, the individual defines through personal attributes the struc-
tural position that he or she can inhabit.49 Class climbing is possible through
self-improvement, as any reader of Pamela well knows. But such self-im-
provement was defined by the culture of bourgeois conduct manuals as dis-
covering and revealing one's own "inner worth" or true identity.50 When
the social structure is itself not rigid and therefore not secure, people ac-
quire a position in it by demonstrating their "inner worth" conceived of as
their essence: one achieves a new status by revealing what is alleged to be
one's own "real" identity. The new dispensation put pressure upon litera-
ture, upon its readers as well as its writers, to reduce the mobility of identi-
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fications in a text because such play is too threatening to the secure estab-
lishment of identity: according to Fuss, "at the very same time that identifi-
cation sets into motion the complicated dynamic of recognition and
misrecognition that brings a sense of identity into being, it also immediately
calls that identity into question."51 When status is secured by occupying a
position, the play of identities is welcome. When status depends upon an
allegedly fixed identity, such play is intolerable. Class mobility, a defining
attribute of bourgeois society, is hostile to the mobility of identifications in
literature. Bourgeois persons operate under the imperative that play be real:
all the signs of identity they perform in order to claim a certain status must
be signs of a real, underlying fact.
The desire to pin down the play of identities, a capitalist desire, did in
fact stimulate bad writing such as George Lillo's London Merchant: the
play so much insists upon readers identifying with one position in the text,
that of the thoroughly good merchant "Thorowgood," that it is in fact more
like propaganda than literature. But the pressure to limit play did not al-
ways or even necessarily affect writers—I am not arguing that, in 1757,
authors began to mumble to themselves while at their writing desks, "OK,
there has to be only one good guy in the text." Although literariness is a
structural attribute, it is one that can be activated only by readers. We could
almost go so far as to say that literariness is not "in" the text; if it is "in"
anything, it is in various readings of texts. According to this view, The Lon-
don Merchant is propaganda only insofar as we reduce its ambiguities when
reading it. Readers gain full access to the literariness of a text when partici-
pating in a reading economy that is sadomasochistic in structure: it involves
the complete expenditure of reading effort without being given any return,
any paraphrase as to what the text "says" that is itself salable or that can be
converted into that admiration for one's acquirements essential to class climb-
ing and identity for the bourgeoisie, as well as to the profession of litera-
ture.52 The pleasure generated by this sadomasochistic economy comes not
from a return on an investment but from the activity of spending itself.
Raymond Williams sees "the aesthetic," one of the "great modern ideo-
logical systems," as housing two ways of thinking about the work of art,
first as "process" and second as "instance." "The making of art," he says,
"is always a formative process," and indeed some aesthetic discourse about
great art sees it as such, as "experience, immediate feeling . . . newly gener-
alized and assembled."53 In the terms developed here, seeing the aesthetic
object as process requires a reading practice that is sadomasochistic in its
economic structure. Much canonical literature has the capacity to sustain a
sadomasochistic reading economy, but canonical literature has very often
not been read that way; often it has been read, to put it in Williams's terms,
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as "instance," as a finished product. Reading literature as literature rather
than to activate its literariness—reading it as a commodifiable and exhaus-
tively knowable object—such reading participates in another kind of
economy and produces another kind of pleasure, one that is sadistic in struc-
ture. The second, sadistic reading economy is of the same sort of structure
as that which produces economic capital. It is a pleasure that comes from
getting back more than you spend, the pleasure of dispossessing another of
a good that one wants.
Early in the eighteenth century, misogyny is a representational structure
that is used to activate a text's literariness, to make it OK and even good for
a reader to engage in multiple identifications. Why misogyny? At the mo-
ment historically when it is becoming necessary to fix woman conceptually
as utterly, disgustingly other, she is not yet quite seen as absolutely different.
People can still see the figure of any one gender as not absolutely excluding
the other.54 That is, a figure in a text can be female and still encourage a
male reader to identify with her, but "secretly," as it were. People consciously
see men as different from women even at this moment, when in cultural
fantasy gender distinctions are not so firm. Misogyny superficially hides
while structurally keeping open the play of identifications offered by a text.
Misogyny therefore usefully protects literariness at a moment when it is
threatened by ideological pressures.
However, as the century progresses, gender difference becomes more and
more fixed.55 Essentializing, transforming gender from a figure into a word
with a literal referent (female anatomy), renders misogyny a representa-
tional strategy that is no longer capable of preserving the literariness of
texts. Gender no longer secretly conveys a reader to another identity but
rather blocks a reader's identification. That is, once woman is seen as essen-
tially different from man, the reader of a text representing the figure of
woman can now completely deny any similarity between a male (or male-
identified) reader and a female figure or passive position in a text. This new
sadistic economy is not a feature of the text—that is, texts are still literary
in structure. But misogynous representations begin to be read in a way that
reduces the figure of gender to a literal referent, prohibits the reader's desire
for cross-gender identification ("cross-corporeal cohabitation," as Butler
puts it),56 and thereby fixes the meaning of a text as univocal.
To summarize, then: early in the century, misogynous representations
serve to keep open the play of identifications or the literariness of a text;
later in the century, misogynous representations work in a sadistic economy.
Although some propagandistic texts do not in fact allow readers to identify
with multiple positions in the text, this shift from one reading economy to
another is more a matter of reading practices than it is a matter of a change
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in the structure of misogynous texts themselves. If this shift in reading prac-
tices has indeed occurred, then that means that we read early-eighteenth-
century misogyny in a way that it was not read during the time it was written.
As demonstrated fully in chapter 1, Swift, Dry den, and Pope did not read
their own and each other's satires in the same way that we read them now.
Seeing their satires as literature, as commodities and disciplinary objects,
has involved suppressing the literariness of those texts, and we can see that
suppression in the history of literary criticism about misogynous satire.
However, we can read as did Pope and Swift. We can as readers activate
literariness and participate in a sadomasochistic economy that resists rather
than promotes the oppressiveness latent in Enlightenment thought. We can
read like Pope and Swift only by employing a feminist method. Am I here
calling contemporary feminist readings of eighteenth-century literature sa-
domasochistic? No. But feminist readings can restore to texts the indetermi-
nate structure of identifications characteristic of sadomasochistic fantasies.57
The treatment of misogyny in this book is distinctive from all other works
on eighteenth-century misogyny insofar as it presumes that misogyny is not
at all natural, that it is not even a natural response to historical moments
during which women demand equality or in other ways try to usurp patriar-
chal power.58 It is necessary for feminists to maintain that misogyny is plea-
surable to men because of what it is used to do rather than because men
naturally hate women: only if overcoming the desire to oppress women is
possible can we imagine a society in which antifeminism would be eradi-
cated. The necessity of maintaining such a stance is not so much moral or
political as it is methodological. That is, what Georg Lukacs says about
"realism" applies to criticism that attempts to realistically portray history.
According to Lukacs, "the possibility of realism . . . is bound up with that
minimal hope of change for the better offered by bourgeois society."59 Only
hope for the better will inspire historians to take subaltern points of view as
well as dominant ones into their account of reality. I personally believe that
misogyny can be abolished, that it is unnatural, and that it persists only for
the ideological purposes that it serves. But even if those things are not true,
assuming that misogyny can be eradicated is a good method: adopting that
assumption produces a more "realistic" history, as defined by Lukacs, of
eighteenth-century literature.
To say that misogyny preserves literariness in the face of emergent ide-
ologies designed to destroy it (chapter 1) and that misogynous representa-
tions can serve even feminist purposes (chapter 4) is not to see misogyny as
good. As chapter 1 argues in greater detail, we circumscribe the rhetorical
power of misogynous representations by misreading them as about real
women rather than as literary structures; we read sadistically if we do not
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see that the figure of woman is a transfer point in a text, a place for affect to
come to and depart from. Thus misogynous representations serve many
functions, both good and bad. But no matter what function such represen-
tations perform, they do indeed have invidious effects on the world. They
promote misogynous culture. It is only within the context of a misogynous
culture that misogynous representations can be used to serve good as well
as bad causes: if sexism were abolished, the rhetorical effects described here
would have to be achieved another way.
Whether misogynous representations are used in the service of good or
bad politics, they have very real and deleterious effects in culture at large,
effects that are themselves unaltered by an analysis such as this one in which
misogyny is shown to be not about women but about something else. But
this kind of analysis can affect reading practices in the field of eighteenth-
century studies that tend to monumentalize (if not valorize) misogyny by
presuming it to be "natural." Whether we read misogyny as only an at-
tempt to demean women or as also an attempt to come to terms viscerally
with socioeconomic changes depends upon us. Only a feminist analysis of
misogyny reveals to us that such aggression has been aggravated and har-
nessed to perform cultural work necessary for an emerging dominant order;
such an analysis thereby allows us to redirect eighteenth-century writers'
anger to its proper target.
This book shows how virulently misogynous representations evoke the
affect of disgust and induce abjection in order to establish crucial ideologi-
cal differences: between entrepreneurship and competitive jousting (chapter
2), between the profiteering man of business and immoral greediness (chap-
ter 3), between canonical literature and works of passing historical interest
(chapter 5). Ideological success usually involves artistic failure: chapters 2
and 3 show misogyny operating in its most virulent, sadistic form; here
misogyny shuts down play through the kind of abjection that establishes
gender distinctions. However, as chapter 1 shows, abjection can also struc-
ture texts that are, ideologically speaking, failures because literary in struc-
ture. Often theorists of "phantasmatic identification" envision the abject
only as that which one disidentifies from.60 But as Kristeva specifies, abjection
is a process that occurs when distinctions are being established and when
they are breaking down.61 If certain eighteenth-century texts are read, as
they should be, using a sadomasochistic reading economy, they can be seen
to deploy misogyny in order to keep open the play of figural substitutions:
here abjection dissolves gender distinctions, thereby facilitating a greater
mobility of identifications.62 In this case, the reader first refuses to identify
with a filthy female figure but then is brought to a "narcissistic crisis" as
sexual difference that distinguishes him from the filthy figure breaks down.
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Abjection, the affect of disgust aroused at the dissolution of difference and
the failure to sustain an ideal, is especially visible in Swift's scatological
satire, when Cassinus has gone too insane to clean himself after defecating,
and so with "embrowned" legs himself, madly raves in horror at the fact
that "Celia shits."63
Abjection is a kind of disgust or hatred one feels during a process of
projection and exclusion that erects distinctions. It is also what one feels
and undergoes at the moment when these distinctions are disintegrating. As
Mary Jacobus puts it in a review of Powers, "the casting out or 'abjecting'
of the mother [involves] in Kristeva's terms the radical exclusion of what
threatens to collapse all distinctions between the self and other."64 Such
radical exclusion is necessary only when "the collapse of all distinctions" is
imminent. Disgust with someone is a last-ditch effort to proclaim that per-
son different from oneself, a use of affect to construct a perceptual and
cognizable difference. Differences often come undone in those moments when
they are first being put in place because they are not strong or conventional
or commonsensical enough to withstand scrutiny.
Swift's and Pope's satires contain the rhetorical process of abjection be-
cause they undo differences and deflate ideals. I suggest in the following
chapter that we have reduced the threat to our ideological constructs by the
way we read Augustan satire: in Swift's and Pope's writings, abjection marks
the undoing of distinctions; in the way that these texts have been made
readable as canonical literature—viz., in the way they have been rendered
morally respectable—we turn that abjection around and make it success-
fully work to erect difference. The modern reader doggedly shores up those
distinctions not quite upheld in these early modern satires.
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1Misogyny and Literariness
Dryden, Pope, and Swift
Literary pleasure comes from texts that are structured sadomasochistically.
While such an idea is rather easy to believe about early antifeminist satires,
this sadomasochistic structure can be found in all types of eighteenth-cen-
tury texts representing women. Both idealizing and satiric eighteenth-cen-
tury poems encourage the reader to identify with many positions in the text,
passive and active, sadistic and masochistic. Often professional readers of
early-eighteenth-century satire have tried to convince themselves that the
satiric is nothing like the passive satiric object. And yet there are moments
when satirist and object become identical. If the satirist at moments re-
sembles the person or character trait that he satirizes, then we as readers
would be encouraged by that resemblance to shift from identifying with
him to identifying with the object satirized. Whereas later canonizing read-
ers disavow similarities between satirist and object in order to reduce the
play of identifications stimulated by these texts, a satiric persona is por-
trayed in early-eighteenth-century texts as "bawdy" thereby is made to re-
semble the satiric object. In Dryden's translation of Juvenal's Sixth Satire,
for instance, woman is attacked for her lasciviousness by a plainly lascivi-
ous narrative voice. Early-eighteenth-century satires structurally push read-
ers toward making multiple identifications, so that the desire among
twentieth-century literary critics to see the satirist as "the good guy," to
fixate upon one point of identification in the text, betrays a change from
sadomasochistic to sadistic reading practices. These practices have stimu-
lated a kind of tunnel vision: it is easy for us to see the masochism in blason
love poetry (a male speaker dies for the love of an ideal woman), and easy
to see the sadistic treatment of women in satiric deflations of love poetry,
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but it has not been so easy for us to see the sadism in idealizing poetry and
the masochism in the satiric. Our reading practices, in other words, have
rendered invisible one half of the sadomasochistic structure of both kinds.
Misogyny in the Ideal
Feminist analyses of lyric poetry have shown that ideal portraits of women
in the lyric are themselves misogynous. Ellen Pollak, Mary Poovey, and
Margaret Doody have all argued, for different reasons, that idealizing women
constrains and denigrates them.1 As feminists are beginning to discover, the
pleasure imparted by ideal representations resembles satiric pleasure in star-
tling ways. Barbara Johnson has analyzed the male masochism inherent in
ideal portraits of women in the Petrarchan tradition.2 Nancy Vickers has
analyzed the sadism inherent in descriptions of ideal beauty.3 In fact, ideal-
istic portrayals of women provide sadomasochistic pleasure. The blason,
the love poem idealizing parts of a woman's body, offers the same kind of
pleasure, though through slightly different mechanisms, as do early-eigh-
teenth-century satiric denigrations of women.
It is usually assumed that male satirists represent "the female monster"
or the grotesque female body to express fear of female sexual appetites and
needs,4 and conversely, that idealized portraits of women represent "self-
less, sexless" women for the sake of constraining female desire.5 The lustful
woman was satirized, the asexual woman idealized. As Marlene LeGates
puts it, "[t]he misogyny which had characterized traditional satire and philo-
sophical thought from the ancient Greeks through the seventeenth century
was replaced by the eighteenth-century version of the Cult of True Woman-
hood."6 With the rise of "domestic virtue,"7 satire became less popular.
However, although many critics are able to explain the function of the
ideal of virtuous, sexless woman, they do not explain why this ideal was
attractive either to women or to men. What is enjoyable about ideal represen-
tations? Why do people desire to be virtuous women, or to have them as
wives? We cannot assume that an ideal becomes desirable simply by being
represented. As Charlotte Sussman says in her discussion of Armstrong's work,
" [Armstrong's] crucial insight into the mechanics of novel-carried ideology
would benefit from a more rigorous account of how 'virtually anyone' was
interpellated into the subject position of the 'domestic woman.' How, for
instance, were novel heroines, and their readers, made to desire this particu-
lar 'gratification'?"8 That the representation of ideal femininity serves a so-
cial or economic or political function, that the middle class defines itself
around it,9 or that it helps separate private and public economic realms,10
does not explain why readers enjoy it nor why it has ideological force.
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We assume that ideal representations just are desirable and enforceable
and so assume that satire is appealing because it deflates or parodies the
ideals society forces us to care about: Swift's dressing-room poems are en-
joyable, it seems, because they present "a parody of the idealization of the
sex"11 and "the deflation of romantic stereotypes and sentimental literary
conventions";12 they give us temporary relief from the values society forces
on us.13 In fact, the opposite is true: ideal representations are appealing only
because they bear an obvious relation to parodies of them.
To begin with, parody does not provide relief from literary or social con-
ventions; on the contrary, such conventions are not even recognizable until
they have been parodied. Critics insist that the coupling of ideal and pa-
rodic portraits is "accidental," but that is not true: every Romance of the
Rose must have its Jean de Meung: the blason was not defined as a genre
until after the appearance of Jean de Tournes's ironic contre-blasons.14 As
Paul Salzman puts it, "one cannot see anti-romance as an attempt to de-
stroy or refute romance"; "it is quite wrong to see romance and anti-ro-
mance as in some way mutually exclusive."15
But parody sustains ideal representations in an even more essential way
than simply providing an ironic ground for the ideal figure. In a purely
morphological way, ideal representations of woman are inherently violent
in the same way that satires of woman are violent. Both chop up women's
bodies, as is suggested by the fact that the name "anatomy" has been ap-
plied to both. The first collection of blasons, written by Clement Marot,
Maurice Sceve, Saint Gelais, and others, was published under the title Blasons
anatomiques du corps feminin (written 1536, collected 1543) precisely be-
cause each poem described one body part, a foot, or a tooth, and in Marot's
famous poem the breast. Satires on women were also called "anatomies,"16
but in this case dissection reveals their hypocrisy rather than the "delicious-
ness" of their parts. Thus, idealizations and parodies perform the same pro-
cedure, but with what are apparently different results.
I say "apparently" because in fact the results are not different. The rose
is very often used in carpe diem poetry to threaten women with the loss of
their beauty: they should comply with men's wishes now while they are
young "buds" because they will soon become "blown" blossoms.17 Yet the
rose metaphor cloaks threats beyond the mere onset of old age. This can be
seen in George Etherege's "To a Very Young Lady":
Sweetest bud of Beauty, may
No untimely frost decay
Th'early glories, which we trace,
Blooming in thy matchless face;
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But kindly opening, like a Rose,
Fresh beauties every day disclose,
Such as by Nature are not shewn
In all the blossoms she has blown:
And then, what conquest shall you make,
Who hearts already dayly take?
Scorcht in the Morning with thy beams,
How shall we bear those sad extreams
Which must attend thy threatening eyes
When thou shalt to thy Noon arise?18
The speaker's masochism is most evident in these lines: he has been "scorcht"
and taken. Not so evident, however, is their sadism. If one pictures what is
being done to the rose as being done to the lady, this poem threatens vio-
lence: "Nature" stands by ready to pull off all her petals (to undress her, or
to disfigure her?) if the young lady unkindly refuses to "open" up her "beau-
ties" to this man.
In "Beauties Periphrasis" (written in 1674, published in 1683), Thomas
Shipman parodies the conventional metaphors used to describe woman in
sonnets and blasons, and thereby brings out some of the violence and hu-
miliation latent in these metaphors. As Shipman's parody shows, the meta-
phor of nature opening the rose can be used by the poet to defend taking off
his lady's clothes:
Her Garments I will first disclose;
Then naked lay my blushing Queen,
The same procedure has the Rose;
First Leaves, and then the Bud is seen.1'
In the second line of this stanza, the poet has elided "I will": he will "na-
ked lay [his] blushing Queen" after stripping her. This line thus elides the
agency that is itself being elided through use of the rose metaphor. The
metaphor conceals the agent of violence, naturalizing it and making it
seem blameless: the "rose" is not "opened" by a rapist, but rather "natu-
rally" opens of its own accord.20 If one pictures what happens to the rose
happening to a woman, one can see the violence inherent in the metaphor.
Idealized portraits of women impart the very pleasure proffered by mi-
sogynous satires insofar as they both depict violence perpetrated upon
women's bodies. Furthermore, just as Etherege's love poem contains both
sadism and masochism, satires generate pleasure—not through sadism
alone—but through a slippage in which the aggressor becomes identified
with the object of attack.
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Misogyny in Satire
In an early article, Felicity Nussbaum presumes that satiric representations of
women provide a check on lust, that they work as a kind of remedia amoris,
"an antidote to the madness of love."21 Yet these satires gave all readers, male
and female alike, a great deal of pleasure.22 Rather than discouraging male
desire, misogynous attacks present sadomasochistic fantasies just like the
fantasy "a child is being beaten" described by Freud, in which gender differ-
ences serve only to distinguish the onlooker from the group of children
being beaten. In "the third phase" of the fantasy of a child being beaten, as
Freud describes it, there are many indeterminacies that match the indeter-
minacies of scatological satires on women: the person doing the beating
(satirizing) is unknown, and the onlooker (reader) does not definitely iden-
tify with any one position in the fantasy, beater (satirist) or beaten (satiric
object). Identifications are more mobile than that. In "the third phase,"
[t]he person beating is never the father, but is either left undetermined . . . , or
turns in a characteristic way into a representative of the father, such as a
teacher. The figure of the child who is producing the beating-phantasy no
longer itself appears in it. In reply to pressing inquiries the patients only de-
clare: "I am probably looking on." Instead of the one child that is being
beaten, there are now a number of children present as a rule. Most frequently
it is boys who are being beaten (in girl's phantasies), but none of them is
personally known to the subject. The situation of being beaten, which was
originally simple and monotonous, may go through the most complicated
alterations and elaborations; and punishments and humiliations of another
kind may be substituted for beating itself. But the essential characteristic [of
this phase]... is this: the phantasy now has a strong and unambiguous sexual
excitement attached to it.23
The pleasure of this fantasy comes from mobility of identifications: the
fantasist identifies with no one position, or with all of them; the source of
the violence is unknown, as the passive construction "being beaten" sug-
gests.24 The gender switch—a male audience watches the humiliation of
women (satire), or a female audience the humiliation of men (Freud's fan-
tasy)—simply serves to keep identifications mobile.
As some recent work on satire suggests, satire characteristically encour-
ages the reader to suspect that the satirist or beater has a great deal in com-
mon with his satiric object and is thus in his very diatribes being beaten
rather than beating. The satirist or attacker often appears as a character in
the poem (thus more properly referred to as a satiric persona) and is identi-
fied by the poem with the satiric object.25 Thus in Swift's "Cassinus and
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Peter: A Tragical Elegy," Cassy—Celia's satiric attacker who cries out in
despair,"Oh! Celia, Celia, Celia shits"—appears in the poem and is identi-
fied with the very Celia who disgusts him. Peter finds Cassy straddling "His
Jordan," his legs "well embrowned with dirt and hair."26 Therefore, Cassy
is horrified at Celia for being "embrowned" like he is. Even the reader is
implicated: insofar as the reader is horrified by the excrement described by
the poem, the reader is like Cassy, who is like Celia.27 The reader's identifi-
cation with Cassinus and also, because Cassinus is made similar to Celia,
with Celia herself renders completely ambiguous who is being beaten.
The same kind of ambiguity occurs in the blasons and sonnets idealizing
women, discussed above. Nancy Vickers sees ideal descriptions of women
as containing within them the threat of dismemberment because of castra-
tion anxiety. Cathy Yandell analyzes Beranger de La Tour's "Blason du
miroir" as an "only partially successful" attempt to "reassemble, through a
complete image of the lady in the mirror, the dismembered body of the
blasons anatomiques."2S The blasons by Marot and Sceve anatomize or dis-
member the female body, and La Tour tries but fails to unite them in a
mirror image. In discussing the sixteenth-century Italian vernacular ekphrastic
tradition, the "detailed presentation of the individual perfections of women,"
Elizabeth Cropper marvels that "the conventional description of the beauti-
ful woman became so closely identified with a lyric poet who never painted
her complete portrait."29 The blason gives us only female body parts; the
woman is more "beautiful" in pieces than she is whole.
However, the threats to male integrity come not from a male father fig-
ure, but rather, Barbara Johnson argues, from the very aggressive female
"object" being described: "The image of being the prey rather than the
hunter, the penetrated rather than the penetrator, would seem to pervade
the Petrarchan figuration not of femaleness but of maleness."30 It is for that
reason that Johnson calls male masochism "the secret that it is lyric poetry's
job to keep" (176). Analyzing the violence inherent in ideal descriptions in
courtly-love poems as male-to-male violence, as the threat of castration,
helps keep masochism a secret by transforming it into the aggression of the
father. In fact, the threat of dismemberment is something "earlier" than
castration, the aggressivity of part-objects described by Kristeva as abjection:
the poet is threatened by parts of the mother-woman's body that threaten to
devour him, the body that he himself has dismembered for the sheer plea-
sure of oral gratification;31 such pleasure was called "primary masochism"
by Laplanche in an early work, designating a kind of sadomasochistic plea-
sure that precedes object-relations.32
But if the positions with which a reader can identify are ambiguously
sadistic and masochistic in satire and in ideal portraits of women, it is diffi-
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cult to imagine that all Augustan misogynous satires collapse the distinction
between satirist (or satiric persona, the "satirist" who appears as a character
in the poem) and satiric object and thereby represent a sadomasochistic scene
in which readers can participate. Since, in the case of satire, the moral outrage
that we share with the satirist is what invites us to identify with him, it is
difficult to imagine that satiric poems, especially scatological satire, impart
pleasure through enabling a fantasmatic identification with the satiric object.
Yet one can argue that moral outrage is only ever pleasurable insofar as the
outraged person "secretly" identifies with the object of his rage.
Satiric Pleasure
John Guillory has called literature a quintessentially bourgeois object.33 And,
as Stallybrass and White amply show, in becoming a "high" rather than a
merely popular form, English literature had to become more respectable.34
For example, many miscellanies produced during the long eighteenth cen-
tury are entitled The Ladies Miscellany: during the Restoration and early in
the century, this title designates collections designed to seduce women;35
toward the end of the century, it designates those designed to instruct women
in virtue.36 With the bourgeoisification of literature, poetry is desexualized.
In the 1690s, before the bourgeois movement of the reformation of man-
ners begins, Dry den published his "Discourse concerning the Original and
Progress of Satire,"37 a work that is almost impossible to read because it points
to the fact that satire is sexually titillating and simultaneously tries to desexu-
alize it, to represent it as motivated by purely moral, asexual concerns. After
distinguishing between the virtuous satirist and the immoral libeler, Dryden
spends no fewer than twenty tedious pages arguing that satire did not origi-
nate in Greece: one immediately wonders, What could possibly be at stake?
Why does Dryden try so hard to dissociate satire from the Satyr (the half-
man, half-goat god), the Greeks, and drama itself (Greek comedy)? The Satyr
was lascivious, as British satirists who associated themselves with it well knew;38
Greeks were associated with voluptuous heterosexual sexuality,39 and theater
was, of course, associated in the 1690s with libertinism. In dissociating satire
from the Greek origins imputed to it, Dryden tries to separate the pristine
rustic whose moral outrage is justified from the lascivious goat who attacks
for pleasure; he wants to distinguish the legitimate "Reprehension of Vices"
from the questionable "License" of Greek feasts.40 But Dryden's repudiation
of the sexiness of satire is not confined to the Progress. He also suppressed
from his translation of Juvenal's Sixth some clearly pornographic verses, in-
cluding passages in which urination either figures ejaculation or is taken to be
a sexually stimulating act in itself.41
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Dryden's "Progress" is nonetheless ambivalent. It sets up Juvenal as hon-
est and serious, unlike Horace, who was himself not virtuous enough to
lash great vices42 and unlike Persius, who though chaste and modest him-
self, too often enjoyed the "Crime" of being "broad and fulsom" in his
attacks (4:52). The "business" of satire, Dryden says, is "to Reform great
Vices," and Juvenal takes the palm in this task since he himself is virtuous
enough to attack them and since he "lashes" them with the greatest vehe-
mence (4:62, 65, 68). Juvenal causes the most pain, involved as he is in "the
slovenly Butchering of a Man," and on that account Dryden contrasts him
with Horace, who can "make a Malefactor die sweetly" (4:71). One would
imagine, then, that Horace gives more pleasure; but a few pages later, Juvenal
finally wins the contest as best satirist because he gives the most intense
pleasure (4:73): Juvenal gives the most pain, and thus the most intense plea-
sure. Dryden describes the pleasure imparted by satire as sexual pleasure in
a passage where he shows his preference for Juvenal: "[T]he Delight which
Horace gives me, is but languishing. . . . He may Ravish other Men, but I
am too stupid and insensible to be tickl'd.... [H]is Wit is faint; and his Salt,
if I may dare to say so, almost insipid. Juvenal is of a more vigorous and
Masculine Wit, he gives me as much Pleasure as I can bear: he fully satisfies
my Expectation" (4:63). If one were to replace in this passage "Masculine
Wit" with "sexual prowess"—a substitution encouraged by the word "Salt,"
which connotes sexual energy—one would have a description of who is
better at giving the reader sexual pleasure.
The same kind of substitution can be performed in Pope's description of
satire in Epilogue to the Satires, where, if one substitutes "penis" for
"Weapon," satirizing becomes a (mono)sexual act:
O sacred Weapon! left for Truth's defence,
Sole Dread of Folly, Vice, and Insolence!
To all but Heav'n-directed hands deny'd,
The Muse may give thee, but the Gods must guide.
Rev'rent I touch thee! but with honest zeal;
To rowze the Watchmen of the Publick Weal,
To Virtue's Work provoke the tardy Hall,
And goad the Prelate slumb'ring in his Stall.43
I believe most readers will feel that it is irreverent for me to insinuate that
this passage is an allegory of masturbation. But if this passage inspires rev-
erence, that "awe" has been manufactured, I would like to suggest, pre-
cisely by institutionalized, disciplinary literary histories within which Popean
and Swiftean satire have always made an uneasy fit.
One could summarize a dominant trend in the criticism of Pope and Swift,
28 Misogynous Economies
from their own time through the New Criticism, this way: Pope is proud,
Swift clinically insane. Those who voice this criticism, however, are not sim-
ply those who read their poems. The "adversaries" (as they are called in de-
scriptions of classical satire) are the interlocutors in satires by Pope and Swift
and say the same things about the main, satiric personae of these poems as we
say about Pope and Swift. The "Friend" who ends Pope's Dialogue II with
"Alas! Alas! pray end what you began, / And write next winter more Essays
on Man" (254-55) might have been an editor of the Norton anthology that
contains the Essay on Man but not the Epilogue to the Satires. The friend
admonishes P. by rendering P.'s probity suspect, to say the least: "You're
strangely proud," says the Adversary to "P." (205). P.'s pride is "strange"
because the friend does not know why P. considers it his duty to vituperate
bad, sycophantic verse, nor why such vituperation has to be formulated in
scatological images: "Hold Sir! for God's-sake, where's th'Affront to you? /
. . . / This filthy Simile, this beastly line, / Quite turns my stomach" (157,
181-82). Why doesn't it turn yours? the Friend insinuates. Does P. wish to
attack using scatological imagery, or does he merely wish to use that imag-
ery, reveling in it as do the bad writers described in the Dunciadl
In Swift's "Cassinus and Peter: A Tragical Elegy," Peter introduces
Cassinus's horrific revelation (that "Celia shits") with, "Dear Cassy, thou
must purge and bleed; / I fear thou wilt be mad indeed."44 Peter is thus the
first in a long line of eminent critics, from Lord Orrery to Middleton Murray,
who are horrified at "[t]he mad Irishman's wandering dirty thoughts."45
But the antagonistic position taken by readers of Dialogue II and "Cassinus
and Peter" is formulated in these poems by more than simply the adversarius.
Pope and Swift deliberately exaggerate their satiric personae in order to
make stick the Friend's and Peter's implicit charges against them; it is al-
most as if Pope and Swift were asking the Curlls, the Gildons, the Lord
Orrerys, the Fidelias, and other correspondents to the Gentleman's Maga-
zine—the critics of their time—to call Pope proud and Swift insane. One of
the first New Critics to point out that the satiric persona is constructed by
and thus not reducible to the satirist, Alvin Kernan, analyzes this exaggera-
tion.46 Given that Stallybrass and White are correct in seeing Augustan sat-
ire as the place where individual psyches, and thus individuals per se, were
first constructed, Kernan most aptly calls the excess or obsessiveness of the
satiric persona its "private personality": "[t]here is always . . . a darker side
to his nature, . . . which [makes] suspect his pose of a simple lover of plain
truth" (264). The satirist goes "beyond mere prurience"; "[t]he more effec-
tively he builds up catalogues of human vice, the more it will appear that he
is merely purveying salacious material to satisfy the meaner appetites of his
audience" (25). Or, one might add, his own.
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In answering the Friend's question as to why he satirizes bad writers, P.
of Dialogue II displays an egotism that strains belief:
Ask you what Provocation I have had?
The strong Antipathy of Good to Bad.
Yes, I am proud; I must be proud to see
Men not afraid of God, afraid of me.
(lines 197-98, 208-9)
The reader begins to realize that, although P. may not write verse to flatter
George II (as, he says, Henry Fox does [line 166]) nor to flatter Walpole (as
does Bubb Dodington [line 161]), he certainly writes to flatter himself. P. is
caught in an adolescent narcissism, imagining himself in an almost onanis-
tic fantasy to be the chosen scourge of God.
In contrast, the Cassinus of "Cassinus and Peter" epitomizes the mad-
man obsessed with excrement, inveighing against it with the most intense
fervor (Cassy wants to die because "Celia shits") and, at the same time,
adoring it, wallowing in it:
Scorched were [Cassy's] shins, his legs were bare,
But, well embrowned with dirt and hair.
His Jordan stood in manner fitting
Between his legs, to spew or spit in.47
Pope's pride and Swift's anal fixation are not only artificial constructs, prob-
lems and diseases that the poets gave to personae in their poems; these con-
structs are also incredibly heavy-handed. Kernan insists that we recognize
the satiric voice as a persona, that we not make it part of an author's biog-
raphy. And Maynard Mack tells us not to "overlook the distinction be-
tween the historical Alexander Pope and the dramatic Alexander Pope who
speaks" his poems.48 It is therefore unwise to read the "O Sacred Weapon"
passage as Pope's own serious proclamation of his satire's effect.
Thus, if substituting "penis" for "sacred Weapon" has no other effect
than restoring the playfulness to this satiric form (which, if not playfully
but seriously meant is not awe-inspiring or sublime but ridiculous), if it has
only the effect achieved by adding "in bed" to the end of each message
written for a fortune cookie, it restores to satire its original indetermina-
tion: the indistinguishability of satiric persona from satiric object; the sati-
rist, and any reader who identifies with him, is being satirized in these poems
as much as is the object of attack.
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Canonizing readers such as Maynard Mack do indeed at moments mis-
understand satire by seriously envisioning it as a "sacred Weapon" "To all
but Heav'n-directed hands deny'd."49 The dangers of taking these satirists
too seriously—that is, in pinning their identities down to those of their per-
sonae—is dramatically visible in Claude Rawson's analysis of Gulliver's
Travels. "One of [the] bleakest implications [of the Travels is] . . . that the
most thorough-going positive in the entire fiction [Houyhnhnm society] is
tartly established as outside human possibility."50 Rawson then speaks of
"the yawning failure of men to live like angels or even Houyhnhnms" (48)—
which, if one remembers that Houyhnhnms are horses, translates into "the
yawning failure of men to live like angels, or even horses." The playfulness
and indeterminacy subtracted from canonized satire can be partly restored
by recalling the context of Pope's allusion to quadrupeds—in the "sacred
Weapon" passage, he calls the prelate's room an ox's stall. To imagine that
the satirist speaking in the poem is Pope, or that Pope means the passage
seriously, is like believing that Swift condones rationalism in Gulliver's Travels
when he portrays rationalists as horses: everywhere in writing of the period,
horses (and oxen) are symbols of concupiscence.51
The satirists were not only "gloomy"; they were also bawdy. The por-
trayal of the satiric persona, the satirist or attacker, within a satire as mor-
ally righteous but suspect, as himself someone who resembles the object of
attack serves, precisely, to give sadomasochistic pleasure: by portraying the
satirist as a scourge who himself secretly identifies with the object he at-
tacks, the satire permits the reader to secretly identify with the object of the
satirist's attack. In early-eighteenth-century satire, indifferentiation between
satirist and satiric object therefore promotes sadism and masochism, the
possibility of identifying with any of the positions (attacker or attacked) in
a scenario of humiliation. Misogyny, engendering the attacked body as fe-
male, serves the same purpose as depicting a suspect satiric persona: it gives
male readers the opportunity for disidentification and simultaneous identi-
fication with the object of attack. The moment of disidentification with the
assaulted satiric object is the moment of moral outrage; identification is the
moment when one recognizes an inescapable similarity between the satiric
object and the outraged satirist with whom one has identified. The moment
of disidentification in misogynous representations involves abjection: the
assaulted object is a filthy materiality that is "not me" but "female."
"Me" in the preceding sentence is a male reader. But abjection can occur
for female readers as well—because nothing forces a reader to read like a
woman, least of all biology. That women can enjoy misogynous, scatologi-
cal satire suggests not that the gender switch is nonessential in the construc-
tion of fantasies, but that misogyny is a peculiarly literary sadomasochistic
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pleasure for which we have acquired a taste. In other words, misandry is
also pleasurable—according to Freud, quoted above, misandrous sadomas-
ochistic fantasies are most pleasurable for women. But if more men are read
than women, and men more often express sadomasochistic desire in mi-
sogynous literary representations than women writers do in misandrous lit-
erary representations, misogyny can thereby become a distinctively literary
pleasure.
Swift's dressing-room poems are not "poems that nauseated their readers
. . . to release men from passion and its attendant madness";52 rather, male
and female readers enjoyed misogynous scatology, and still do. In fact, rhe-
torical flourishes that point to enjoyment of the very misogyny being de-
nounced can be found throughout Sandra Gilbert's and Susan Gubar's
Madwoman in the Attic: there are moments when their text revels in its
own descriptions of "filthy femaleness."53 In other words, there are mo-
ments in The Madwoman in the Attic when it is not clear whether Gilbert
and Gubar are exposing a misogyny "hidden" in the text or whether they
are actually manufacturing misogyny for literary pleasure.54 At times in femi-
nist works, the exposure of misogyny and enjoyment of it are indistinguish-
able. Misogynous desires have been sanctioned and perhaps even instilled
by the high literary culture that has formed Gilbert's and Gubar's taste and
has taught them to write "interesting" and "appealing" prose.55
Literary pleasure comes from a sadomasochistic economy at work in both
lyric love poetry and satire. One feature of satire that makes it possible for
the reader to identify with multiple positions is the satirist's undermining of
the satiric persona: the satirist deliberately calls into question his "probity"
as scourge. If the satirist is deliberately portrayed as lascivious, then he is no
better than his object: he resembles what he attacks. Criticism denies such a
resemblance for the sake of reducing the text's play and thereby attempting
to fix who the reader identifies with. Structurally, Swift's satire pushes read-
ers toward multiple, contradictory identifications. Practically, we have fore-
closed on such identifications by seeing the satiric persona's self-righteousness
as justified rather than deluded.
There are three kinds of denial required for canonizing satire that I have
just discussed: (1) a denial that satire's misogynous representations are plea-
surable; (2) the denial that Augustan satire attempts to be bawdy; and (3)
most important, the denial that the bawdy satirist resembles his lascivious
satiric object. To admit the latter would require admitting that the pleasure
of satire comes from the extent to which our identifications with positions
in it can be mobile. Jean I. Marsden opens her essay "Ideology, Sex, and
Satire: The Case of Thomas Shadwell" with an excerpt from the prologue
to Shadwell's The Lancashire Witches:
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But [satiric] Poets and Young Girls by no mishaps
Are warn'd, . . .
Their former Itch will spite of all perswade,
And both will fall again to their old trade.
As Marsden points out, Shadwell here explicitly "link[s] the satiric urge to
female sexual desire."56 Despite passages in writings of the Restoration pe-
riod and the early eighteenth century that equate satire with the salt and
itch of sexual desire, literary criticism of canonical Augustan texts has, as
Rose Zimbardo claims, "cut the . . .  morally uplifting model for satire in
stone": "we have always had difficulty in trying to fit Swiftian satire to the
binary, moral-emendation model [of satire and] have usually solved the prob-
lem by assuming that Swift was far in advance of his time."57 The "morally
uplifting model" of satire has made satiric poetry by Pope much more ca-
nonical than that by Swift because Pope's satiric personae have been, de-
spite Alvin Kernan's best efforts, seen as less contaminated, as sharing fewer
of the attributes of the satiric object, than have Swift's.
Swift's satiric persona, or the point of view we are supposed to sympa-
thize with as readers, is typically contaminated. We are sometimes forced to
move out of it into another perspective. Edward Said credits Swift with "the
discovery of the intellect's madness" and sees in "Swift's mind" the "essen-
tial resistance to any fixed boundaries"; for Said this anarchy is fundamen-
tally at war with a Tory literary tradition and form.58 And one can see this
madness operating as identificatory instability in "An Argument against
Abolishing Christianity."59 The projector of "An Argument against Abol-
ishing Christianity" argues "for the retention of 'nominal' Christianity"60
so that the pamphlet itself argues the opposite (Swift's) view, which is that
society should retain "real" as opposed to "nominal" Christianity. How-
ever, when this projector argues against retaining "real" Christianity, he
argues too well:
To offer at the Restoring of ["of real Christianity"], would indeed be a wild
Project; it would be to dig up Foundations; to destroy at one Blow all the Wit,
and half the Learning of the Kingdom;... to ruin Trade, extinguish Arts and
Sciences with the Professors of them; in short, to turn our Courts, Exchanges
and Shops into Desarts: And would be full as absurd as the Proposal of Horace,
where he advises the Romans, all in a Body, to leave their City, and seek a
new Seat in some remote Part of the World, by Way of Cure for the Corrup-
tion of their Manners.61
The projector says, in effect, that "only a satirist would advocate a plan as
crazy as following real Christianity"; he attributes this idea to the writer of
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the satire who has constructed him. One cannot tell here whether Swift is
satirizing the projector or the projector is satirizing Swift. The projector,
who was supposed to be the satiric object, is winning in an argument against
the satiric persona: in order to know this, we have to be identifying with the
projector's point of view and therefore with the position of the satiric ob-
ject. The identification is temporary; in a moment, we will slip back into the
satirist's point of view.
I have shown that the mechanism by which readers procure literary plea-
sure from misogynous satire and idealizing lyrics is best explained by Freud's
"A Child Is Being Beaten." In my view, Freud's descriptions of how fantasy
works are not really about the operations of a timeless psyche but rather
about how reading practices established in the early modern period oper-
ate. We deny that misogyny is pleasurable because we are currently partici-
pating in a new, sadistic affective economy that requires reducing identifications
to one. Whether we choose to identify with assaulting satirists or attacked
women, such fixity is accompanied by moral outrage. The pleasures of
literariness, of the promiscuous mingling of identities in a scene of
indifferentiation, cede to the pleasure of sadism.
Abjection and Literature
The literariness of satire, I have argued, consists in the mobility of identifi-
cations for the reader. But the mobility of identifications resides not only in
the representation: the possibility for identifying with multiple positions
can be foreclosed by the reader. Insofar as we take seriously the gloomy
moral outrage proffered by the satiric persona in Pope's Dialogue II; and
further, insofar as we read misogynous satires as really about men's "natu-
ral" hatred of women—in both cases, we build a bulwark against identify-
ing with the satiric object. It is precisely those kinds of reading that canonizing
Augustan scatological satire has involved. In other words, turning Augustan
misogyny into a literary object has reduced its literariness.
For Pope and Swift, who did not see their satirists, their weapon-holders,
as sublime, moral outrage—the most violent way to proclaim oneself as
different from the outrageous object—does not work: in their satires, differ-
ences between moral satirist and immoral object of attack are done and
undone in a continual vacillating process. They wrote their satires, and prob-
ably expected us to read them, relying upon a sadomasochistic economy.
Those of us who have seen the satiric personae in their texts as "Pope" and
"Swift" themselves, and who have then read their satires as expressions of
disappointment with the world of politics or a secret hatred of women, are
reading according to a sadistic economy. For us, abjection works: we see
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them as successfully outraged, successfully abjecting. Insofar as we do so,
we reduce to nothing the literariness of their satires by putting a halt to the
play of indeterminate and incomplete identifications they proffer.
But the pleasure of indeterminacy is not forgone for nothing. The sadis-
tic pleasure that we get in exchange works this way: the reader sees that the
morally virtuous satirist is in fact identified with the morally impure object;
in a sadistic moment, the reader pulls away from that identification via self-
righteous differentiation. "The satirist and I are not ourselves promiscuous
as is a promiscuous woman; she is a disgusting slut, just like a piece of
'blown' meat hung up by the Butcher to attract flies."62 The amount of
hatred or disgust, the affect generated by misogyny, is what puts the distinc-
tion in place. That amount of affect is not "in" the text, but "in" the reader,
or, more truthfully, in the circumstances surrounding the reader that make
adamant differentiation so necessary.
The next two chapters analyze precisely those pressures put upon writers
and readers of texts to make a distinction, pressures I see as coming from
capitalism. I am going to analyze texts that are not canonical: Otway's Or-
phan, George Lillo's London Merchant, and Bernard Mandeville's Modest
Defence ofPublick Stews. Successful abjection makes texts canonical, and
two of these texts do indeed successfully project onto women morally re-
pugnant qualities of the capitalist businessman that are then disowned
through disgust. All three texts were immensely popular during the eigh-
teenth century, and Otway was considered until the beginning of the nine-
teenth century to be a playwright of national stature. But these works are
nonetheless rarely considered to be canonical texts. There are two reasons
why texts that perform the work of successfully idealizing the businessman
by abjecting women are not canonical. First, canonical literature is not capi-
talist propaganda. If it purveys capitalist ideology, as this book argues, it
does so only at the expense of a risk: canonical literature also provides a
place for dismantling the ideologies it contains. To the extent that Swift's
and Pope's satires are canonical, they are so because they have a sadomas-
ochistic structure capable of demystifying forms of conceptualization re-
quired by capitalism but are susceptible of being read sadistically, that is, in
accordance with capitalism's conceptual needs. Canonical texts offer the
possibility of identifying secretly with a satiric object while waging self-
righteous attack; noncanonical, propagandistic texts do not offer the possi-
bility of secret identification along with overt disidentification through moral
outrage. The two texts analyzed here that are structured sadistically,
Mandeville's Defence and Lillo's London Merchant, are not canonical be-
cause there is no sadomasochistic affective economy underlying the sadis-
tic. They contain, simply, the good (male businessman) and the bad (woman).
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Second, successful abjection depends upon a moment of identification
with the female figure that is then, in a subsequent moment of virulent
abjection, violently disavowed. As shown in the next chapter, using the fig-
ure of woman successfully as a scapegoat requires "animating" her to the
perfect degree: that is, the character must be animated or human enough to
attract some sympathy, but not so animate that one cannot violently abject
her, that is, disidentify with her via disgust and hatred that reduce her to the
monstrous or inhuman, a sheer thing. In she-tragedies, identification with
the heroine is easy; it is disidentification that has become problematic. The
amount of sympathy that readers will have for female figures is overde-
termined by structures in the text and the reader's capacity for identifica-
tion, depending upon socioeconomic pressures. Before the establishment of
a possessive market society is secure, abjection fails to promote sadistic
capitalist pleasures over the sadomasochistic pleasures enjoyed by the
knightly courtier. Otway's Orphan and she-tragedies in general evoke what
is for us too much passion for their heroines because the distinction be-
tween entrepreneur and courtier that abjecting such heroines would serve
to put in place could not be established. But also, what makes an eigh-
teenth-century reader just barely identify with a female figure could make
us identify with her whole hog: Millwood's feminism and Mandeville's femi-
nist statements, which were lures for identification to their readers and au-
ditors, are to us reasons for never relinquishing our identification with the
female figure.
36 Misogynous Economies
2Capitalism and Rape
Thomas Otway's The Orphan
Thomas Otway's The Orphan eroticizes rape by using it to figure specular
relations of power. The play renders rape appealing, represents it as procur-
ing sexual pleasure, while simultaneously using rape to figure competitive
business relations among entrepreneurs. The heroine of the she-tragedy plays
the part of an abjected materiality that threatens to undermine the idealiza-
tion of business relations: the raped, inert female body left over at the end of
she-tragedies such as Otway's The Orphan and Nicholas Rowe's Jane Shore
is the price and remainder of the idealization process. The world-annihilating
scenes of chaos portrayed so often at the end of she-tragedies, and decidedly
at the end of Otway's The Orphan, show us that the idealization process is
not yet complete, that competitive relations do not look ideal by the end of
this play as they should. Too much sympathy in writer and audience animates
the abject remainder of the distinction being made, the figure of the woman,
and her refusal to be thingified threatens to undo her role as mere object in an
idealized, pleasurable scene of exchange between men.1
Feminists have for a long time seen rape as not fundamentally erotic—as
an act of violence rather than a sexual act. However, ten years ago Catherine
MacKinnon argued that heterosexual relations under capitalism are a ver-
sion of rape and consequently that rape is indeed a sexual act, is in fact a
more overt manifestation of the violence in all heterosexual relations.2 It
has been the premise of this book that no form of the oppression of women
is "natural," thus that no representation of violence committed upon women's
bodies is in itself sexually exciting, meeting the needs of a biological instinct
or natural sexual drive. Given that premise, Mackinnon's argument does
not apply to rape throughout time but only to rape under capitalism. In
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fact, rape should not be seen as a self-identical set of actions existing in
every historical period but as itself structured by the ideological work per-
formed in representations of rape. As Hazel Carby puts it, "Rape itself should
not be regarded as a transhistorical mechanism of women's oppression [but]
as one that acquires specific political or economic meanings at different
moments in history."3
If MacKinnon's argument is historicizable, if, that is, we can see rape as
a sex crime rather than a crime of violence under the capitalist system that
came into existence during the early modern period, then we need to know
how capitalism sexualizes the violent misogyny present in representations
of rape. The "she-tragedies"4 of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries help to answer that question. They show us that rape is repre-
sented as sexually pleasurable to the rapist insofar as the relations of power
figured by rape are themselves erotic. Those power relations become eroti-
cized as part of the cultural work of promoting relations among capitalist
entrepreneurs. If sympathy for the heroine is not too great, the disfigured,
abject, and ultimately inanimate body of the raped woman serves a func-
tion in securing these sadistic, capitalist relations.
Audiences watching she-tragedies derive a great deal of pleasure from
the spectacle of victimized women. Judging from the lyricism of violent scenes
in Otway's The Orphan of 1680 and Nicholas Rowe's/awe Shore of 1714,
and from the protracted scenes in which the women chastise themselves for
the crime that has been perpetrated against them, the authors obviously
enjoy depicting virtuous women who have been raped. Jane Shore has been
raped by King Edward IV, the "royal spoiler," to whose progeny she none-
theless professes allegiance, and the play ends with her wandering the streets
barefoot, bleeding, unable to eat some conserves her loving husband tries to
feed her, and finally dying of starvation. Audiences of the late eighteenth
century began to enjoy the spectacle of a virtuous woman suffering for hav-
ing been raped offstage. Why? What ideological function does portraying
those completely abject women, social outcasts, who die after having been
raped, serve? This chapter shows that the fantasmatic representation of rape
in The Orphan allows the play to reconceive business relations in a way
conducive to an emerging market society. But it is important first to sketch
out the difference between business relations in a feudal society and those in
a capitalist society.
From Courtier to Competitor: Regulating Expenditure
In the feudal society of manorial lords, wealth and rank were inextricably
aligned: wealth was an inevitable result of nobility, coming "naturally," as
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it were, from the tribute of vassals and baronial conflict. Necessary for the
consumer revolution and the birth of a market society was the redefinition
of status as determined by "purchasing power" rather than hereditary right.5
Of course, in the old hereditary system, there had been greater social mobil-
ity than strict inheritance of property and titles would seem to allow: the
number of titled families increased from 55 during the sixteenth century to
160 by the end of the seventeenth.6 Lisa Jardine describes how status was
acquired in Tudor England. Land was granted to families by royal charter,
"in return for direct services to the Crown."7 The crown consolidated its
power by "maximis[ing] the wealth and landholdings of a small, select group
of nobles" (80) who then opposed any transfer of property except by inher-
itance: "it was these new peers," Jardine says, "who set their faces most
firmly against any further social mobility" (142); "Landlords (and the Crown)
were opposed entirely to alienation of land" (79), to allowing land to be
sold rather than inherited or reapportioned through royal charter. It is pre-
cisely the alienability of land, C.B. Macpherson has shown, that was re-
quired for a possessive market society to come into being.8 Ideologically,
property had to be seen no longer as an inherited "right" to income from
rents, a right earned through service to the king, but rather as a salable
thing. Doing business had to be reconceived, from courting favor to ex-
changing goods for a profit.
According to Neil McKendrick, the consumer revolution began in ear-
nest in the 1690s with "the unleashing of the acquisitive instincts of all
classes."9 It is undoubtedly true that the detachment of wealth from rank
made emulative spending possible for more classes of people. But the no-
tion that the consumer revolution "unleashed acquisitive desires" should
not blind us to the intensity of such desires, even among poorer people,
preexisting the birth of a consumer society. Sumptuary laws in Tudor En-
gland tried to prevent wealthy commoners from buying clothing inappro-
priate to their rank.10 Yet the 1563 Statute of Apparel prohibits people from
buying such clothing only if they do not have the "ready money" to do so,
and it warns the garment-maker not to take any "assurance . . . by bond,
surety, promise, or pain of the party or any other" as credit instead.11 Thus,
as Frances Baldwin says, the statute tries, among other things, "to prevent
the poorer classes from buying clothes beyond their means" (209 n. 48). In
his treatise of 1583, The Anatomie of Abuses, Phillip Stubbes complains
that people with incomes of forty shillings a year buy silk stockings costing
twenty shillings, and they have several pair.12 The Act of Apparel of 1563
thus seeks to prevent people from spending all or more than all that they
have. In thinking about the change from a feudal to a market economy, we
need to entertain the counterintuitive possibility that the desire to spend did
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not have to be stimulated but rather limited; that a self-destructive and sa-
domasochistic desire to expend all of one's means to the point of total ruin
had to be curtailed.
Two Kinds of Business in The Orphan
According to the OED, it is between 1670 and 1727 that the meaning of
the word "business," arguably the word uttered most often on the Restora-
tion stage, began to have its modern sense, to shift from designating prima-
rily public life or affairs at court to specifying trade, commerce, and
mercantile transactions.13 Otway's The Orphan opposes the change. The
play can be seen as a sort of cautionary tale, warning us of what will happen
if merchants try to achieve status in their own way and thereby proclaim
that the courtier's rank is not indisputable but up for grabs. The play figures
as rape the attempt to acquire status that one has not been born into nor
received as a gift from the king, rape being, to the courtier, an apt figure for
the predations of monied men.
Yet, for all its royalism, the play is not able to admonish against the new
mode of business and portrays the pleasures of the new man just a little too
well. The moral of the tragedy is that upstart younger brothers should not
try to usurp the fortunes of their elder brothers, whose right to their inher-
itance is inalienable; however, that the play has a moral marks it as one of
the new domestic tragedies, bourgeois in form.14 Thus, even though the
play depicts the disastrous consequences of acquiring wealth independently
of royal sanction, it does its part in the ideological task of convincing people
to transfer affect from the old mode of business to the new. In fact, the play
ultimately contradicts the argument it wants to make by showing us that
the pleasures of the business of service are not lost in the transformations of
a market economy but, on the contrary, subsumed and intensified by the
business of competition. By examining the pleasures proper to both kinds
of business, and the transfer of affect from one to the other in this play, we
can see how the sadomasochistic desire to utterly expend one's means is
redirected and curtailed, transforming it into a sadism that makes rational
exchange possible.
The representation of the new businessman in The Orphan is, from the
point of view of the emergence of capitalism, successful: capitalist entrepre-
neurship undertaken for profit is shown to be as pleasurable in a sadomas-
ochistic way as is feudal courtiership, despite the play's explicitly articulated
moral promoting inherited wealth and status over earned wealth and sta-
tus. However, the ideological success of this representation in promoting
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capitalist business relations is purchased at a cost: the change from the rela-
tions between men obtaining in a gift economy succeed to specular relations
at the cost of the unleashing of mimetic violence that, as Rene Girard would
say, can only be stopped by scapegoating.15 At the end of The Orphan, it is
not just the raped woman who is murdered; rather, the world is represented
as being completely annihilated, a fact which suggests that this scapegoating
ritual has not worked to stem the violence intrinsic to capitalist relations.
Scapegoating rituals can fail if the female scapegoat is not seen as fully
human, on the one hand, or on the other, if an audience refuses to relinquish
its identification with her—it can fail, that is, if she is represented as having
too little or too much psychological depth. A woman who is a flat character
will not serve as an effective scapegoat. In she-tragedies, being raped endows
the female figure with a sense of personhood because a raped woman is some-
one who had an invisible intention made visible in its violation, who has an
inner volition differing from outer actions, and therefore who is a person
with psychological depth.16 Insofar as she is a person, the figure of woman
can be identified with. But because she is, during the rape, rendered a passive
object, disidentification should follow. In the identificatory moment, aggres-
sion can be projected onto her; in the moment of disidentification, one's own
projected violence will be seen as coming from the other. If like Lucretia, she
is murdered by herself. Self-murder makes visible that she did not consent to
rape, and thus that her mental intention differed from her (forced) sexual,
physical action, but it is also an act of violence that imitates the original rape.
In murdering herself, she embodies violence rendered impotent, which is
thereby temporarily stopped. However, if the text and/or audience refuse to
relinquish their identification with the murdered heroine—if she is too well-
rounded—her self-murder doesn't provoke the deanimation of and conse-
quent distancing from her that is necessary for the scapegoating ritual to work.
In that case, both she and the world are annihilated. The play of identifica-
tions that promote or undercut the scapegoating process will be illustrated
fully below in discussing Otway's play, the South Sea Bubble, and G.B. Tiepolo's
painting "Tarquin and Lucretia." One further point will be made in the con-
clusion to this book about the figure of the raped woman. From being a
subject capable of multiple relations, she is reduced to the status of an object
through violence that deanimates her. Insofar as her virtue is represented as
wealth, and this is appropriated from her, the figure of the raped woman is a
protocommodity, and the incessantly repeated story of Lucretia is an allegory
of the commodification of human labor. As will be seen here, the figure of the
raped woman is a commodity exchanged in a relation of specular violence,
the relation between two entrepreneurs.
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The Business of Love
At the very end of Otway's The Orphan, after Castalio, Polydore, and
Monimia have all killed themselves and the patriarch Acasto is ready to die
at any moment, one of the marginal characters, Acasto's daughter Serina,
tells us that she will go to London, take "some city lodgings," and pretend
to be a rich heiress: these actions "may produce a story worth the telling, /
Of the next sparks that go a fortune-stealing."17 The question immediately
arises, has The Orphan been about two "sparks that go a fortune-steal-
ing" ? Monimia, though of noble birth, is a penniless orphan, Acasto's ward
and beneficiary of his charity. Out of respect for her noble birth, Acasto has
promised to give her a portion of ten thousand crowns or twenty-five hun-
dred pounds. But that is hardly a fortune: the average portion for a peer's
daughter at the time was almost four times that amount.18 In fact, the play
continually emphasizes her poverty and thus her defenseless state. But as it
does so, the play figuratively equates sexual pleasure with a valuable com-
modity. When planning their secret tryst in which they will consummate
their marriage, Castalio says to Monimia: "When shall I come? For to my
joys I'll steal / As if I ne'er had paid my freedom for them" (3.300-301).
According to Castalio, marriage is a business in which the freedom a hus-
band gives up pays for the sex he can have with his wife. Sex itself is figured
as money. When Castalio goes to Monimia's room, he expects
To take possession of Monimia's arms.
At midnight thus the us'rer steals untracked
To make a visit to his hoarded gold
And feast his eyes upon the shining mammon.
(3.506-10)
Later, when Polydore is revealing to her that he has substituted himself for
Castalio—her husband and his brother—at the tryst and has slept with her
in Castalio's stead, Polydore explicitly equates with wealth the sexual plea-
sure Monimia has given him. He claims to be a "man that's rich / [because
now] in possession of thy sweetness" (4.416-17). The "fortune" these sparks
have tried to "steal," as Serina puts it, is not a portion—Monimia has no
money—but rather sexual pleasure from intercourse with her.
In order to make its explicit argument about how business affairs should
be conducted, the play sets business at court and courtship at home in a mir-
ror relation to each other. The Orphan opens by telling us that Acasto has
prohibited his twin sons Castalio and Polydore from seeking either favor at
the Bohemian court or fame in the emperor's army. The ambitious boys feel
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that they are literally rotting at home (1.100-101). Thus, lacking the oppor-
tunity to distinguish themselves in the emperor's service, Castalio and Polydore
redirect their ambitions toward winning Monimia. Monimia is often called a
"tyrant" (1.142, 5.225) or a "sovereign" (2.337); she is figured as a lord
(2.385-89) and is said to possess an empire (3.554). The main characters try
each in their own way to increase their value in the monarch Monimia's eyes.
Castalio tries to win Monimia through serving her in courtly fashion.
Monimia, angry that Castalio has allowed Polydore to "affront [her] with
his brutal passion" (2.349), threatens to break off relations with him. "But,
oh, Monimia," he protests, "when th'hast banished me, / No creeping slave,
. . . . / Shall ever dote [on thee] as I have done" (2.386-89). Monimia is, he
proclaims, "the sovereign of my joys" (2.337); "I am a doting honest slave,
designed / for bondage, marriage bonds—which I've sworn / To wear"
(2.312-14). Castalio is a knight in her service, literally enthralled—in thrall
or serfdom to a lord. Later in the play, when neither of them know that
Monimia has slept with Polydore, she thinking it was Castalio and he angry
because he was not admitted into her room, Castalio shouts at her: "I know
my charter better" (4.120). In the paternalistic system portrayed by this
play, the business of court is the business of love: in return for service, the
monarch grants the courtier a charter to pure pleasure.
The Business of Rape
Polydore at first tries to win Monimia by doting, just as Castalio has done.
But he is not a true courtier like his elder brother; rather, Polydore is one of
the false courtiers who practice "the trade of courtship, / And . . . deal love
out with art" (3.109-10). That is, instead of doting, he flatters. Flattery is
associated with the new kind of business: not with the total self-expenditure
of the enthralled courtier, but with exchange of currency, which flattering
words figure. Polydore's father Acasto denounces the court where he has
recently been disappointed, where " [a] huffing, shining, flatt'ring, cringing
coward" (1.23) was raised in honor above him. Flattery, Acasto says,
is a little sneaking art, which knaves
Use to cajole and soften fools withal.
If thou has flatt'ry in thy nature, out with't,
Or send it to a court, for there 'twill thrive.
. . . 'Tis next to money current there.
(2.16-20)
Polydore first tries to purchase Monimia with flattery,19 but when that fails,
he plans her rape:
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Who'd be that sordid foolish thing called man,
To cringe thus, fawn, and flatter for a pleasure,
Which beasts enjoy so very much above him?
The lusty bull ranges through all the field,
And from the herd singling his female out,
Enjoys her, and abandons her at will.
It shall be so. I'll yet possess my love.
(1.361-67)
For Polydore, performing the courtier's service does not give pleasure in
itself; rather, flattery purchases sexual pleasure. He doesn't want to spend
the coin of flattery and so vows instead to steal pleasure through rape.
Insofar as Otway explicitly advocates aristocratic values, the winner in
the contest for Monimia's love has been predetermined. The first son out of
the womb, Castalio, claims her as his hereditary right: "I loved her first," he
says to Polydore, "and cannot quit the claim, / But will preserve the birth-
right of my passion" (1.135-36). When Monimia, "polluted" as she says by
incest, tells Castalio that she must leave him, he replies: "Thou art my heart's
inheritance; I served / A long and painful, faithful slavery for thee, / And
who shall rob me of the dear-bought blessing?" (5.280-82). Polydore, of
course, has already robbed him of his inheritance. But the play tells us that
Castalio is to blame for the tragic events (5.445-54) because he encourages
Polydore to compete with him over an inherited right that should be indis-
putable. Castalio's fault, Otway contends, is that he should not have agreed
to a contest in which Polydore can try to make good his illegitimate claim.
By allowing Polydore the opportunity to compete, Castalio turns Monimia
into a whore before Polydore has even raped her: "Am I then grown so
cheap," she asks, upon being told about their pact, "just to be made / a
common stake, a prize for love in jest?" (1.260-61). As the engine of the
tragic denoument, competition itself changes love into rape.
The Pleasures of Hatred
Just like a fairy tale, the play has given us a good brother and an evil one,
good business and bad, love and rape; they are as different as night and day.
However, if one closely examines, inside the play and out, the kind of plea-
sure that accrues from service, paternalism, "love," on the one hand, and
competition, capitalism, "rape," on the other, the distinction collapses. As
we have seen, the play distinguishes paternalistic doting from the flattery of
the new economic man. Doting, it contends, is service performed out of true
love; flattery is performed simply for the sake of outdoing another server:
Polydore wants to win Monimia only to overcome "the start [Castalio] got
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of [him] in birth" (3.374), only to overturn an inherited right. His pleasure
in raping her will come not from the sexual pleasure she gives him but
rather from hearing Castalio's cries at being refused entrance into her room,
that is, from knowing that he has deprived his brother of pleasure. Polydore
tells us this in a soliloquy in which he figures out how "[t]o cheat this brother"
by standing in for him at their meeting:
Oh, for the art of Proteus but to change
The happy Polydore to blest Castalio!
She's not so well acquainted with him yet,
But I may fit her arms as well as he.
Then, when I'm happily possessed of more
Than sense can think, all loosened into joy,
To hear my disappointed brother come
And give the unregarded signal [for entrance into her room]. Oh!
What a malicious pleasure will that be!
(3.411-19)
The Orphan shows us here how pleasurable it is to watch someone suffer
in dispossession. The play represents a new desire, a desire absolutely neces-
sary, according to Marx, for turning large sums of money into capital proper.
While villainizing the new desire thematically (i.e., in making Polydore its
proponent), the play also represents as pleasurable the very actions that it
condemns on moral grounds. For money and means of production to be
transformed into capital, the owners of these things have to be "eager to
valorize the sum of values they have appropriated by buying the labor-power"
of the peasants they have expropriated from the soil;20 they have to want to
enjoy, I would say, watching those who were peasant farmers and are now
dispossessed laborers suffer from the loss of the goods that the capitalists
themselves now possess. The distinctively capitalist pleasures represented
by Polydore are not only sadistic but also, insofar as the capitalistic preda-
tor identifies with the man he has dispossessed, sadomasochistic.
In its explicit argument, The Orphan would like to pretend that such
pleasures are absent from a paternalistic society. However, Raymond Will-
iams has called into question the so-called benevolence of paternalism.
Whereas The Orphan wants to pretend that the sadistic Polydore corrupts a
benevolent system, Williams says that "the 'intruders,' the new men, were
entering and intensifying a system . . . already established [and already,] by
its internal pressures, developing new forms of predation."21 As to the con-
solidation of lands through dispossessing the peasantry, Williams says, "It
needed no merchant to teach it to landowners."22 Where, then, is the sado-
masochism in paternalistic relations?
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Castalio describes his doting service as absolute, complete expenditure.
When begging Monimia for her favor, he says:
Which way shall I court thee?
What shall I do to be enough thy slave,
And satisfy the lovely pride that's in thee?
I'll kneel to thee, and weep a flood before thee;
Yet prithee, tyrant, break not quite my heart.
(5.221-25)
Monimia's brother Chamont repeats this masochistic fantasy of total self-
expenditure; for him, loving is just like expending oneself in the emperor's
wars:
Onsets in love seem best like those in war,
Fierce, resolute, and done with all the force.
So I would open my whole heart at once,
And pour out the abundance of my soul.
(3.111-14)
And again, Acasto proclaims himself to be one of those men who "[h]ave
spent their blood in their dear country's service, / Yet now pine under want"
(2.61-62). In service, one expends all one's bodily liquids, tears and blood,
or like Chamont, "pour[s] out the abundance of [one's] soul." But total
expenditure is not a free gift.
Every sort of masochism involves some kind of contempt for the tyrant
who inflicts the suffering. Theodore Reik puts it this way: "The masochist
exhibits the punishment but also its failure. He shows his submission cer-
tainly, but he also shows his invincible rebellion.... He has an inexhaustible
capacity for taking a beating and yet knows unconsciously he is not licked."23
Castalio, Chamont, and Acasto claim the ability to expend themselves totally
in service to their tyrants; the claim to have "an inexhaustible capacity for
taking a beating," for being able to spend oneself down to the last drop of
blood and tears, is, as Gilles Deleuze insists, a "provocation": "[There is an]
element of contempt in the submission of the masochist . . .: his apparent
obedience conceals a criticism and a provocation. He simply attacks the law
on another flank. . . . [H]e overthrows the law as radically as the sadist,
though in a different way."24 That the masochist's assault on the tyrant who
makes him suffer is as violent as the sadist's rebellion can be seen if one under-
stands what total expenditure means in a precapitalist gift economy.
In The Gift, Marcel Mauss has made visible the violence of giving. Inso-
far as any giving, in any economy, makes the receiver indebted to the giver,
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it renders the recipient vulnerable. But in a gift economy, the failure to return
a gift equal to or better than what one has received means loss of status. In
that case, a giver's total self-expenditure ("potlatch") is a violent attempt to
humiliate the receiver who may not be able to repay.25 Thus, Chamont fears
greatly for his sister Monimia because the defenseless orphan has been sub-
jected to Acasto's benevolence. Acasto's gift to her, Chamont fears, may
force her to pay it back by giving her virginity to his sons:26
Great spirits bear misfortunes hardly;
Good offices claim gratitude, and pride,
Where pow'r is wanting, will usurp a little;
May make us (rather than be thought behindhand)
Pay over-price. . . .
. . . I fear her weakness
May make her pay a debt at any rate.
(2.176-82)
Pride makes potlatch progressively more violent, each participant returning
the gift with interest as a way of doing violence to the other.27
In the business of service, sadomasochistic pleasure comes from potlatch,
from sheer expenditure, in which nothing is retained. As discussed above in
connection with the 1563 Act of Apparel, when people began to believe
that they had the right to aristocratic pleasures, they at first tried to spend
everything, even their future income; like those aristocrats who continued
to practice the sheer expenditure of luxury, these people would have made
very bad capitalists, bankrupt ones, to be exact.
The pleasures of a gift economy are in this play represented as transfer-
rable, however, to a capitalist system in which competitors are in a specular
relation competing for a prize (Monimia) that (or, in this case, whom) is not
an end in itself but a medium of exchange, the "thing" competed for. Monimia
is merely currency in the primary affair between Castalio and Polydore. Of-
ten, specular relationships such as Castalio and Polydore's are figured as ho-
moeroticism.28 Here specular rivals are represented as twins, and Polydore's
rape of Monimia as incest: "Sure we're such friends," Castalio says to Polydore,
"So much one man, that our affections [for a woman] too / Must be united as
we are" (1.151-53). Competition for the object covers over but also enacts a
desire to merge into a unity with the other, to become him. The workings of
capitalist desire are often obscured by homophobia;29 here, we are prevented
from seeing the sadistic desire coupled with masochistic identification inher-
ent in destructive specular rivalry by the violent figure of rape.
Insofar as we imagine that the rapist's gratification comes from the fact
that rape resembles certain kinds of sexual intercourse, we are prevented
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from seeing that rape is not essentially erotic but rather eroticized by the
power relations it enacts, that the rapist's pleasure comes from the sadism
of dispossessing a competitor. Polydore does not only rape Monimia; he
also ravishes his specular rival of their common stake. In the case of the
second kind of business, that of competition and exchange, the sadomas-
ochistic pleasure is preserved, but no longer gained from sheer expenditure;
now the pleasure comes from sadism, from taking rather than receiving the
gift, and from secretly, masochistically identifying with one's beaten rival.
The Orphan shows its audience that the sadomasochistic pleasures avail-
able in the total expenditure of courtly service are still available in sadistic
commercial competition.
That one of the relations of power under capitalism is specular, often
(although not necessarily) on that account figured as homoerotic, and that
women figure into the specular, imaginary battle as chattel, we could have
known from reading with Eve Sedgwick The Country Husband, a Restora-
tion comedy dating, as does The Orphan, from the time of the Exclusion
Crisis. But The Country Husband represents seductions, not what gets called
rape, and the women in the play do not die: The Country Husband is a
comedy, The Orphan a tragedy. As a tragedy about woman, as a she-trag-
edy, it is performing very specific ideological work. The Orphan represents
capitalist competition as pleasurable. It tells auditors that they will not have
to forgo the sadomasochistic pleasures of courtly service, but rather that
those pleasures can accrue from competition that allows for both sadistic
and masochistic pleasures. But what the play itself performs differs entirely
from what it represents. One would expect a work that heralds the new
capitalist order (despite Otway's conscious intention) not only to represent
sadistic pleasure but also itself provide it: one would expect the play to
perform a sadistic act for the sake of securing as ideal the businessmen it
represents. But it does not do that. In fact, The Orphan is not able to suc-
cessfully differentiate aristocrats from capitalist businessmen, nor to ideal-
ize the latter. This play performs the failure of abjection, the collapse of
sadism into sadomasochism.
Rene Girard's account of tragedy and Mary Douglas's account of pollu-
tion rituals together provide a way of understanding what ideological work
the she-tragedy performs as itself a ritual reenactment of crisis. Girard and
Douglas describe scapegoating rituals—what causes them, how they oper-
ate—in a way that deepens Kristeva's notion of abjection.30 The abject is a
scapegoat in a ritual that takes place in a text or a psyche. Thus it is struc-
turally identical to what the ritual commemorates—to scapegoating rituals
that take place in the world.
48 Misogynous Economies
The Sacrificial Crisis
In Violence and the Sacred, Girard plots the life of any given social structure
on a continuum that ultimately proves to be a circle.31 At one end, a
scapegoating event brings a community into existence: the members of a
group project all the violence they wish to perpetrate upon each other onto
the violent interchange of two antagonists; at some moment during the vio-
lent interchange between these rivals, the distinction between them and thus
among all of the members of the community whom they represent disap-
pears. It is necessary for the members of the community to identify with
both of the rivals in order for scapegoating one of them to work to stem
violence within the community: only if all members can identify with the
scapegoat can the scapegoat be an effective locus of their projections; only
if they can see the scapegoat as a version of their violent selves can they kill
off that violence by killing the scapegoat.
The community unanimously decides to victimize one of the rivals, thereby
establishing an originary and arbitrary social definition (a definition that is
necessarily arbitrary, since both antagonists, and indeed all members of the
community, are at the moment of the sacrificial crisis "the same"). The
scapegoating event establishes social distinctions, laws, the society's con-
trolling fictions. They are fictions because they are arbitrary, because the com-
munity has unanimously "decided" to regard them as facts. The arbitrariness
must not be too visible, however, for these fictions to function well.
Next, ritual recollections of the original event, ritual sacrifice, reinforces
and sustains those fictions. At a later stage, the community withdraws be-
lief in its fictions and ritual loses its effect: ritual reenactments of the violent
event cede to actual violence; violence is no longer contained within the
ritual frame. During this deritualization, mimetic desire or mimetic rivalry,
the desire to be the same or rivalry for the same place within society's struc-
ture, devolves into mimetic violence, a violence that is not only wrought
upon a rival but also necessarily undermines the ritually sustained social
structure itself. As they rival for the same place, rival in effect to be the
same, as they commit the same acts of violence upon each other, antagonists
necessarily do violence to the structure that distinguishes them.
Finally, when mimetic violence reaches its peak, the structure disinte-
grates; it no longer distinguishes between rivals. Everyone in the commu-
nity, until now polarized because all its members identified themselves with
either one rival or the other, becomes indistinguishable from and identified
with each other. Like the original sacrificial crisis that established the com-
munity and was commemorated in ritual, this sacrificial crisis ends when
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one rival—now identical to and indistinguishable from the other rival—is
scapegoated: this arbitrary and unanimous act of violence consists in mas-
sive disidentification. Members of the community arbitrarily and unani-
mously distinguish themselves from an outsider who is both evil (containing
as he does the community's disowned aggressions) and divine (in retrospect,
since the death of this hero gave birth to unanimity and a new social struc-
ture). The scapegoated victim becomes a mythic hero, the focus of subse-
quent ritual reenactments of the event, whose distinctive tragic flaw both
requires disidentification and abandonment by the spectator and exalts the
hero to divine status.
In Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas analyzes the "dirt" of a society,
"that which must not be included if pattern [social structure] is to be main-
tained."32 Society's dirt, its "inarticulate forms" (37, 95-100), are a source
of power and danger. It is at first glance hard to see how Mary Douglas's
analysis of pollution rituals designed to ward off the danger of nonstructure
(123) might be plotted so that it parallels Girard's scheme in which a com-
munity comes into being by violently excluding its own violence. Douglas
rigorously distinguishes between two kinds of religious fears that sustain
and undermine secular power structures (secular systems of differentiation):
pollution danger, fear of transgressing structural boundaries because of a
power inhering in the structure itself, and sorcery danger, fear of power
believed to be wielded by agents who either consciously ("sorcerers") or
unconsciously ("witches") threaten social structure. In pollution rituals, the
community faces the threat to its definitions posed by anomaly and ambi-
guity. Another way to clarify social definitions is to accuse someone of be-
ing a sorcerer who perverts the power accorded to them by the social
structure. The accusation allows "guilt to be pinned on [a] source of confu-
sion and ambiguity" (107) other than the structure itself. Even though Dou-
glas does not explicitly say that pollution rituals devolve into accusations of
sorcery as social distinctions lose their efficacy, one can link Douglas's pol-
lution rituals to the earlier stage in Girard's scheme in which ritual effec-
tively reinforces social distinctions, and link the fears of sorcery Douglas
analyzes to Girard's mimetic violence.
Douglas's "dirt" is inanimate matter that has been excluded by social
definitions because it contradicts them. It is "matter out of place."33 One
could think of dirt as a corpse: it is neither entirely a thing nor entirely a
being; it is partially animated by the power it has to disturb these two cat-
egories. The more dirt threatens to undo the system sustained by its exclu-
sion, the more animated it becomes: marginal matter becomes a marginal
or interstitial person, a witch. This is to say that, instead of rejecting and
thereby deanimating the exclusions that threaten their laws, members of the
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community begin to identify with them, to endow them with subjectivity or
personhood. In a witch, dirt is half-animated; she or he is seen as operating
unconsciously, mechanically, without intent. As the social system further
disintegrates, members of the community attribute its disarticulation to sor-
cerers who abuse the system: what threatens the structure is now fully en-
dowed with personhood and conscious intent; dirt is now fully animated. A
witch embodies, as a sorcerer thinks the structure's contradictions.
In describing the African tribe she studied, the-Lele, Douglas talks about
their pangolin ritual in which anomalies considered to be polluting (they
threaten the structure, which is defined only by virtue of their exclusion) are
confronted and affirmed: "The Lele pangolin cult is only one example of
which many more could be cited, of cults which invite their initiates to turn
round and confront the categories on which their whole surrounding cul-
ture has been built up and to recognise them for the fictive, man-made,
arbitrary creations that they are."34 But the Lele are not always a "dirt-
affirming" society (170): "The elaborate system of anomalies rejected and
affirmed which their cults present is regularly superseded by the latest anti-
sorcery cult which is nothing less than an attempt to introduce the millenium
at once" (171). When their social structure is most threatened, the Lele see
sorcerers as consciously using the power of inarticulate forms to undermine
structure.
Consciousness of dirt always threatens the social structure: the threat of
a structure's disintegration can instill belief in its necessity, but it can also
truly threaten to undo not only that particular system but all systems for
differentiating. In the latter case, the community's reaction is twofold and,
although the reaction seems to make sense, from the point of view of struc-
ture, it is absolutely disastrous: first, the community tries to eliminate the
threat to the structure by eliminating all dirt; second, the community looks
forward to "the millenium"—the elimination of all structure, of all the in-
justices due to differentiation: "[a]U evil is caused by sorcery. [The Lele]
can clearly visualise what reality would be like without sorcery and they
continually strive to achieve it by eliminating sorcerers."35 The community
rejects the arbitrariness of social distinctions and animates excluded dirt: it
is a sorcerer. The desire to purify social structure of its fictionality or arbi-
trariness paradoxically leads to its destruction. If members of the commu-
nity would only ritually affirm whatever threatens their social structure,
instead of trying to eliminate it, the structure would be strengthened. Intol-
erance of dirt leads to arbitrarily ascribing evil intent to a sorcerer and then
scapegoating that sorcerer, an event that will stem violence only if it does
not incite vengeance and provoke a chain of scapegoating events.36
For Girard, if violence is to end, the scapegoated sorcerer must be a "sur-
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rogate victim," differing enough from the original antagonist so that her
family will not take revenge, but similar enough to both antagonists, who
are now, in the throes of antagonism, themselves virtually identical. Girard
talks about a community averting a sacrificial crisis by identifying with a
tragic hero, a victim of the system, and then abandoning that identification.
To put it in terms of conscious intent, members of the community recognize
the necessity of the system even when confronted with the injustice they
must commit for the sake of establishing and maintaining social distinc-
tions. To put it in other terms, members of the community identify with
social structure by distancing themselves from the hero, deflating their per-
sonification of inarticulate forms, deanimating, that is, the exclusions that
the tragic hero represents.37 By withdrawing identification, members of the
community say, in effect, that its insight into the tragic hero is, finally, a
fiction, and that the social structure alone (unjust or not) is real.
For tragedy to work at all in clarifying the social structure, members of
the community must be able to identify with the tragic hero at the outset.
The sacrificial crisis is precipitated by tragedy when the community refuses
to abandon identification with the scapegoated tragic hero. In Girard's ac-
count, tragedy fails to allow ritually recognizing the arbitrariness of the
system (and thereby strengthening it) when writers and audiences no longer
see the scapegoated victim's death as necessary. In that case, audiences re-
tain their identification with the tragic hero even after his death, envision-
ing him as an antihero victimized by a worn-out system.38 Social fictions are
seen as unjust and fictitious (and indeed, if unsanctioned, they are no longer
"real"). The possibility of eradicating dirt, arbitrariness, fictionality, and,
in short, systematicity per se is seen as real: people believe that overturning
the system will bring about the millenium. Once the sustaining arbitrariness
of the system is eradicated, the system topples.
According to Girard, asserting difference or claiming status will "swell
the flood" of violence unleashed by indifferentiation when status is not pre-
determined but achieved and lost in "perpetual confrontation"39 among the
members of a community, when, that is, assertions of difference lead to
indifferentiation.40 Because we erroneously blame structuration itself for
those crises in which claims to status proliferate, as opposed to blaming the
loss of structure to which such a proliferation attests, we cannot see that
differentiation itself, and with it inequality, actually stem violence:
Order, peace, and fecundity depend on cultural distinctions; it is not these
distinctions but the loss of them that gives birth to fierce rivalries. . . . Mod-
ern society aspires to equality among men and tends instinctively to regard all
differences . . . as obstacles in the path of human happiness. . . .  [A]n
"antidifferential" prejudice often falsifies the ethnological outlook . . . on the
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origins of discord and conflict. . . . Although usually implicit, its principles
are explicitly set forth in Victor Turner's Ritual Process: "Structural differen-
tiation, both vertical and horizontal, is the foundation of strife and factional-
ism, and of struggles in dyadic relations between incumbents of positions or
rivals for positions." When differences come unhinged they are generally iden-
tified as the cause of those rivalries for which they also furnish the stakes.
This [is] not always their role. . . .  [W]hen they no longer serve as a dam
against violence, they serve to swell the flood.41
According to Girard, Victor Turner is correct in connecting assertions of
difference with the outbreak of violence, but not "structural differentia-
tion" itself with such outbreaks. Violent differentiation only breaks out when
the system for differentiating is breaking down.
The Exclusion Crisis and subsequently the Glorious Revolution mark
exactly such a moment in British history: they mark the birth of British
liberal theory, insofar as John Locke's Second Treatise of Government is a
product of the Exclusion Crisis42 and insofar as the Declaration of Rights
punctuates the end of absolute monarchy.43 This sense of the fundamental
equality of human beings is also essential, Marx maintains, to the birth of
exchange value as human labor in the abstract.44 If the emergence of ex-
change value does not in and of itself make a system "capitalist," it is the
crucial component that makes labor alienable and appropriable for the gen-
eration of surplus value—which is to say, of capital. If Girard's notion that
indifferentiation produces violence is right, then there would be one per-
petual sacrificial crisis in a liberal, capitalist system. Such a system attempts
to eradicate differences among people for the sake of furthering humanitar-
ian concerns and, at the same time, paradoxically, for the sake of rendering
human beings exploitable. And in fact the distinguishing feature of bour-
geois hegemony, class mobility, might be seen as a perpetual assault upon
those in particular places in a hierarchy, and in fact as a perpetual assault on
structural differentiation itself.
The South Sea Bubble: The Crisis "Legally" Resolved
In his Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of
Crowds, Charles Mackay describes the South-Sea Bubble crisis from the
point of view of a member of the class whose status was threatened by the
crisis and clarified by its outcome;45 thus, the "facts" he describes and the
way he describes them illustrate the salient features of an outbreak of sor-
cery fears and the sacrificial crisis as described by Douglas and Girard. During
1720, rumors that the Spanish government would open the ports of its colo-
nies to the South Sea Company enabled the company to sell stock on Ex-
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change Alley at incredibly high prices, allowed them to cash in on future
trading opportunities. Since "the inordinate thirst of gain that had afflicted
all ranks of society was not to be slaked even in the South Sea"(52), entre-
preneurs began other joint-stock companies ("Bubbles"). Once buyers were
assured that any Bubble's petition for a royal patent would be granted, the
price of its stock rose. When the price of stock was at its peak, the original
projectors, the directors of the Bubble company, sold out, "the scheme was
at an end," and the stock purchasers were ruined (54-62):
Each poor subscriber to the Sea,
Sinks down at once, and there he lies;
Directors fall as well as they,
Their fall is but a trick to rise.46
What horrifies Mackay about the activity on Exchange Alley is the inter-
mingling of classes and sexes. "Everybody came to purchase stock":47 "[a]
speculating frenzy had seized [peers] as well as the plebeians" (51); a "fran-
tic eagerness [seized] people of every class to speculate" (54); "[p]ersons of
distinction, of both sexes, were deeply engaged in all these bubbles" (56).
He quotes "A South-Sea Ballad":
The greatest ladies thither came,
And plied in chariots daily,
Or pawned their jewels for a sum
To venture in the Alley.48
Worse, success in these ventures allowed drastic changes in status. As J.H.
Plumb shows, movement from one class to another was relatively easy dur-
ing the early part of the century, even out of the Alley:
Towards the end of their careers, ["the merchant princes"] often bought up
great estates to endow themselves with the social prestige which went with
land ownership and which would enable their sons and daughters to marry
into the aristocracy or to acquire a title in their own right. These were the
men who controlled the Bank of England and the great chartered companies
. . . . With property came standing in society and a future for one's children,
for in the early part of the century it was relatively easy to pass from one
social class to another—a fact which amazed Voltaire and others.49
Mackay portrays the sudden changes in status that occurred during 1720
this way: "The overbearing insolence of ignorant men, who had arisen to
sudden wealth by successful gambling, made men of true gentility of mind
and manners blush that gold should have power to raise the unworthy in
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the scale of society." For Mackay, these changes in status bring with them
"a corresponding laxity of morals": corrupted manners, "scenes of infamy
disgraceful . . . to the morals of the offenders," and (here Mackay quotes
Smollett) a "'picture of tasteless vice and mean degeneracy.'"50
Activity on Exchange Alley constituted a crisis of indifferentiation: it
presented in exaggerated form disintegrating definitions of class occurring
throughout the early part of the century. For Mackay and Smollett, the
new-monied men are "dirty," which is to say "degenerate" and immoral.
Significantly, Mackay and "A South-Sea Ballad" figure class indifferentiation
as the corruption of fine ladies.
The crisis of indifferentiation on Exchange Alley came to a head in the
larger crisis, the bursting of the Bubble, the first stock-market crash. Both
crises arose because once a title can be purchased by "hard cash,"51 the
ficitionality or arbitrariness of class distinctions has become too visible. But
these crises did more than expose the definition of "aristocrat" to be a fic-
tion once sanctioned by a now visibly shaken feudal social structure: the
contradiction also exposed the fiction that "cash" is in any way "hard."
Some of the proposals for establishing companies by raising capital
through selling stock seem like "normal" economic ventures to us. Thus,
among those ventures listed in Mackay's summary of the companies that
were, after the crash, outlawed by the order of the Lord Justices, 12 July
1720, there are projects for making money through manufacturing prod-
ucts; "purchasing and improving leasable lands" or "lands to build on";
"buying and selling estates"; insuring against wage loss, fire, robberies, and
theft; lending money; importing; and, like the South Sea Company itself,
"carrying on trade." However, most of the Bubble companies were purely
"monetary corporations," corporations that, like the South Sea Company,
intended to make money less by actually undertaking their projects than by
inflating the price of their stock: as mentioned above, the more unabashedly
monetary, the more absurd and "scientific" (in the Royal Society sense of
the word) were their projects. The project "for a wheel for perpetual mo-
tion [which required] capital [of] one million [pounds]" and the company
"for carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody knows
what it is" were both declared illegal, along with insurers and importers, by
the order of the Lord Justices.52
As absurd as these and other projects were, it is important to note their
affinity with what we consider "normal" economic ventures: what we con-
sider "legitimate" capitalist enterprises and out-and-out scams are here
equated; "normal" and "absurd" economic ventures occur on the same list
of illegal joint-stock companies. Thus, in answering the question as to why,
even in the hands of "aggressive, inventive" industrialists and merchants,
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"progress [in the early eighteenth century] was so slow,"53 J.H. Plumb con-
cludes that the greatest "hindrance to rapid commercial and industrial ex-
pansion was the lack of capital," a lack directly attributable to " [t]he financial
panic of the South Sea Bubble" and the subsequent "Bubble Act of 1721,
which forbade the formation of joint-stock companies without a royal char-
ter—an instrument which was costly and difficult to get; and, therefore, the
easiest method of raising the capital necessary for large-scale industrial or-
ganization was not available" (26). The South Sea Bubble was a crisis of
indifferentiation arising from the market economy's attempt and failure to
supersede feudal class definitions.
The panic and run on the banks of September 1720 occurred because the
idea that a projector wants to raise capital in order to undertake an enter-
prise that would make products, jobs, money, and commodities suddenly
became too obviously a fiction: that a projector wanted to raise capital
merely to enrich himself was so obvious that most projectors skipped the
intermediary steps of investing the capital they received from stock jobbing
in any actual enterprise. It is not that a capitalist sorcerer today would not,
like the "unknown adventurer" who proposed "[a] company for carrying
on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody knows what it is," "be
contented with his venture [in selling stock], and set off the same evening
for the Continent";54 rather, laws limit the degree to which an undertaking
can be fictional.
Mackay, like William Maitland, whom he quotes, is amazed at public
credulity, amazed that people believed any of the more absurd projects would
ever be undertaken.55 He cites numerous examples of satire that exposed
the projects as scams, among them the "Bubble Cards" (62-64): "every
card of the pack exposed some knavish scheme, and ridiculed the persons
who were its dupes" (64). But Mackay errs in telling the story "of a plun-
dered people" (70), of "a whole people shaking suddenly off the trammels
of reason, and running wild after a golden vision, refusing obstinately to
believe that it is not real" (71). Contemporary accounts of the crisis, such as
that which appeared in the Political State, reveal a people fully conscious of
the delusiveness of their own hopes: "[Projects were] set on foot and pro-
moted by crafty knaves, then pursued by multitudes of covetous fools, and
at last appeared to be, in effect, what their vulgar appellation denoted them
to be—bubbles and mere cheats."56 In Mackay's words, "The populace are
often most happy in the nicknames they employ. None could be more apt
than that of Bubbles."57 If a whole group of people call a bubble a bubble,
a cheat a cheat, a fiction a fiction, they cannot be poor fools imposed upon
by knaves. It is because of the fictionality, and not in spite of it, that people
bought stock. The rash of satires that exposed projects as fictions did noth-
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ing to dissuade buying stock because no one cared about the reality of the
projects themselves. Everyone was a director investing in a purely monetary
corporation and hoping to sell at just the right moment.
What is most interesting about Mackay's account is that, while he at-
tempts to arouse pathos for the poor imposed-upon victims of projectors,
and while he relishes describing the punishment of the directors, punish-
ment that takes the form of mob violence, Mackay also recognizes the arbi-
trariness of this scapegoating process, recognizes that in fact the crisis was
not caused by criminals who cheated victims but rather by a whole slew of
would-be criminals.58 To put this in terms of Girard's account, one would say
that Mackay attests to the efficacy of Parliament's punishment of directors in
stemming violence and arresting the crisis not despite but precisely because he
recognizes its injustice. Mackay quotes Gibbon's defense of his grandfather (a
director of the South Sea Company), in which Gibbon laments the punitive
actions of "a lawless majority" who exacted "arbitrary fines and forfeitures";
Gibbon points out that "[o]ne man was ruined because he had dropped a
foolish speech, that his horses should feed upon gold."59
Mackay repeatedly points out the arbitrariness of scapegoating directors
for the actions of a whole nation.60 If we take Girard seriously, we can say
that seeing the punishment of directors as arbitrary paradoxically allows
feeling that their punishment was necessary. One needs to see the acts of
violence that brought the crisis to a close as arbitrary in order for them to
work. For indeed, it is after pointing out the arbitrariness of punishing the
directors that Mackay attacks them with excessive rhetoric:
The overbearing insolence of ignorant men, who had arisen to sudden wealth
by successful gambling, made men of true gentility of mind and manners
blush that gold should have power to raise the unworthy in the scale of soci-
ety. The haughtiness of some of these "ciphering cits," as they were termed by
Sir Richard Steele, was remembered against them in the day of their adver-
sity. In the parliamentary inquiry, many of the directors suffered more for
their insolence than for their peculation. One of them, who, in the full-blown
pride of an ignorant rich man, had said that he would feed his horse upon
gold, was reduced almost to bread and water for himself; every haughty look,
every over-bearing speech, was set down, and repaid them a hundredfold in
poverty and humiliation. (71-72)
The rhetorical force of this passage, the sense of the justice of the class
distinctions it upholds, is not undermined but enhanced by the excessive
and arbitrary punishment wreaked by this rhetoric on the man whose horse
would eat gold. Girard would say that scapegoating various directors re-
solved the crisis because everyone in "the mob" became identified with the
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directors during the progress of the crisis, and this identification allows the
violence perpetrated against them to be, like Mackay's rhetoric, visibly ar-
bitrary and excessive. But the selection of scapegoats must also not be so
visibly arbitrary that they don't seem culpable at all, in which case killing
them would serve no scapegoating function. These directors seem to be at
once equally guilty and more guilty than everyone else.
Fictional Scapegoats: Tragedy
During the sacrificial crisis, mimetic rivalry or the attempt to displace an-
other within a system becomes mimetic violence, the attempt to seize "ku-
dos" (divine and inviolable status) "once and for all": seizing kudos consists
in trying to fix a hierarchical definition upon one person, to reify it, rather
than to allow social distinctions to define an empty place in a structure that
can then be filled by any number of people;61 if the structure and what
threatens it are fixed in, embodied, and animated by two individuals who
attack each other, the structure will disintegrate because it can no longer
recognize what threatens it by incorporating and thereby enlisting that threat
in the process of structural definition.
For members of the society in a crisis, one "sorcerer" presents pure fact,
the other pure fiction; one is good, one evil. Members of the community
believe that they need only choose one and eliminate the other in order to
establish the millenium. From within the crisis, they think they are trying to
establish a permanent social structure and definitions that, since not arbi-
trary, will not be at all fictional or unjustly exclusive; in fact, eliminating
indifferentiation also eliminates the differences that it sustains. Reciprocal
violence between contenders for a position within a system, between "sor-
cerers," breaks down the system itself: "Although the targets are individu-
als, it is the institutions that receive the blows. Legitimate authority trembles
on its pedestal and the combatants finally assist in the downfall of the very
order they strove to maintain."62
During sacrificial crises, tragedy devolves into invective and a battle among
"sorcerers" such as Oedipus and Tiresias, who embody the social institu-
tions that have granted them the status they are fighting to maintain. The
scapegoating event that ends the sacrificial crisis only succeeds after the two
antagonists engaged in seizing kudos have, by using the same weapons to
attack each other and by the rapidity of attack and counterattack, become
identified with and indistinguishable from each other and all other mem-
bers of the community: once identified with each other, the necessary in-
extricability of fact from fiction and vice versa is recognized; the violent
murder and expulsion of one of them (re)establishes the social order be-
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cause, since the scapegoat is recognizably "the same" as his opponent (and
everyone else), the violent exclusion of him, his violent reduction to the dirt
of the system, is recognizably an arbitrary act; system is (re)established when
it can again incorporate fictionality or arbitrariness, when the community
can recognize that the system is real only by virtue of their unanimous "de-
cision" to act as if it were real.
Difference is established only when asserted and undermined at the same
time,63 only when it is possible to recognize the arbitrariness of definition in
the very act of distinguishing. One might talk about the strength of a social
order in terms of an "optimum distance" between the consciousness and
unconsciousness of that system's arbitrariness or fictionality.64 Effective dif-
ferentiation requires some recognition of arbitrariness, of the community's
complicity in granting the system factual status, of the community's guilt in
and responsibility for establishing it. Any demand to purge a system of its
fictions, to literalize dirt by locating it in an enemy who can then be ex-
pelled, comes from being too aware that the system is a fiction.
Scapegoating to Uphold the New System
At the time when The Orphan was first produced, entrepreneurship looked
fictional because it was still new, because it was not yet in fact a reality that
ambition should follow business rather than curry favor at court. The trag-
edy itself attempts to expel fictionality from the new system of capitalist
relations by staging a sacrificial crisis. The crisis begins with indifferentiation.
In the relationship between Castalio and Monimia, Castalio is in her service
or thrall and continually designates himself as her slave (2.306). Yet, with
all the instability of a truly specular relationship, their roles keep switching,
he becoming her "lord" and "tyrant" (1.279, 2.337, 4.110-33) and then
she becoming his (1.142, 2.306, 5.191-225) in rapid alternate succession.
Their "love" consists in a competition for superiority, in bouts of love and
hate in which master and slave switch their roles. Castalio and Monimia are
contestants in a joust for superiority, just as Castalio and Polydore are con-
testants in a "joust" for Monimia's love.
The woman's superiority in the she-tragedies of The Orphan and jane
Shore consists in her capacity to retain and capitalize upon the chastity that
constitutes her own value on the marriage market. She is an entrepreneur
like Polydore, with this difference: she is a she.65 Mominia is thus on one
level identical with Castalio and Polydore—all three being competing entre-
preneurs—but, insofar as her gender is represented as a salient and essential
difference, she is also susceptible of being scapegoated, differentiated from,
and deanimated. And in fact, the play kills her by her own hand. Her self-
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murder puts an end to the sacrificial crisis insofar as it cannot be avenged,
and no one is left alive by the end of the play for the cycle of vengeance to
continue.
A Difference That Works?
There is a problem if gender difference does not distinguish Monimia enough
from Polydore and Castalio. Also, her self-murder identifies her with them
even more. Similarly in Rowe's Jane Shore, Jane and her oppressor Gloster
become identified when he scourges her with curses:
Glos. Ha! do'st thou brave me, minion!
Do'st thou know
That I can let loose fear, distress and famine
To hunt thy heels like hell-hounds thro' the world;
That I can place thee in such an abject state
As help shall never find thee; where repining,
Thou shalt sit down, and gnaw the earth for anguish,
Groan to the pitiless winds without return,
Howl like the midnight wolf amidst the desart,
And curse thy life in bitterness of misery.66
Jane returns this curse that renders her abject with an almost identical curs-
ing of herself:
/. Sh. Let me be branded for the publick scorn,
Turn'd forth, and driven to wander like a vagabond,
Be friendless and forsaken, seek my bread
Upon the barren, wild, and desolate waste,
Feed on my sighs, and drink my falling tears,
E'er I consent to teach my lips injustice.
(4.1.170-75)
The "e'er" of the last line quoted here shifts her self-cursing away from
mere repetition of Gloster's, but not by much.
Just as Monimia is identified with both Castalio and Polydore in their
attempts to be tyrants or usurpers, the raped Lucretia identifies, by murder-
ing herself, with her rapist, stabbing herself in just the same way that he
would have done in the act of rape had she resisted. Critics have noticed in
the iconography of paintings of Lucretia that she physically "quotes" her
assailant in stabbing herself.67 In "Tarquin and Lucretia," by G.B. Tiepolo
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Figure 1. Giambattista B. Tiepolo, Tarquin and Lucretia (1750). Courtesy of
Staatsgalerie am Shaezler-Palais, Stadtische Kunstsammlungen, Augsburg,
Germany.
(see fig. 1), the two characters are almost identified because the elbow of
Tarquin's knife-wielding arm intersects with Lucretia's elbow, making the
painting a bit ambiguous as to whether Tarquin is threatening to stab her or
Lucretia is stabbing herself.
Self-murder expresses an intention that differs from what the woman's
body expressed in the physical activity of being raped. To have an intention
that differs from action is to have a psyche capable of consent—a modern
psyche.68 Although representing the self-murder of the raped victim gives
her a psyche, it does so in the process of depriving that psyche of a living
body to inhabit. As someone identifiably the same as all of us whose feel-
ings differ from the activities that express them, but different because pol-
luted, material, and dead, the raped woman is the perfect scapegoat for the
capitalist market's violent crimes. But insofar as the playgoer's sympathy
animates her too much, she does not quite remain the inanimate scapegoat
that she is meant to be.
In fact, at the end of the play, there is an exchange of curses among
characters, "plagues" that go from Polydore to Castalio (5.421, 95), a curse
in Monimia's last wish for Castalio (5.486, 98), and plagues from Chamont
to Castalio (5.489, 98) and back again (5.514, 99), culminating in a scene
of chaos:
Confusion and disorder seize the world,
To spoil all trust and converse amongst men;
'Twixt families engender endless feuds;
In countries, needless fears; in cities, factions;
In states, rebellion; and in churches, schism:
Till form's dissolved, the chain of causes broken,
And the Originals of Being lost.
(5.516-22, 99)
This looks less like the end of a sacrificial crisis through scapegoating and
the consequent establishment of an arbitrary difference, and more like a
continuation of the sacrificial crisis. Insofar as Monimia is a genuine tragic
heroine, our chaos is come again, a chaos of indifferentiation.
The Orphan successfully represents the sadomasochistic pleasures of the
gift economy and how one might change from giving gifts to getting goods
without forgoing those pleasures. But it unsuccessfully performs a sadistic,
differentiating act. For our tastes, the play is too pathetic, the world-annihi-
lating emotion over Monimia's death far too overdone. Whereas we can
transform at least some of Swift's and Pope's satires into works that effec-
tively distinguish good moralist from bad sexually promiscuous woman,
this play leaves us with no "good" and "bad" objects. We cannot effectively
62 Misogynous Economies
distinguish between good and bad capitalists via the effective scapegoating
of a woman, as we are able to in reading George Lillo's London Merchant
and Bernard Mandeville's Modest Defence ofPublick STEWS, discussed in
the next chapter. The Orphan performs a sadomasochistic economy, but it
requires huge amounts of pathos in order to keep the audience sympathiz-
ing with its heroine. For us, exaggerated pathos will have exactly the oppo-
site effect—it will turn off our sympathy. But the exaggeration suggests that
Otway and Rowe, and writers of she-tragedy generally, had to go to great
lengths to make the passive woman in this humiliating scene someone with
whom one can identify. Writers of she-tragedies wrote with a sense that it
might be difficult to get their auditors to identify with female victims. We
can here see misogyny failing to keep up the play of identifications neces-
sary for literariness: the woman is not hated enough to be disidentified with
at the end of the play, and so no distinctions are made fixed or fluid. (There
is no indeterminacy without determinate positions to be undecided about!).
The Orphan does not fix identity in one determinate position, but it also
does not give us numerous positions with which to identify, continually
offering readers a way out of every determinate position. Instead of the
indeterminacy central to literariness, it gives us indifferentiation. The texts
by Lillo and Mandeville discussed in chapter 3 do not collapse into indeter-
mination, nor do they restore indeterminacy. Instead, for the sake of fixing
the reader's desire to identify on one character, the ideal businessman, they
shut down literary play, perhaps because the danger of setting off a sacrifi-
cial crisis is, after the South Sea Bubble, seen as too great.
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3Engendering Capitalist Desire
Filthy Bawds and Thoroughly Good
Merchants in Mandeville and Lillo
Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the Bees and Modest Defence of Publick
STEWS and Lillo's London Merchant engender capitalist desires. By first
gendering them female, these texts can scapegoat the figure of woman for
morally repugnant aspects of capitalist pursuits. Such scapegoating engen-
ders the desire to maximize profits not only by cleansing profiteering of its
morally reprehensible features, but also by eroticizing the quest to capital-
ize on one's investment.1 My larger reason for examining this scapegoating
process is to try to understand how at certain moments feminist sentiment
surfaces in what are otherwise antifeminist works of the period. I am not
interested in whether Mandeville and Lillo were feminists,2 but rather in the
contradictory conjunction of feminist arguments and misogynous portray-
als in their texts. Unlike Otway's Orphan, Mandeville's Defence and Lillo's
London Merchant successfully erect distinctions between (bad) women and
(good) businessmen. The Orphan is caught in a sadomasochistic affective
economy, she-tragedies in general generating too much pathos for their hero-
ines so that audiences cannot easily relinquish their identification with them.
Such an identification must be relinquished in order for a text to success-
fully scapegoat women for unsavory aspects of capitalist enterprise; a sadis-
tic moment is needed for disidentification to take place. Mandeville's treatise
on prostitutes—a shadowy counterpart to his defense of mercantile capital-
ism in The Fable of the Bees—and Lillo's bourgeois tragedy sadistically
deanimate their heroines (prostitutes; businesswomen who trade in bodies)
in order to animate and beautify capitalists (capitalists; businessmen who
truck only in abstract labor, labor allegedly disengaged from particular bod-
ies). Mandeville's and Lillo's texts successfully idealize the capitalist, as I
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will show, by abjecting women, and it is through abjection that these texts
attempt to engender the desire to produce profits.
Prologue: The Desire to Consume
Raymond Williams talks about representations of the desire to consume
luxuries in early-seventeenth-century literature. He finds portrayed in coun-
try-house poems like Ben Jonson's "To Penshurst" a certain "willing and
happy ethic of consuming [which is unaware of] the possible grossness of
[such consumption]." There is a sense of "prolonged delight," he says, in
"that easy, insatiable exploitation of the land and its creatures."3 Later in
the century, Williams maintains, people become much more self-conscious
about the exorbitance of capitalist desires. As Laura Brown has demon-
strated in her recent article "Reading Race and Gender: Jonathan Swift,"
early-eighteenth-century texts associate female desire with the desire to con-
sume foreign products.4 Not only in those mercantile tracts that deplored
importing goods, but also in the "Whig panegyrics" that celebrated trade,
the desire to consume imports was rewritten as the female desire for fash-
ion, for sexual attractiveness, hence as woman's inordinate sexual appe-
tites.5 Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the Bees, reprinted throughout the
1720s, partakes of this trend.6 A great trading nation, Mandeville contends,
consists in "[m]illions endeavoring to supply / Each other's Lust and Van-
ity" (1:18). The Fable represents unbridled consumerism as vicious but de-
fends it as a necessary evil: " . . . they, that would revive / A Golden Age,
must be as free / For Acorns, as for Honesty" (1:37); those who preach
against acquiring luxuries had better be ready for discomfort, he says.
Economists writing later in the century did not follow Mandeville's lead
of portraying consumerism as a necessary evil, but rather, as Albert O.
Hirschman has shown, tried to reconcile the desire for luxury with tradi-
tional notions of virtue.7 Thus, Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments
(1759) portrays some forms of consumerism as bad and others as good: "It
is the great fallacy of Dr. Mandeville's book [The Fable of the Bees] to rep-
resent every passion as wholly vicious which is so in any degree and in any
direction."8 It appears as though a change has taken place between the writ-
ing of the Fable and of Smith's Theory, a change that allows capitalist de-
sires to be seen not merely as an evil, albeit a necessary one, but also as an
ideal; in fact, however, it is precisely Mandeville's representation of the de-
sire to consume that enables Smith to make these distinctions of degree and
direction, that enables him to call some forms of consumerism virtuous and
others reprehensible. Mandeville's tract scapegoats women for consumer-
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ism and depicts male merchants as trading merely for the sake of satisfying
their wives' vicious desires.
Since consumerism is portrayed as unequivocally evil in Mandeville's
Fable, one might expect it to be an antimercantile tract.9 It is not such a
tract precisely because the evil consumer it portrays is Woman. The Fable,
subtitled "Private Vices, Publick Benefits," argues that the public benefits
from the vicious habits of private citizens; trade is stimulated by the desire
for luxury. However, Mandeville formulates the argument so that a male
public benefits from the private world of evil women. The essays or "Re-
marks" appended in 1714 to Mandeville's original poem explicitly attack
women: if the wives who now demand goods from their husbands, it says,
were to change suddenly and "behave themselves as a sober wise Man could
wish them," "nothing could make amends to the Detriment Trade would
sustain" (1:225). The reader must realize, Mandeville asserts, "that a con-
siderable Portion of what the Prosperity of London and Trade in general,
and consequently the Honour, Strength, Safety, and all the worldly Interest
of the Nation consist in, depends entirely on the Deceit and vile Stratagems
of Women. . . . [The virtues women should have] could not possibly be a
thousandth Part so serviceable, to make an opulent, powerful, and what we
call a flourishing Kingdom, than their most hateful Qualities" (1:228). In
this passage, Mandeville attacks women and condemns consumerism: the
desire for things leads women to use "Deceit and vile Strategems." How-
ever, it is by way of that condemnation of women that Mandeville is able to
quarantine the vicious part of capitalism and then idealize the capitalist
enterprise of trading: an honorable, strong, safe, opulent, powerful, flour-
ishing kingdom is a trading kingdom, and the activity of trading itself in no
way involves the deceit or vile strategems of consuming women. By confin-
ing the vicious part of capitalism to the female consumer, the text purifies
the merchant's desire to get goods.
Mandeville's Fable can distinguish between the abject10 desire to indulge
in luxury and the ideal desire to trade because of its use of the figure of
woman: vicious consumerism is female, virtuous mercantilism is male. As
Rene Girard has shown in his work on the scapegoat, the scapegoat must be
recognizably the same as its ideal counterpart in order for that ideal to be
established. Scapegoating must be recognizably arbitrary: that which is to
be idealized and its abject counterpart must visibly share those attributes
for which the abject will be scapegoated; in order to assume any given
society's ideals as their own, members must be able to identify both with the
ideal and with the scapegoated victim who takes the punishment for the
ideal's repulsive qualities.11 To put this in terms of Mandeville's Fable, En-
glish merchants can only feel wholly good about searching the world for
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treasures if they can punish women with whom they identify, the consum-
ing women who force their husbands to "rob the State" and "ransack" the
Indies in order to get what they want (1:33): it is only through identifying
with these vicious women whom they castigate or symbolically murder that
merchants can purify and elevate their own motives.
At times, Mandeville's Fable reveals the arbitrariness of pinning on the
figure of woman the vicious desire to consume. It is either out of love or
"out of Vanity," Mandeville says, that some men are "lavish to their Wives,
and . . . croud New Clothes and other Finery upon them faster than they
can ask it" (1:227). Here, the Fable almost recognizes that the female con-
sumer is not always female. Intuitively one might read this moment in the
Fable as profeminist: women are not really to blame for consumerism,
Mandeville seems to say; men are. But Girard's account offers a counterin-
tuitive reading of this passage: identifying with the abject female consumer
allows the proper businessman to successfully disown his own excessive
desires by punishing these female figures for them. The female consumer
must be identical to the male writers and readers who are victimizing her in
order to effectively take the blame for their faults. Thus, what appears to be
a feminist moment is in effect an invitation to identify with the scapegoat
for the sake of making that scapegoating process effective.
As the case of consumerism demonstrates, then, works of the Restora-
tion and the early eighteenth century engaged in the project of rendering
capitalist desires morally respectable are able to degrade and elevate the
same passion by splitting it in two, splitting it into its ideal male and abject
female forms. I will now examine this dynamic in the case of the desire for
profit. It makes sense that in its abject female form, such a desire would be
pinned on prostitutes—they are profiteers easily degraded. I turn therefore
to Mandeville's treatise on legalizing prostitution.
Mandeville's Modest Defence of Publick STEWS (1724) sets up an ab-
ject and decidedly female version of the desire to intensify profits; it creates
the version of it that, in a certain degree and direction, is "wholly vicious,"
so that in another degree and direction it can be ideal. For this reason,
moments in this treatise that appear to be feminist are actually moments
when the text invites identification with women in order to better scapegoat
them. These feminist ideas and figures are sympathetic precisely to the de-
gree that the ideal capitalist appears to readers and writers to be contami-
nated by abject desires; victimized females are the more sympathetic the
more the capitalist needs to be cleaned off. Anxieties about the excesses of
profit-hungry merchants get displaced onto the fear that prostitutes are reap-
ing too much profit, excessive pleasure as well as too much money. In
Mandeville's Modest Defense of Publick STEWS, the rule goes, when anx-
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ious because businessmen can control the fate of Spain, then regulate the
business of bawds.
Profiteering: Filthy versus Clean
A Modest Defence is a satire on reformers, the same group Mandeville at-
tacked in his "Essay on Charity and Charity-Schools" of 1723. Mandeville
writes his treatise on streetwalkers in the character of the "Reformer" "Phil-
Porney,"12 a lover of prostitutes.13 Phil Porney's "Dedication" is addressed
to the "Gentleman" of the Reforming Societies whose method of "convert-
ing" prostitutes does not seem to be working: "[I]t would not be amiss, if
You chang'd somewhat your present Method of Conversion, especially in
the Article of Whipping. It is very possible, indeed, that leaving a Poor Girl
Penny-less, may put her in a Way of living Honestly, tho' the want of Money
was the only Reason of her living otherwise; and the Stripping of her Na-
ked, may, for aught I know, contribute to Her Modesty, and put Her in a
State of Innocence; but surely, Gentlemen, You must all know, that Flog-
ging has a quite contrary Effect" (x-xi).
A Modest Defence of Publick STEWS thus satirizes "the Defence of
Modesty and Virtue" (i) undertaken by reform societies; however, as I will
now show, it is not so much about reform as it is about business.
Richard Cook maintains that Mandeville seriously proposes state-run
prostitution.14 Cook contends that Mandeville exaggerates the mercantilist
position not to parody it but rather for the sake of baiting his opponents.
The grand jury had condemned the author of The Fable a year earlier, say-
ing that Mandeville had endeavored to apologize for and praise "the very
Stews themselves. . . . with Design, we conceive, to debauch the Nation."15
However, as Cook recognizes, Mandeville could be satirizing the mercantil-
ist stance: Phil Porney's discussion of the importation of foreign women and
the retail price of various kinds of prostitutes might be designed to outrage
readers over the alienating effects of mercantile practices. It is always pos-
sible, therefore, to argue that Mandeville exploits what Cook calls the "comic
potentialities" of mercantilism in order to satirize it. Like The Fable of the
Bees, which could be read as a rigorist rejection of capitalist values, A Mod-
est Defence could be read as an antimercantilist tract.16
We can avoid the whole issue of Mandeville's seriousness by reading the
text not for his opinions about prostitution and mercantilism, but rather for
the ideological work it does, whether serious or not.17 There is no simple
relation between the growth of prostitution and the proliferation of texts
on prostitution, nor between mercantile expansion and the use of it as a
figure. The Reform Movement and (anti)prostitution tracts should not be
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seen as simply a reaction to a preexisting social problem, any more than
Whig panegyric depicts a preexisting economic reality. By defining "Vice"
and campaigning against it, reformers work toward channeling desire in
new ways.
Henry Abelove has suggested that "sexual intercourse so-called," that is,
those sexual activities that promote reproduction, "became importantly more
popular" during the eighteenth century, and that this popularity accompa-
nied and may not be distinct from the privileging of productivity in profit-
intensive economic pursuits.18 The plan for state-regulated "public stews,"
Phil Porney asserts, will restore the "Inclination to Matrimony" (29). He
insists that state-run prostitution will increase "the Number of [the state's]
Inhabitants" on whom its "Prosperity" depends (5) by restoring to mar-
riage its true "Ends and Purposes" (30): people will not marry for Love,
which they can get more easily at the government stew, but rather will marry
to propagate (26-34; cf. 4-5). If the reformers and other prostitution tracts
attempt—seriously in their case—not only to inspire young men "to quit
the Gaiety of a Single Life" (30), but also to persuade them that the func-
tion of marriage is propagation, then they may be seen as part of the move-
ment toward privileging reproductive sexual behavior that accompanied
privileging production. Abelove does not intend to imply that a rise in re-
production caused a rise in production, or vice versa: "Neither of these
causal arguments would seem to me to be sound, and both would of course
depend on a too-easy and conventional distinction between the sexual and
material realms."19
At the level of argument, Mandeville's treatise works toward establish-
ing what is now for us this "too-easy and conventional" distinction be-
tween sexual pleasure and business. However, A Modest Defence also
simultaneously seems to dissolve this distinction: it represents profit-mak-
ing as sexually pleasurable, ideal in its male form, abject in its female form.
Representing the distinction between the two as arbitrary does less to dis-
solve the distinction than it does to establish it.
A Modest Defence sets up two kinds of capitalists: Mandeville directly
addresses the people to whom he is speaking about regulating prostitution
in their capacity as reasonable businessmen, and indirectly he figures the
women about whom he speaks as abhorrent capitalists. Occasionally ob-
scene, the treatise spends pages describing woman's irrational and overly
"eager Pursuit of Pleasure" (45-46) in contrast to man's necessary and ra-
tional business pursuits. According to the Defence, all women essentially
want to lose their chastity (44, 51), but they manage their "modesty" as
men manage property, capital, and credit. Mandeville's Modest Defence
renders virtuous the capitalist's exorbitant desire for profit by contrasting it
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with the prostitute's business activity. This contrast forms an arbitrary dis-
tinction between good and bad versions of the desire to exploit others for
the sake of one's own pleasure. The arbitrariness of it is especially visible
when sexual behavior is figured as economic activity and vice versa.
Phil Porney begins his treatise by saying that "mischievous Consequences"
do not come from "Whoring, consider'd in itself, but only proceed from the
Abuse and ill Management of it; our Business is certainly to regulate this
Affair in such sort as may best prevent [many] Mischiefs" (6). In this
projector's mercantilist dream, turning "Private Whoring" ("rape, seduc-
tion, and adultery without the exchange of money")20 into "Publick Whor-
ing" or prostitution (8) by erecting public stews will eliminate "the ill
Consequences of this Vice" (2). But the projector gets lost in his own mer-
cantile zeal. In a way that certainly scandalized most of Mandeville's read-
ers,21 Phil Porney discusses female prostitutes as commodities, dividing them
"into four Classes, who for their Beauty, or other Qualifications, may justly
challenge different Prices" and elaborately detailing why one woman should
cost "Half a Crown" while another should rate "a Guinea" (13). As is vis-
ible even in the projector's excess, the ostensible argument is that changing
stews from whatever they are into business will promote the public good,
that therefore private whoring is at this moment not a business. However,
as shown below, the effect of the treatise is to demonstrate that women are
already good managers of their most valuable commodity, their feigned or
real chastity.22 Sex is indeed a business, and women are not mismanaging it,
but managing it too well.
Mandeville's projector wants to argue that women cannot manage their
chastity because in women passion predominates over businesslike ratio-
nality: "In short, there requires no more to convince us of the Violence of
Female Desire when raised to a proper height, but only to consider, what a
terrible Risque a Woman runs to gratify it. Shame and Poverty are look'd
upon as Trifles, when they come in Competition with this predominating
Passion" (41). To further support the treatise's premise that passion op-
poses financial interest and therefore must be publicly managed, one would
think that Phil Porney would go on, from his discourse on the violence of
female desire, to describe how women forget their financial interests in the
heat of sexual desire, and the treatise does do that to a degree—it is de-
signed to be titillating. However, in Phil Porney's taxonomy of types of women
and how they manage their chastity, Mandeville's treatise actually demon-
strates that women manage their honor so as to both gratify their passion
and serve their financial interest. In fact, at moments during this account of
women's maneuvers, financial gain and sexual pleasure become indistin-
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guishable. The most successful businesswoman is (or will become) the most
passionate, and Mandeville describes their strategies in economic terms.
Passion, honor, and interest are the three terms used in Mandeville's
treatise to perform a surprisingly structuralist analysis of types of women:
each of the four types of women is defined by the presence or absence of
passion, of a strong desire for honor, and of a strong sense of financial
interest. The first type is naturally chaste; this kind of woman desires honor
and has little or no passion (42). The second type, the woman who values
her reputation as much as the first but is naturally amorous—Mandeville
calls her "a Wanton Woman of Honour" (45)—tries to maintain her repu-
tation by concealing her amorous escapades. Phil Porney describes these
efforts at concealment as trying to buy sexual pleasure on credit: by hid-
ing their sexual encounters, these women try "to purchase Pleasure with-
out the Expence of Reputation" (45).
In the passage in which he describes the third type, middling women who
want to marry well, Mandeville equates financial interest with sexual de-
sire. These women have neither honor nor inclination; that is, since they do
not yet have honor (and with it, money), they completely repress their inor-
dinate sexual appetites: "[F]or when a Woman has her Interest and Fortune
depending upon her Reputation, as all the middle Rank of Womankind
have, she is a Woman of Honour of course. Interest, indeed, is inseparable
from Female Honour. . . .  The bare Puncto of Honour, when abstracted
from Interest, would prove but a small Rub to Women in their eager Pursuit
of Pleasure: Thus we see the Conduct of a Maiden Lady, how much more
Circumspect is it whilst her Fortune in Marriage is depending, than after-
wards, when that Point of Interest is secured by a Husband" (45-46). This
passage deviates from the argument Phil Porney wants to make. He wants
to say that female desire is so strong, the only way to contain it is by pre-
venting men from laying siege to it. Here, in contradiction to that conten-
tion, a woman's desire is perfectly in tune with her financial interests: she is
naturally a woman of honor ("a Woman of Honour of course"), naturally
"circumspect" until her "Interest" has been "secured by a Husband." Once
comfortably married, however, "let their natural Chastity be ever so great,
the smallest Spark of Desire is capable of being blown up and rais'd to a
considerable Pitch" (46). In other words, for those who have secured their
interest through marriage, financial well-being incites desire.
According to A Modest Defence, then, all women manage their own de-
sire just as a businessman manages his "Accounts," with a view to procur-
ing the greatest amount of financial gain and pleasure. As the treatise
describes their endeavors, pleasure is equated with financial gain by being
figured as success in capitalist enterprise. Lower-class women who have no
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chance of gaining a fortune through marriage "can't promote their Interest
by preserving their Chastity, yet, if they have the least Spark of Beauty, they
will find their Account sufficiently in parting with it" (47). A woman who
wants a man to marry her will "bribe his After-Love, by the great Value she
seems to put upon her Chastity before she makes him a Present of it" (48).
A woman who tries to raise the value of her chastity by actually remaining
chaste instead of merely resisting temporarily must have "a good Stock of
Virtue, [or] an unaccountable Series of good Fortune if she escapes" from
passion (52).
The most striking and disturbing figure represents men as essentially bet-
ter capitalists than women because men have penises. A woman's vagina,
Mandeville says, is "like a Debtor's House upon the Verge of two Coun-
tries, [and so] is liable to be attack'd both Ways; a parte ante, & a parte
post" (49). Collecting a debt is here equated with laying siege to a vagina,
with rape. In "Commerce with Women" (30), a vagina owes and a penis
makes it pay. The tropological argument of the text equates profit with
sexual pleasure.
The logical argument of the Defence, however, pretends that only bawds
are merchants driven by passion. It contrasts bawds with the business man-
agers to whom Phil Porney speaks, the men who should take over and run
houses of prostitution and who habitually practice "that cool Exercise of
[their] Reason" (8) unless they are distracted by (sexual) desire (4, 8). At the
level of argument, A Modest Defence thus explicitly disconnects sexual plea-
sure from the pleasure of making money. Erecting public whorehouses, the
argument runs, will keep businessmen from falling in love and therefore
will help business; it will save businessmen from "the Expence [love] occa-
sions, and the Neglect of Worldly Business" (22). The sexual desire that
rules women and that men can rationally regulate in order to keep them-
selves fit for business "is quite inconsistent with Industry, the main Support
of any, especially a trading, Nation" (4). As part of this attempt to separate
business from sexual pleasure, women become associated with the realm of
leisure in two ways: they are said to be too passionate to take care of their
own financial interest, as seen above, and are relegated to the status of
objects in the realm of leisure and pleasure. It is through these representa-
tions of the figure of woman, therefore, that A Modest Defence is able to
establish a series of oppositions: "Men of Business" versus "Men of Plea-
sure" (24); industry versus "Indolence" (22, 4); business versus leisure (26).
Tropologically, as we have seen, the text equates business and sexual
activity. It does so for the sake of inviting businessmen to identify with the
bawds who will be scapegoated for the desire to exploit others to increase
their own pleasure. The whores appearing on Mandeville's pages are filthy
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embodiments of and containers for the kind of pleasure that has been ex-
cluded from, that one denies that one gets through, profit-intensive busi-
ness management: indolence and pleasure in excess are here figured as sexual
pleasure, and sexual pleasure is quarantined, as it were, from the clean con-
cerns of business. At the very moment when the distinction between the
drive to obtain sexual pleasure and the desire for financial gain most threat-
ens to collapse, the prostitutes in A Modest Defence are "abjected," in
Kristeva's sense of the term. They are figured as "dirt": a stew is "a Bog-
house"—an outhouse; a whore is a piece of "blown" or spoiled meat that
"a Modern Butcher. . . . hang[s] up for a Cure," that he uses to attract the
flies away from his fresh meat (xi). They are insidiously evil: a prostitute
has the power to contaminate the businessman, to "drain his Pocket, and
make him unfit for any Business" (25), to make him contract "a Seminal
Weakness" (32); furthermore, Mandeville carefully argues, it is really women
who spread venereal disease to men, and not vice versa (20-22). Here
Mandeville's treatise renders the figure of the businesswoman revolting and
marshals horror at her for the sake of making a distinction where one did
not exist before, or of shoring up a distinction that threatens to collapse: in
these passages, prostitutes are represented as filthy for the sake of distin-
guishing business from sexual pleasure.
Feminism, Capitalism, Aesthetics
A Modest Defence of Publick STEWS animates in the figure of the prosti-
tute the evils to be excluded from the ideal of prudent business manage-
ment: women get (sexual) pleasure out of capitalizing, men do not; women
capitalize in the service of indolence, men do not.23 A Modest Defence al-
lows the businessman to prosecute a victim recognizably as innocent (or as
guilty) as he is and yet completely other; it allows him to identify with and
simultaneously distance himself from, to abject, the evils of an exorbitant
desire for profit. The prostitute offers businessmen the perfect opportunity
for both identification and disavowal.
A Modest Defence sets businessmen and prostitutes up as identical an-
tagonists: Mandeville speaks to "lewd Men of Honour" (17) about "a wan-
ton Woman of Honour" (45). But there is another way of inviting identification:
arousing sympathy for female victims by pointing to the arbitrariness of con-
demning them. In Mandeville's treatise, there is no subtle transition between
passages that recognize the arbitrariness of scapegoating women and those
that assert that these women are completely other (i.e., that they are deserv-
ing victims). Open acknowledgments that condemnation is arbitrary con-
trast starkly with passages that scapegoat. Thus, Mandeville describes
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"Whoring as a Kind of Peccant Humour in the Body-Politick, which, in
order to its Discharge, naturally seizes upon such external Members as are
most liable to Infection, and at the same time most proper to carry off the
Malignity. If this Discharge is promoted by a Licence of Publick Stews, which
is a Kind of legal Evacuative, the Constitution will certainly be preserv'd"
(57). Prostitution is the discharge of infected bodily fluids, a "Virulence"
and a "Contagion" (58) that threatens to "[seize] upon . . . external Mem-
bers . . . most liable to Infection"; it is truly revolting. But a page before
comparing whorehouses to outhouses and prostitutes to maggot-infested
meat, Phil Porney, in what appears to be real understanding and sympathy,
admonishes overzealous reformers "that leaving a Poor Girl Penny-less, may
put her in a Way of living Honestly, tho' the want of Money was the only
Reason of her living otherwise" (x). A Modest Defence of Publick STEWS
abjects women—offers identification with them, allowing them to become
the locus of all projections, and then violently debases them so that identifi-
cation is withdrawn—in order to idealize capitalist desires. It is because of
this dynamic that real disgust with prostitutes stands in stark contrast to
what appears to be real profeminist support of them. This text thus seems
to contain feminist sentiment, which is in fact only a tool for implementing
an ideological effect, the promotion of capitalist desires.
In Mandeville's treatise, as in Lillo's play, examined below, feminism is
not proposed for its own sake, but to stimulate temporary identifications:
identifying with female figures is necessary in order to turn them into effec-
tive scapegoats. Mandeville's text is hobbled aesthetically by the task of
performing abjection for an audience that needs to be regaled with rational
arguments about equality to make identifying with prostitutes possible.
Because of the seesaw of invitations to identify with women, proffered and
then violently withdrawn, the text does not look unified, and Mandeville
does not look like a unified personality. We might call him "borderline"
now because of the radical swings he makes between sympathizing with
and hating women, though it would be wrong, as well as anachronistic, to
psychologize these rhetorical structures. Moreover, for Mandeville's audi-
ence, the seesaw worked to effect a difference.
Staging Difference
As seen in chapter 2, The Orphan and Jane Shore do not successfully repre-
sent their heroines as different enough from those for whom they are
scapegoated, and their deaths unleash a chaos of indifferentiation rather
than effectively resolving social ambiguity. In contrast, in William Wycherley's
The Country Wife and George Lillo's The London Merchant, difference is
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successfully established.24 The process of abjection successfully erects an
image of the ideal businessman: immoral in Wycherley's case, as one would
expect in Restoration comedy, because the pleasure he takes in business is
too evident; hypermoralized in The London Merchant as one would expect
of bourgeois, "realist" drama. Lillo's play is of the genre that Denis Diderot
called "la comedie larmoyant" and defined in his Entretiens sur Le Fils
naturel (1757) as the kind of play that arouses intense emotion and then
causes the spectator's "own emotion [to be] augmented by the large number
of those who share it."25 The London Merchant is able to establish its ideal
through scapegoating a woman (abjection) and transferring the pleasures
of indifferentiation to the pleasure of "discovering" a difference that is an
essence.
As Katherine Eisaman Maus has argued, in order for women to appear
on the English stage, there had to be a fundamental change in the concep-
tion of woman that rendered it "unrealistic" for boys to play the parts of
beautiful women. When woman is conceived of as an undeveloped man,
then a young boy can easily pass for Cleopatra; but when woman is con-
ceived of as essentially different from man, then such imitation is "unrealis-
tic."26 Thomas Laqueur has analyzed eighteenth-century medical texts on
reproduction in order to show that the conception of woman did change at
this time: she had been seen as a "lesser" or underdeveloped man and was
now being seen as essentially different. According to Laqueur, the change
takes place in order to allow the continued subordination of women despite
new theories of the equality of all human beings.27 However, it is most ana-
lytically useful to see the oppression of women in society not as an end in
itself, but rather as a structure capable of carrying an ideological load. The
political import of early-eighteenth-century gender distinctions has been
examined in detail by scholars who analyze cross-dressing.
Unsettling disguises, genuinely transgressive kinds of cross-dressing, con-
trast with those kinds that merely reinforce the norm and stabilize social
structure by stimulating resistance to "the deviant." This distinction is
Jonathan Dollimore's.28 To put it in terms relevant to early-eighteenth-cen-
tury practices, a truly transgressive kind of disguise is "blacking," whereas
a recuperable transgression is "masking."
In his book Whigs and Hunters, E.P. Thompson describes the practice of
blacking both in forests and in cities during the 1720s, to which the Black
Act of 1723 was a brutal response.29 Rural protesters reasserted their rights
to use newly enclosed common lands by blacking their faces and hunting
deer on private property. The notorious Black Act made deer hunting in
disguise a capital offense. One way to explain the severity of such punish-
ment is to say that such an act was necessary to enforce the new definition
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of property as "private." However, as an act passed by Parliament in 1722
clearly shows, capital punishment was invoked not so much against theft as
against blacking. "Theft or poaching," Thompson says, "might be conform-
able with due daylight deference. It was, above all, malice to the gentry
which the act was designed to punish" (256).
And not only malice, but also symbolic usurpation. For one thing, black-
ing was of a piece with those customary practices that, on special feast
days—and then, beginning in the early 1720s, during public protest—al-
lowed for the temporary overturning of hierarchies: customary practices
and the forms of protest that evolved out of them that have been described
by Bob Bushaway and by Stallybrass and White30 often involved men dress-
ing as women and sometimes also playing the part of royalty. For example,
the turnpike rioters at Lebury in 1735 blackened their faces and dressed in
women's clothes,31 thereby pointing to the fact that disguise is meant to
overturn hierarchies, in this case that of gender. But class hierarchies were
also threatened: the leader of the Hampshire blacks active from 1720 to
1723 was named "King John." And authorities perceived the threat as one
directed at social status. Thompson writes that, for the sake of prosecuting
metropolitan imitators of the Windsor and Hampshire Blacks, Parliament
passed "an almost forgotten act (9 George I c.28) . . . with a death-clause
for anyone who, from a pretended place of privilege, joined in disguise or
riot" (249). It was not deer-stealing but deer-stealing in blackface that so
much threatened economic distinctions. In the early eighteenth century, dis-
guising oneself through blacking had the same effect as did cross-dressing in
the early seventeenth: these were not acts of hiding one's own person but
rather of hiding one's status. Blacking was a way of defying social structure
by covering its marks on one's body.
In contrast to blacking, masking as described by Terry Castle did not
pose a radical threat to social structure but rather reinforced that structure
by allowing a temporary release from it.32 Masquerades were like a safety
valve; they protected society by providing a place specifically for the trans-
gression of social and sexual norms. Allocating space within social struc-
ture for its violation protects the structure from direct challenges to it.
It is not quite possible to argue that, from the Renaissance to the Resto-
ration, blacking changed into masking: both were going on in the 1720s.
And similarly, it is possible to see, during the early eighteenth century, fe-
male cross-dressing that is genuinely subversive as well as instances of it
that merely flirt with ambiguity while containing it. Thus, Kristina Straub
argues that, although gender ambiguity became "intolerable" when con-
nected with male actors during the Restoration and the early eighteenth
century, female cross-dressing remained genuinely subversive: "The cross-
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dressed actress of the early to mid-eighteenth century seems to constitute a
historical possibility for pleasure in sexual gender ambiguities."33 But Straub
recognizes that this kind of pleasure gets shut down as the century progresses:
"By the end of the century, discourse about the cross-dressed actress is both
more condemnatory . . . and more insistent that female cross-dressing, like
the male, was mere travesty, an obvious parody which left gender bound-
aries unquestioned" (127). It is therefore possible to impose a narrative of
change on these two kinds of phenomena. Just as the genuinely threatening
blacking gradually ceded to a contained kind of subversive behavior, mask-
ing,34 there was a change on the English stage from truly transgressive to
merely recuperative cross-dressing, or cross-dressing that is mere masking.
When characters like Shakespeare's Rosalind disguised themselves as boys
on the Renaissance stage, their gender was truly ambiguous and therefore
defied social definition: "Rosalind" was a boy actor playing the role of a
female disguised as a boy. Lisa Jardine has shown that what was titillating
for Renaissance audiences was this genuinely transgressive ambiguity itself:
"the boy player," she says, "is liable to be regarded with erotic interest
which hovers somewhere between the heterosexual and the homosexual
around his female attire."35 During the Renaissance, Jean Howard has ar-
gued, cross-dressing by women off the stage was not just transgressive but
too revolutionary to be borne: cross-dressed women "signal not only the
breakdown of the hierarchical gender system, but of the class system as
well."36 What made female cross-dressing not only bearable, but enjoyable
enough for cross-dressed women to appear on the stage?
Shortly after women began acting on the stage in 1660, they not only
played roles in which female characters cross-dress, they were also cross-
cast: plays such as Thomas Killigrew's Parson's Wedding and William
Congreve's Love for Love were staged using actresses to play all the parts,
male and female. But the attraction of these spectacles, Pat Rogers has ar-
gued, the attraction of women playing "the breeches part" on the Restora-
tion stage, came from their failure to pass themselves off as men, revealing
the essential womanliness that lay "beneath" any disguise.37 The cross-dressed
woman on stage who cannot be manly proves the rule that women are not
like men, and it was this reinforcement of the law that gave audiences such
pleasure. By emphasizing the fact that female cross-dressing gave early-eigh-
teenth-century audiences pleasure from genuine gender ambiguity, Straub
does not wish to overturn Rogers's argument, but rather to say that he is
"correct up to a point": that the change he imagines "may have been only
emergent at this moment in history."38 Clearly, in the 1720s, cross-dressing
stimulated two kinds of pleasure. As in the case of the boys-playing-women-
dressed-as-boys of the Renaissance stage, titillation on the early-eighteenth-
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century stage comes not only from sexual ambiguity, as Straub maintains.
However, in contrast to Renaissance cross-dressing, pleasure also comes
from the resolution of ambiguity, as Rogers demonstrates.
Williams's notion of dominant, emergent, and residual ideological struc-
tures is an especially valuable analytic tool here:39 William Wycherley's Coun-
try Wife and George Lillo's London Merchant both proffer an emergent
ideology, the belief that men and women are essentially different. Wycherley's
earlier play can be seen as addressing an audience who, however, still gets as
much pleasure from gender ambiguity as it does from the clarification of
gender distinctions. At that moment, the belief that women are underdevel-
oped men still dominates, but it is beginning to evanesce into a residue. By
the time Lillo's play is produced in the 1730s, the dominant ideology of
Wycherley's moment is even closer to becoming residual, and the emergent
view that sexual difference is essential is fast becoming dominant.
If during the Renaissance one declares a definitely social identity by the
clothes one wears and threatens social definitions by wearing different
clothes, on the mid-eighteenth-century stage, a woman's essence is revealed
by the clothes she peels off, through the rather piecemeal exposure of fe-
male body parts underneath the rind of male clothes. The new pleasure that
comes from resolving ambiguity is dramatized in William Wycherley's Coun-
try Wife. Marjorie Pinchwife has demanded that her jealous husband take
her to see a play. Pinchwife is forced to take her but determined to hide her
from Homer, who wants to make him a cuckold. Pinchwife's sister Alithea
recommends that she put on a mask. "A mask," he replies, "is as ridiculous
a disguise as a stage-beard; her shape, stature, habit will be known." Not
only that, he says, "A mask makes people but the more inquisitive. . . .
Masks have made more cuckolds than the best faces that ever were known.
. . . A mask! No—a woman masked, like a covered dish, gives a man curios-
ity and appetite, when, it may be, uncovered, 'twould turn his stomach"
(3.1.93-99,105-8). This passage eroticizes pretended depths: not knowing
what lies beneath the mask makes whatever it is more valuable and attrac-
tive. That is, Pinchwife ends up being wrong about the nausea one may feel
in uncovering the dish; as the libertines who seduce Marjorie demonstrate,
glimpses of what is inside it increase pleasure. Pinchwife dresses Marjorie
up in a suit he has bought for his brother-in-law, but covering her body
succeeds no better at mitigating Horner's desire than covering her face with
a mask would have done. The disguise fails because, as Pinchwife puts it,
"she carries it so sillily" (3.2.381). In her behavior, she exposes the essential
femaleness hiding underneath a man's clothes. And yet we cannot quite get
over Pinchwife's suggestion that this essential femaleness may turn out to be
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something nauseating: an abject sexuality, perhaps, that is indistinguishably
female or male. The pleasures of unresolved gender ambiguity are alleged to
be disgusting by this play, but they have not been completely prohibited, as
indeed they are by Lillo's play.
George Lillo's London Merchant scapegoats anyone donning blackface
in representation; the play resolves indeterminate identity into an essential
difference through the figural abjection of anyone whose blacking threatens
the structure.40 On a walk "at some distance from a county seat," the cor-
rupted apprentice Barnwell decides to murder his uncle in order to get the
money he needs to court a woman: "[Wjithout money, Millwood will never
see me more, and life is not to be endured without her. She's got such firm
possession of my heart and governs there with such despotic sway—aye,
there's the cause of all my sin and sorrow. 'Tis more than love; 'tis the fever
of the soul and madness of desire" (3.5.20-25, 49-50). To make sure that
he can continue to have sex with this courtesan, then, Barnwell "[p]uts on
the vizor, and draws a pistol" (3.5.36, 50)—he becomes guilty of blacking,
of disguising himself as a highwayman. After Barnwell has killed his uncle,
however, he repents, and the ambiguity caused by blacking disappears when
Barnwell "throws off his mask" (3.6.16). When Barnwell is executed at the
end of the play, Millwood is executed with him, but not before her gender is
called into question in her interchanges with the "good" apprentice
"Trueman."
The character Blunt calls Millwood "the Devil," whom he describes as
"he that first seduces to sin and then betrays to punishment" (4.14.5, 60).
Trueman then calls her "deceitful, cruel, bloody woman!" but then adds,
"To call thee woman were to wrong the sex, thou devil!" Millwood re-
sponds: "That imaginary being is an emblem of thy cursed sex collected, a
mirror wherein each particular man may see his own likeness and that of all
mankind!" (4.18.1-7, 64). Millwood's diatribe is less a canny feminist cri-
tique than it is a rhetorical device used to call her own gender identity into
question.
Gender indeterminacy renders Millwood an effective abject for erecting
Thorowgood and Trueman into ideal men of business: thoroughly, truly
good men. Lillo's London Merchant splits the capitalist in two, into an
ideal and an abject capitalist, the merchant Thorowgood and the prostitute
Millwood, who are indistinguishable except for gender. Millwood is the
inverted, mirror image of Thorowgood. She cares for nothing but money.
She ruthlessly perverts Thorowgood's apprentice Barnwell into stealing from
his master. Unlike Millwood, who will attempt to get wealth in any way
possible, Thorowgood teaches his apprentice Trueman that "the method of
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merchandise" is not "merely a means of getting wealth" but instead "a
science" that must be used to "promot[e] humanity" (3.1.1-5,40). Millwood
is both the victim and the perpetrator of robbery:
I curse your barbarous sex who robbed me of [my "uncommon perfections of
mind and body"], ere I knew their worth, then left me, too late, to count their
value by their loss. Another and another spoiler came, and all my gain was
poverty and reproach. My soul disdained, and yet disdains, dependence and
contempt. Riches, no matter by what means obtained, I saw secured the worst
of men from both. I found it, therefore, necessary to be rich and to that end I
summoned all my arts. You call 'em wicked; be it so! They were such as my
conversation with your sex had furnished me withal. (4.18.4-20)
She presents therefore a demonic version of the ideal portrayed by Trueman:
I have observed those countries where trade is promoted and encouraged do
not make discoveries to destroy but to improve mankind—by love and friend-
ship to tame the fierce and polish the most savage; to teach them the advan-
tages of honest traffic by taking from them with their own consent, their
useless superfluities, and giving them in return what, from their ignorance in
manual arts, their situation, or some other accident, they stand in need of.
(3.1.11-19,40)
Millwood was robbed of what was essential to her without her consent,
and she herself continues that process. But the merchants who trade with
savages are nothing like those who originally dispossessed Millwood, and
thus nothing like Millwood herself, who follows in their path. The mer-
chants are not rapists: the "savages" with whom merchants trade, accord-
ing to Trueman, have "useless superfluities," not essential parts of themselves,
"takfen] from them with their own consent," not via rape.
The play opens by representing Thorowgood as having forced Genoa to
break a contract to loan Spain money for the sake of diverting "the storm
that threatened our royal mistress, pure religion, liberty, and laws" (1.1.1-
22). Karl Kroeber is justifiably amazed that such activities can be here called
the practice of "honest merchants" and that it would inspire in Trueman
the apprentice an "honest scorn" with which to reject all vice. Kroeber points
out that it is hard to see how "such mercantile national self-interest differs
from Millwood's mercenary egoism."41 Millwood will be executed for per-
suading Barnwell to break his contracts, as an apprentice to a merchant and
as a client to a manorial lord. It is precisely the similarity between Millwood
and Thorowgood, their near indistinguishability, that allows the play to get
away with extreme (and to our taste, ridiculous) praise of all mercantile
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practices as sheerly beneficial to humankind. When Millwood is scapegoated
at the end of the play, she takes the blame for all the evils of mercantile
capitalism.
Millwood is minimally distinguished from Thorowgood and Trueman
by gender. Insofar as she is like them, she is able to stand in for whatever
materiality could undermine the businessman's ego ideal. Insofar as she dif-
fers from them, she can be scapegoated for the qualities of business that are
evil. But distinction by gender established in the case of Millwood is not
finally secure. One would think that such indeterminacy would undo the
differences that the figure of Millwood establishes, the difference between
good and bad business, rape and trade, nationalist fervor and the breaking
of contracts. However, in this play, instead of undermining differences, the
inability to differentiate by gender is actually localized in Millwood and
itself expelled. Millwood is scapegoated for being immoral in business and
for her own gender indeterminacy. She represents the power of blacking,
having learned early, she says, to protect herself by "detraction [which], like
darkness and death, blackens all objects and levels all distinction" (4.18.31-
32, 65). Her creed is to live according to indifferentiation: "All actions are
alike natural and indifferent to man and beast who devour or are devoured
as they meet with others weaker or stronger than themselves" (4.18.43-45,
65). As a representative of gender indeterminacy, Millwood thus is
scapegoated for the figurative tricks that allow her to serve as a scapegoat
and effectively erect mercantile practices into an ideal.
Lillo's 1731 bourgeois tragedy solves a huge problem in representation
that the she-tragedies could not overcome: by using a trope customary in
medieval misogyny—woman as a figure for rhetoric itself42—bourgeois trag-
edy or "crying comedy" blames the figure of woman for the very rhetorical
instability necessary for making her into an effective scapegoat. That insta-
bility needs to be mustered, and then shut down for effective scapegoating,
for the woman to be effectively abjected. The figure of woman needs to be
seen as essentially distinct so that women can be used to establish perma-
nent-but-male universals and ideals. To the degree that she is not essentially
different, she is hateful. Since women are essentially feminine, a woman
who speaks like a man simply arouses more disgust, securing the scapegoating
process rather than undermining it.
Propaganda versus the Literary
It is clear from the production history of The London Merchant—produced
between 204 and 230 times during the eighteenth century, many times "At
the Particular Desire of several Persons of Distinction and eminent Mer-
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chants of the City of London,"43—that the play was indeed successful in
idealizing the man of business. Eighteenth-century audiences did not see as
unbelievable the play's unqualified praise of mercantilism: scapegoating
Millwood worked. As Tejumola Olaniyan puts it, Lillo's play legitimized
"the merchant self and function" in the face of "the snobbery of the landed
gentry" that saw "the merchant class" as inferior to landed wealth.44
But although popular, The London Merchant, like Mandeville's Modest
Defence ofPublick STEWS, never was considered great literature. Can we
conclude that idealizing capitalists and making great literature are two com-
pletely separate and opposed enterprises? As I pointed out in the introduc-
tion, literature is riot capitalist propaganda. Insofar as they are distinct from
propaganda, works that have been considered great and have become ca-
nonical contain literariness, a structural indeterminacy hostile to the suc-
cessful establishment of ideals. In contrast to propaganda, literary texts
structurally generate indeterminacy, although that indeterminacy can be
foreclosed upon in the process of canonization (as shown in chapter 1) by
the bourgeois consumer of high art. In noncanonical, propagandistic litera-
ture, the original structure of indeterminacy is missing. Although sadomas-
ochistic and therefore potentially indeterminate in structure, Otway's Orphan
is not considered to be great literature (i.e., it has not been canonized) be-
cause it generates indifferentiation rather than indeterminacy: there are not
several poles with which one can identify, but ultimately only one (if every-
one is the same) or none (if everyone is indistinguishable). Inculcating a
sadistic affective economy that effectively differentiates women from men,
Lillo's and Mandeville's texts are not "great" literature because they abjure
indeterminacy for the sake of establishing capitalist ideals, refusing in the
end to offer their heroines any sympathy at all. When Lillo generates too
much sympathy for Millwood, or when he renders her gender indetermi-
nate, at those moments the character engages in what look to be feminist
speeches. However, in the case of all three texts, the excessive attempts to
both generate and derail sympathetic identifications cause the stark juxta-
position of sexism with feminist sentiments. Excess is necessary because of
the absolute difference being established between men and women, making
it harder for a male audience or readership to identify with female figures
and feminist statements in the first place. In Mandeville's work, as for Lillo,
the requirements of effective scapegoating require them to deploy viable
feminist arguments, making their female figures sympathetic enough to their
audience, too sympathetic for us and perhaps for any budding feminists
among their readership. If this chapter explains why such a popular play
and pamphlet were not canonized, revealing some of the reasons for their
propagandistic feel to modern audiences, it might also begin to explain how
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the uttering of feminist sentiments might seem propagandistic: it is not the
starkness of feminist sentiments, nor their intrinsic "ugliness" as aesthetic
objects, but the promotion of capitalism to which these feminist utterances
contribute, that make them in particular part of noncanonical literature.
The Orphan, A Modest Defense, and The London Merchant are all
noncanonical texts that fail to preserve indeterminacy—the former collaps-
ing into a chaos of indifferentiation, the latter too successfully promoting
capitalist ideals. I now turn to noncanonical literature that is indeed inde-
terminate in structure. Mary Leapor's poetry is literary despite the fact that
it has never been canonized. Whereas the texts analyzed in chapters 2 and 3
do not contain the requisite structure for being great literature, whereas
they are not indeterminate and literary, Leapor's work suffers from the op-
posite problem: her poetry has never been canonized because its indetermi-
nacy is not reducible, because it could not be reduced to the bourgeois object,
literature.
In the next chapter I examine in Leapor's poetry another coincidence of
misogyny and feminism. This time, feminism is not just an epiphenomenon
of the attempt to balance a system of identifications and disidentifications:
Leapor uses misogyny to demystify literary conventions. In trying to under-
stand her work, one can see that misogynous reading practices that we have
inherited from the eighteenth century, practices necessary for establishing
our ideals, threaten to rob Leapor's work of its feminist potential. The next
chapter analyzes the effects of sadistic reading practices. Shutting down the
literariness of texts is one way of co-opting feminist protest: the sexism
intrinsic to certain conventions can be effectively registered only via ambi-
guities produced by literary form.
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Mary Leapor
Corydon: 'Tis true, her Linen may be something soil'd.
Phillario: Her Linen, Corydon!—Herself, you mean.
Are such the Dryads of thy smiling Plain?
Why, I could swear it, if it were no Sin,
That yon lean Rook can shew a fairer Skin.
Corydon: What tho' some Freckles in her Face appear?
That's only owing to the time o'th'Year.
Come, come; you view her with malicious Eyes:
Her Shape
Phillario: —Where Mountains upon Mountains rise!
And, as [if] they fear'd some Treachery at hand,
Behind her Ears her list'ning Shoulders stand.
Corydon: But she has Teeth—
Phillario: Considering how they grow,
'Tis no great matter if she has or no:
They look decay'd with Posset, and with Plumbs,
And seem prepar'd to quit her swelling Gums.
—Mary Leapor, from a poem upon herself called "Mira's Picture"
Note, This Description of her Person is a Caracture. [Note by the editors to
"Mira's Picture"]
I must beg Leave to enter a Caveat against printing the Poem call'd Myra's
Picture; because tho' she may be suppos'd to have made very free with her-
self, I think it may give the Reader a worse Idea of her Person than it deserv'd,
which was very far from being shocking, tho' there was nothing extraordi-
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nary in it. The Poem was occasioned by her happening to hear that a Gentle-
man who had seen some of her Poems, wanted to know what her person was.
—Bridget Freemantle, introduction to vol. 2 of Leapor's Poems
Bridget Freemantle advises against printing this antiblason written by the
popular eighteenth-century, laboring-class poet Mary Leapor.1 As her pa-
tron, Freemantle is concerned in general to present Leapor as one of the
deserving poor2 and thus is worried about this antiblason's politically sub-
versive intent. Freemantle's caveat implies that Leapor's "Picture" poem is
neither an accurate description nor a misogynous satire against women, as
antiblasons are usually taken to be. Rather, it is a satire of the aristocratic
gentleman Phillario, who, like the "Gentleman who had seen some of
[Leapor's] Poems [and] wanted to know what her person was," has a set of
expectations, gleaned from the pastoral, about rural, laboring women.
Phillario addresses the "harmless Shepherd Swain" Corydon in order to
find out whether "th'Arcadian Nymphs outshine / The shiv'ring Beauties of
this Northern Clime" (2:294-95): he ridiculously expects rural nymphs to
have white skin and teeth, despite the hardship of their physical existence.
This poem de-idealizes the pastoral nymph and swain by describing skin
freckled or browned from working out of doors and decayed teeth, which
Phillario foolishly attributes to eating sugar plums and wine-spiced posset
rather than to poverty. Leapor's poem, like Duck's "Thresher's Labour"
and Collier's The Woman's Labor, exposes the pastoral's deliberate obfus-
cation of rural labor and poverty,3 but it does so using a markedly different
strategy from that employed by either Duck or Collier. Whereas Duck and
Collier put male and female laborers (respectively) back into the prospect
from which they have been removed, Leapor depicts an aristocratic gentle-
man whose expectations of rural life, conditioned by the pastoral, are sorely
disappointed by Mira's dirty linen, swarthy skin, and bad teeth; real experi-
ence of the repugnant female body, Leapor insists, demystifies pastoral liter-
ary conventions.
"Mira's Picture" is not by any means the first antiblason. Antiblasons
are included in the first collection of poetry that eulogizes female body parts,
Marot and Sceve's Blasons anatomiques du corps feminin (1536).4 Before
the eighteenth century, antiblasons work, as parody always does, to better
define that tradition. For example, in his poem "My Mistress' Eyes are
Nothing Like the Sun," Shakespeare describes how unlike blason images
his lover's body actually is, for the sake of succeeding better than his prede-
cessors at praising her beauty: he de-idealizes for the sake of idealizing bet-
ter, outdoing but not overturning the blason form. In contrast, antiblason
poetry of the eighteenth century written by Jonathan Swift and Leapor ques-
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tions the ideological investments of the form. It operates as that kind of
literary history that engages in progressivist critique, the basic rhetorical
structure of which is articulated in John Locke's Essay concerning Human
Understanding.
Knowledge comes, Locke says, from "[observation employ'd either about
external, sensible Objects; or about the internal Operations of our Minds,
perceived and reflected on by our selves";s the experience of observing pro-
vides a ground for "the taking away False Foundations" (Essay, "Epistle to
the Reader," 10). Objective experience, experience of that which anyone
would find to be existing in reality, is used by Locke to critique the ideas
promulgated by past authorities,6 just as the antiblason points to reality in
order to critique literary conventions. Locke's critical, progressivist mode
of analysis thus constitutes a "reflection on 'today' as difference in history
and as motive for a particular philosophical task"—to take Michel Foucault's
definition of Enlightenment discourse.7 As an Enlightenment genre, the eigh-
teenth-century antiblason deploys the rhetoric of experience to reflect on
the adequacy of conventions; its "philosophical task" is to discover the re-
ality hidden by traditional literary forms for the sake of overcoming their
oppressive mystifications.
Contemporary histories of difference, whether feminist, post-Marxist, or
new historicist, despite their desire to distance themselves from the positiv-
ism informing Enlightenment modes of critique, implicitly rely on the rhetoric
of empiricism insofar as they presuppose the objectivity of their own pro-
nouncements. Since writing antiblasons is, as shown in more detail below,
an eighteenth-century way of doing a progressive, "new" history, analyzing
one of its most debilitating pitfalls can elucidate a serious problem con-
fronting those engaged now in recovering histories of difference through
cultural artifacts that intrinsically exclude those histories.8
Although enabling a progressive questioning of exclusionary cultural
forms, objectivity has its price. Demanding a "concordance between the
mind of man and the nature of things," as Bacon does in describing the new
science,9 puts pressure on representation to become immediate—that is, for
its own conditions to drop out of sight. Tristram Shandy tells us that Locke's
Essay "is a history-book . . . of what passes in a man's own mind,"10 but
eighteenth-century writers collude in trying to forget that it is a "book,"
"an account" of the raw stuff of experience rather than that stuff itself.
From Bacon to Sterne, history is being redefined so that rhetoric and condi-
tions of representation are seen only as containers for actuality. But of course
the rhetoricity of language continually reasserts itself, causing scientific
writers a certain amount of anxiety, as evinced by the often-quoted passage
from Thomas Sprat's History of the Royal Society in which he asks scien-
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tific writers to obviate "the mists and uncertainties [that come from] Tropes
and Figures" by "returning] back to the primitive purity [of language],
when men deliver'd so many things in almost an equal number of words."11
Both Naomi Schorr and Jacqueline Rose have noticed that, when anxiety
about representation runs particularly high in a given text, it turns misogy-
nous; that is, it attempts to incite hatred of women by depicting the female
body as disgusting.12 The (post)modern era beginning with the Enlighten-
ment might be defined by the intensity of anxiety over the sheer referentiality
of discourse.13 Depictions of the decaying female body are deployed to shore
up this emerging, modern "representational epistemology," in which "to
know reality is to have a correct [i.e., literal rather than figural, actual]
representation of things."14
In "Mira's Picture," one can see the anxiety caused by an implicit claim
to the referentiality of Leapor's discourse and, concomitantly, the use of
misogyny to allay it. In her antiblason, Leapor uses the platform of realistic,
experientially informed description as a method for attacking the way that
aristocratic conventions represent laboring women. She describes the fe-
male body as disgusting as a way of asserting the greater objectivity of her
own discourse in comparison with the aristocratic pastoral. "'Tis no great
matter whether [Mira] has [teeth] or no / They look decay'd," Phillario
exclaims: what difference does it make whether the nymph has teeth; they
are rotting! While that sentence shirks responsibility for accurately depict-
ing history (Mira may or may not have teeth), it simultaneously claims to
do so: that they are pictured as rotting constitutes proof that these teeth are
being accurately described—why would one describe teeth as decayed un-
less they actually are? The language of this poem is able to point to really
existing teeth because they are rotting. Whether language can capture the
"great matter"—the real world—that it points to "or no," is indeed a "great
matter" since it reveals the oppressiveness of aristocratic pastoral form.
A logic becomes apparent in the protest made by "Mira's Picture" then,
revealing a connection between feminist literary history and the antiblason
tradition. Because misogyny sustains objectivity, and because progressivist
discourse relies upon objective reality to demystify ideologically loaded mis-
representations of reality, misogynous representations are a particular temp-
tation even for Enlightenment discourses that are themselves engaged in
critiquing sexism. The trope of the repugnant female body has been used in
the rhetoric of empiricism to ground its own objectivity and consequently
has been a crucial component of progressivist discourses arising during the
Enlightenment—including feminism itself. Reading Leapor's more explic-
itly feminist antiblasons shows that, unfortunately, the representational epis-
temology sustained by misogyny underpins feminist literary histories. In
Misogyny and Feminism 87
literary history, misogyny and feminism are interdependent: there is a temp-
tation to misogyny in the writing of the a feminist literary history dedicated
to recovering women's voices.
The Antiblason as Progressivist Literary History
The antiblason's critical power—and, as discussed below, that of feminism
and new historicism—depends upon the visibility of its own literariness. We
mistake antiblasons as mere statements of misogyny insofar as we do not
notice that the speaker of the poem is a satiric persona. In both Leapor and
Swift, the satiric persona is an object of attack: he is one of those
"empiricks"—one of those "quacks, . . .  mountebanks, enthusiasts, and
theurgies"15—suspect for delivering such a misogynous outburst. The
"Cassy" of Swift's "Cassinus and Peter. A Tragical Elegy," a speaker who
no doubt observes the truth of Celia's bodily functions, is deeply suspect for
being so interested in and affected by them; Swift is critiquing Cassy's em-
piricism, not Celia's body. Similarly, in "Mira's Picture," Phillario's desire
to actually see the beautiful "rural nymphs" he has read about reveals that
he too is a suspect "empirick," rather like the antiquaries who read classical
texts as ethnographic descriptions rather than as art. Leapor's "The Visit"
describes Mira begging entry into Artemisa's home that she might "'scape
the penetrating Eye / Of Students in Physiognomy" (2:291). Empiricks such
as Phillario and these physiognomists practicing their "body criticism"16
can be seen as blasonneurs gone mad, trying to read the body to see whether
Petrarchan sonnets are true.17
But satires that portray scientists as mere "empiricks" and mad blason-
neurs rarely are read as critiquing their personae.18 From Lord Orrery to
Middleton Murry to Norman O. Brown, Swift's antiblasons have been con-
nected to disturbances in his sexuality and his mind.19 Critics who try to
normalize Swift's message, to see it as "universal,"20 often themselves pur-
vey a certain amount of misogyny. For instance, according to Siebert, "crit-
ics agree that these [dressing-room] poems explode certain illusions
surrounding romantic love": "A Beautiful Nymph" represents a lover's nec-
essary "realization that even beautiful women stink."21 It is difficult to find
critics who notice that the female body does not in general seem to be the
object of Swift's attack:22 the picture of misogyny is too tempting.
One of the first readers of "Mira's Picture" obviously yields to the temp-
tation of reading misogynous depictions literally. In the 1780s, a correspon-
dent to the Gentleman's Magazine answers someone's query about "Molly
Leapor" by describing her as "swarthy" and "crane-neck[ed]."23 No longer
a satire on gentlemanly ways of imagining reality, the poem is read by this
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historicist corresponding to the Gentleman's Magazine as accurately de-
scribing what Leapor looked like when she was alive. Distressingly, both
the gentleman historicist who defuses the poem's political power on the one
hand and Leapor herself on the other—both deploy the same rhetorical
structure in their arguments: they both check literary figures against the real
stuff of experience; they both take an empirical turn. But whereas Leapor
uses ordinary experience to question the ideological stakes in conventional
forms, and thus performs an act of demystification, the gentleman historian
"confus[es] linguistic with natural reality."24 The aristocratic gentleman's
"historical" account of Leapor's body reduces a swarthy figure to a swarthy
body by conceiving her discourse and his own as purely referential. What
tempts him to defigure discourse, his and hers, is the titillating attraction of
imagining a disgusting referent "beneath" the poem. Misogyny is not "natu-
rally" titillating, but, at Leapor's particular historical moment and still in
ours, misogyny has been eroticized.
The gentleman historicist who reports to us how Leapor actually looked
is a historicist of the positivist kind—an "old" historicist—insofar as he
tries to look through language to historical actuality by ignoring the
rhetoricity of language. But nonetheless he writes to the Gentleman's Maga-
zine out of a progressive interest in a laboring-class woman poet. There is a
critical power to be found even in old historicism, but it seems nonetheless
to differ crucially from the "new." "New" historicism may have roots in
progressivist Enlightenment discourses, but it does not read texts as pic-
tures looking out onto the world. And yet, any secure sense of the difference
between old and new historicism disregards how difficult it is to avoid tak-
ing a referential view of language and a positivist approach to history. In
"The New Historicism: Back to the Future," Marjorie Levinson describes
how much of the old is in the new: "It is precisely our failure to articulate a
critical field that sights us even as we compose it, that brings back the posi-
tivism, subjectivism and relativism of the rejected historicist methodology."25
The resurgence of positivism comes from the new historicist's failure to sight
himself in the field—that is, from the historicist's failure to see himself as
using rhetoric to construct objectivity rather than seeing himself as an ob-
jective (impersonal, as good as absent) observer of reality.
Both new historicism and feminist historical materialism26 turn toward an
objective place called "experience" in order to attempt what Leapor is trying
to do in her antiblason, that is, for the sake of demystification and critique.
Unfortunately, if critics fail to see their own work as rhetorical, turning to
experience in order to analyze the rhetoric of a past literary tradition ulti-
mately (but not necessarily) subverts the political efficacy of their own criti-
cism: like the gentleman historicist, they mistake the rhetoric used to critique
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for a description of an actual state of affairs. Because they share the empirical
turn as method and then face the temptation to confuse methodological ne-
cessity with political reality, feminist materialists and new historicists risk
importing into their accounts a narrative of the past that reads: "women,
laborers, and colonized Others have disgusting, embrowned bodies."
Others have shown that misogyny is intrinsic to the world of experi-
ment,27 and that misogyny, classism, and racism are intrinsic to Enlighten-
ment rationality.28 Here the focus is different: this chapter shows that
particular method used by literary historians writing during the Enlighten-
ment, such as Leapor and the gentleman empiricist, and even afterward,
such as Catherine Gallagher and Michael McKeon, for demystifying the
classism and sexism of patriarchal literary conventions easily collapses into
an epistemology that grounds the real in filthy femaleness. Mistaking the
politicized deployment of experience, a rhetorical strategy, for reality, an
extradiscursive thing, is no mere paradox; it threatens to disable feminist
literary history. A critical turn toward "experience" is a rhetorical device
that has been misrecognized as reality;29 the device has been handed down
to us from the antiblason tradition. The misogyny that is, consequently,
inherent in this rhetorical strategy threatens to undermine efforts to retrieve
women's protest and thereby threatens feminist literary history per se.
Misogyny and the Literary Assault on Empiricism
In Scriblerian satire against the new science,30 Swift, Pope, and others insist
that the empiricist's object of study is really the dead, decaying, and
"embrowned" human body.31 Thus, the empiricist Gulliver, like the "minute
philosophers" described in book 4 of Pope's Dunciad, dutifully records the
details of the disposing of his feces and urine in Lilliput32 and in later
Brobdingnag: "I hope the gentle reader will excuse me for dwelling on these
and the like particulars, which, however insignificant they may appear to
grovelling vulgar minds, yet will certainly help a philosopher to enlarge his
thoughts and imagination, and apply them to the benefit of public as well as
private life" (76). Envisaging the empiricist's truth as excrement is not only
an assault on ideal versions of the empirical object; it renders the point of
empirical pursuit as absurd as possible: it is not at all clear how Gulliver's
record of his daily defecations can be used for "the benefit of public as well
as private life"; why, Swift makes us ask, are the Minute Philosophers so
hot in pursuit of grotesque details?
Swift's satire operates not by perverting empiricism but rather by over-
dramatizing it. The empiricist is just like Strephon of "The Lady's Dressing
Room," who
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Stole in, and took a strict survey
Of all the litter as it lay:
Whereof, to make the matter clear,
An inventory follows here,
(lines 7-10)
Like Strephon, the empiricist uses an ideal image or a descriptive term to
cover a reality and render it attractive: Strephon takes an inventory of ob-
jects in the dressing room in order "to make the matter clear," that is, to
clean it up. The "matter" is now not only attractive but also can now be
accused of hiding behind or beneath it "[t]hose secrets of the hoary deep"
(line 98), secrets that the empiricist can then seek to discover. He does dis-
cover them, in horror, horrified as much by what "really" attracted him as
by the falsity of the image that hides the actual "fact" of excrement.
One thing that Gulliver's Travels does through its attention to excrement
is to recognize the genre of the Essay concerning Human Understanding:
Swift shows us that Locke's Essay is an antiblason that first appears to be
idealizing body parts, as a blason would, but second uncovers a filthy un-
derside to them (i.e., it de-idealizes them). Gulliver repeats, parodies, and
mimics the moves made by Locke in his Essay in order to expose in empiri-
cism this double movement. Gulliver in Brobdingnag discovers "that [his]
sense was more acute in proportion to [his] littleness."33 Locke imagines
that an angel making its organs as small as possible would see minutiae
independently of, and indeed as a replacement for, their total human signifi-
cance: "What wonders would he discover, who could so fit his Eye to all
sorts of Objects, as to see, when he pleased, the Figure and Motion of the
minute Particles in the Blood, and other juices of Animals, as distinctly as
he does at other times, the shape and motion of the Animals themselves"
(2.23.13, 303). But the "wonders" Gulliver discovers upon becoming little
are expressed in Gulliver's Travels in grotesque detail as several antiblasons
on the breast. Swift thus informs us that there is a generic connection be-
tween Locke's Essay and Marot's Blasons anatomiques du corps feminin, of
which the panegyric on "Le Beau Tetin" is the most famous.
In Brobdingnag, Gulliver is horrified to see the "monstrous breast" of a
nurse giving suck in front of him and tells us so in a passage that might be
called "Le Tetin Repugnant":
I must confess no object ever disgusted me so much as the sight of her mon-
strous breast. . . . It stood prominent six foot, and could not be less than
sixteen in circumference. The nipple was about half the bigness of my head,
and the hue both of that and the dug so varified with spots, pimples and
freckles that nothing could appear more nauseous. . . . This made me reflect
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upon the fair skins of our English ladies, who appear so beautiful to us, only
because they are of our own size, and their defects not to be seen but through
a magnifying glass, where we find by experiment that the smoothest and whitest
skins look rough and course, and ill coloured.34
"Experiment" with magnifying glasses reveals not wonders but monstrosi-
ties that make Gulliver nauseous, and reveals a fundamental difference be-
tween English men and "our English ladies": the "fair skins" of English
women would really appear "varified with spots, pimples, and freckles,"
"ill-coloured"—no doubt "swarthy"—were we to see them up close.
Gulliver's antiblason on the monstrous breast carefully distinguishes En-
glish men from English women by their swarthy skins.
Later, the monstrous breast is associated with decay that disgusts the min-
iature Gulliver at the same time that he fantasizes immersing himself in it:
One day the governess [of the miniature Gulliver's caretaker, Glumdalclitch]
ordered our coachman to stop at several shops, where the beggars, watching
their opportunity, crowded to the sides of the coach, and gave me the most
horrible spectacles that ever an European eye beheld. There was a woman
with a cancer in her breast, swelled to a monstrous size, full of holes, in two
or three of which I could have easily crept, and covered my whole body.
There was a fellow with a wen in his neck.... But the most hateful sight of all
was the lice crawling on their clothes. I could see distinctly the limbs of these
vermin with my naked eye, much better than those of an European louse
through a microscope. . . . I should have been curious enough to dissect one
of them, if I had proper instruments (which I unluckily left behind me in the
ship) although indeed the sight was so nauseous, that it perfectly turned my
stomach.35
The "European eye" magnifies the cancerous breast with a microscope pre-
cisely to turn the sight of decay into a titillating spectacle, into "the most
horrible spectacle that ever an European eye beheld": Gulliver's fantasy of
creeping into the holes of the cancerous breast, of being surrounded and
engulfed by decay, is, Swift claims, what the empiricist really wants.
Scientific empirical researches, the allegedly unmediated acquisition of
knowledge through the senses, have as their real object disavowal of one's
own death. Empirical description fragments bodies and idealizes the parts
so that the decay examined is not something that seems to happen to a
person; the instruments of empiricism, microscopes and dissecting tools,
are a means for shifting oneself out of the realm of decay. Because Gulliver
left these "proper instruments" aboard his ship, Swift deploys the rhetori-
cal "instruments" necessary for such disavowal by figuring the decaying
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body as female. But decay and with it death become by this very disavowal
eroticized: a narcissistic identification with the disgusting female body al-
lows the empiricist to immerse himself in it, as Gulliver does in the cancer-
ous breast. Such an immersion in the abject female body is a source of erotic
pleasure—here we can see "the murky source . . . of our loves."36
The decaying body that empiricism disavows and desires is not necessar-
ily female—that is to say, empiricism is not necessarily misogynous—but it
very often is. The empiricist wants to identify with but then at a crucial
moment distance himself from decay. If the empiricist presumes himself to
be male, then gendering the decaying body female allows him to distance
himself from it by making it into a "her" and thus into an object of scopo-
philic desire. Gender difference allows for a dialectic of identification and
disidentification.
But sometimes the dialectic does not work; sometimes gender difference
is not enough to save the empiricist from an agonizing identification with
dead and decaying matter. In moments of extreme instability, racial differ-
ence is mobilized for the sake of abjecting physical decay: Phillario and
Corydon describe Mira's freckled face; the gentleman empiricist describes
Leapor's "swarthy skin"; Swift describes the skin of a female "dug" as "so
varified with spots, pimples and freckles" as to be "ill coloured." Disidenti-
fication can work through the figure of woman, who, Freud says, is "al-
most the same but not quite"; but sometimes, as Homi Bhabha says, such a
dialectic requires someone who is "almost the same but not white."37
Swarthiness as a signifier is ambiguous, pointing to what could be a racial
or a class difference, since the lower classes had not yet "reformed" into
adopting notions of cleanliness:38 in any case, this sign of minimal otherness
allows the empiricist viewer and reader to revel in the dirt with the Other
with whom he identifies while simultaneously disavowing any identifica-
tion. If repugnant gender difference is one of the mechanisms that make it
possible for the empiricist blason to effectively represent a disavowal of and
desire for bodily decay, why would a woman poet write an antiblason?
What is to be gained for her?
The Instability of Parody as Critique
Use of the empirical turn is often a very effective mode of critique. Leapor's
poem "Strephon to Celia. A modern Love-Letter" exposes the hypocrisy of
upper-class discourses on "love"39 by figuring "Celia" as uglier "in reality"
than conventions of love poetry allow. Because Strephon is such a bad poet—
"Yet I can hardly spell my Letter"—we can see that his blason is financially
motivated rather than prompted by "real" love:
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You need not wonder at my Flame,
For you are not a mortal Dame:
I saw you dropping from the Skies;
And let dull Idiots swear your Eyes
With Love their glowing Breast inspire,
I tell you they are Flames of Fire,
That scortch my Forehead to a Cinder,
Your Cheeks that look as if they bled,
Are nothing else but Roses red.
Your Lips are Coral very bright,
Your Teeth—tho' Numbers out of spite,
May say they're Bones—yet 'twill appear
They're Rows of Pearl exceeding dear.
(1:104-6)
In order to critique the basis of upper-class love poetry, Leapor's poem veers
toward the Swiftian grotesque blason. The fop speaker of this poem, like
that found in Robert Gould's "The Playhouse,"40 equates Celia with bird
droppings that fall from the sky.41 The poem almost disfigures Celia's face.
In order to show that Strephon's descriptions of Celia's teeth as pearls and
her cheeks as roses depend upon her "Five hundred Pounds a Year," the
poem turns the "real" Celia's teeth into bones and almost depicts her face as
if it were diseased—"bleeding."
Reading this poem, the reader is fairly secure that Strephon—and not
Celia—is being parodied: we are witnessing Strephon's inept use of pastoral
convention, not the emergence of Celia's "real" picture from rhetoric. Leapor
clearly gains critical power through deploying the antiblason's misogyny—
that is, what would be read as misogyny if we were to see the poem as a
pure description of Celia. But often, revealing various ideologies to be class-
and gender-specific by relying on the empirical turn—by showing that they
fail to accurately describe experience—backfires.
In her country-house poem Crumble-Hall, Leapor overturns the conven-
tions of that form described by Raymond Williams in The Country and the
City. Usually the owners appear in a landscape and home devoid of laborers
and servants: nature, these poems usually say, furnishes forth its riches of its
own accord.42 In contrast, Leapor absents the owners of the house and de-
scribes only the servants. When about to take in a prospect from the top of
the house, "Mira" (Leapor's muse) is hurled into this "nether world" of the
servants, where she records a "mournful" kitchen maid's lament to her hus-
band Roger. Ursula's lament43 begins by describing Roger, exhausted after a
day's labor and a huge meal:
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O'er-stuff'd with Beef; with Cabbage much too full,
And Dumpling too (fit Emblem of his Skull!)
With Mouth wide open, but with closing Eyes
Unwieldy Roger on the Table lies.
His able Lungs discharge a rattling Sound:
Prince barks, Spot howls, and the tall Roofs rebound.
Him Urs'la views; and with dejected Eyes,
"Ah! Roger, Ah!" the mournful Maiden cries:
"Is wretched Urs'la then your Care no more,
"That, while I sigh, thus you can sleep and snore?
"Ingrateful Roger*, wilt thou leave me now?
"For you these Furrows mark my fading Brow:
"For you my Pigs resign their Morning Due:
"My hungry Chickens lose their Meat for you:
"And, was it not, Ah! was it not for thee,
"No goodly Pottage would be dress'd by me.
"For thee these Hands wind up the whirling Jack,
"Or place the Spit across the sloping Rack.
"I baste the Mutton with a chearful Heart,
"Because I know my Roger will have Part."
Thus she—But now her Dish-kettle began
To boil and blubber with the foaming Bran.
The greasy Apron round her Hips she ties,
And to each Plate the scalding Clout applies:
The purging Bath each glowing Dish refines,
And once again the polish'd Pewter shines.
(2:119-20)
In the anaphora "For you" and "for thee," Ursula says that she does all of
her work only for Roger. Ursula attempts to transform her labor into what
female labor will become for growing numbers of middle-class women: "mere
epiphenomena of wifely devotion."44 However, because Ursula and Roger
work for the absent owners of Crumble-Hall, because Ursula works in the
kitchen with Sophronia to feed not only Roger but "Grave Colinettus" and
"surly Graffo," Ursula's lament "render[s] the contradictions of [bourgeois]
romantic ideology, and its powerfully imaginary status as ideology, particu-
larly obvious" (180): Ursula's repetition of "For you" and "for thee" is
belied by her statement that she makes a dinner of which Roger will only
"have Part"; she labors for pay, not "love."
In Crumble-Hall, Leapor parodies domestic ideology; she is trying to
show that the ideal that represents women as working only for the love of
men cannot be applied to women of the laboring classes such as Ursula. But
here the parody slips out of her control: rhetoric and parody slip into real-
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ism and misogyny. Ursula's lament potentially tells us that the idea of ro-
mantic love comes from women; Ursula is stupid, the poem might be say-
ing, to apply her notions of romantic love to that particular husband, to the
Roger lying on the table, who resembles a stuffed pig, dressed and ready to
eat. Leapor's portrait of Ursula can be read as locating this cultural corrup-
tion in female desires and demands.45 It is difficult to tell in Crumble-Hall
whether Ursula satirizes romantic expectations or whether conventional
images of love in fact satirize Ursula (she is stupid to expect love from the
swinish Roger) or satirize Ursula and Roger as laboring buffoons, "clowns"
like the gravediggers in Hamlet, who cannot manage to get love right. Once
again, critique can be recuperated as mere reiteration of the status quo:
Ursula's mimicry, her repetition of bourgeois love with a difference,
undecidably parodies either hegemonic ideals or Ursula herself.
As with Swift's antiblasons, Mary Leapor's love poetry potentially either
reveals her own misogynous attitudes or criticizes social practices; in the
case of Crumble-Hall in particular, whether she parodies or repeats the styl-
ized laborer-as-buffoon is undecidable. Her biography makes it less unde-
cidable. Because expressions of misogyny and classism would be less
"natural" in her poetry than they allegedly are in Swift's, it is more obvious
in her poems that the project of demystifying aristocratic ideals by relying
on "experience" pulls her work in the direction of misogyny, that she is not
trying to express misogyny but is rather forced to do so. Are we to read
Crumble-Hall then as evidence of the inevitable failure of critiques launched
from within literary conventions to undermine the classist and sexist bias of
those conventions?
Leapor's Literary Criticism and Ours
The insight that the conscious desire to perform radical political actions can
be co-opted because the forms of protest are always already contaminated
is fundamental to new historicism. Although people have argued that the
view of contaminated or co-opted protest comes from certain strands of
Marxist theory46 or from the Foucault of Discipline and Punish,''7 in
Catherine Gallagher's view, the experience of that insight came to new his-
toricists primarily from seeing the results of feminist activism. She recalls
the moment when certain feminists arrived at this insight, after the failure
of consciousness-raising to achieve its intended political effects: "Was it
possible, we asked, that certain forms of subjectivity that felt oppositional
were really a means by which power relations were maintained?"48 This
realization fundamentally altered feminist modes of interpretation: "[B]y
focusing attention on our gendered individuation as the deepest moment of
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social oppression, some of us called into question the political reliability of
our own subjectivity. We effectively collapsed the self/society division and
began regarding our 'normal' consciousness and 'natural' inclinations as
profoundly untrustworthy. We, along with our erstwhile political optimism,
became for ourselves the objects of a hermeneutics of suspicion."49 Gallagher
here provides one of the most compelling accounts of the ideological forma-
tion of one's own subjectivity, a phenomenon of which naive feminism re-
mains unaware. Similarly, the ideological construction of literary conventions
renders possible, indeed likely, betrayal by liberatory discourses relying on
those conventions, even if only to react against them.
This hermeneutics of suspicion has provided insight into exactly what
compromises any project of demystification. Insofar as consciousness is ideo-
logically constructed, it is untrustworthy; and in Leapor's work, insofar as
her critique relies upon ideologically inflected conventions, it cannot help
being antifeminist and classist. However, notice that the insight into indi-
viduation as fundamentally social provided by this hermeneutics of suspi-
cion relies upon the very category of experience constructed by the
eighteenth-century British empirical tradition; it too relies upon the rhetoric
of experience that both enables and disables Leapor's protest against the
oppression of women.50 Because Gallagher relies on experience at the mo-
ment when she discovers the co-optation of modes of "subjectivity [that]
felt oppositional," her "discovery" is like the gentleman historicist's revela-
tion that Leapor really had swarthy skin: our oppositional subjectivities,
she discovers, "really" are not oppositional. Such a "discovery" needs to be
taken for what it is: the rhetorical strategy necessary for demystification,
for analyzing what kinds of forces defuse or contain that oppositionality,
should not be mistaken for reality—an empirical fact that subjectivity can-
not be oppositional. To conclude that Crumble-Hall's critique inevitably
fails, then, is to mistake a rhetorical for a real predicament.
Moreover, the fatal moment when critics discover how opposition to
hegemony has been co-opted by hegemonic forms—even though it does pro-
vide insight—puts us in an intellectually indefensible as well as politically
reactionary role of dominance over the past writer whose articulation of
protest we are trying to retrieve. Frederic Jameson has noticed that, in cer-
tain historicist accounts, "power"—and he is speaking of power in the sense
of "power to contain protest"—often becomes an "increasingly total sys-
tem or logic" that gives the critic herself complete mastery over the past.
But if power indeed were so total, then where does the critic stand in order
to see power operate? An epistemologically untenable mastery is purchased
at the price of "fatalism," Jameson says: "Insofar as the theorist wins, there-
fore, by constructing an increasingly closed and terrifying machine, to that
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very degree he loses, since the critical capacity of his work is thereby para-
lyzed, and the impulses of negation and revolt, not to speak of those of
social transformation, are increasingly perceived as vain and trivial in the
face of the model itself."51 In proclaiming power omnipotent, the critic does
not simply find Leapor's protest contained but rather enacts that contain-
ment for the sake of achieving mastery.
In reading Leapor's antiblasons, how can we prevent the mode of cri-
tique—a mode that exerts a misogynous pull—from becoming the antifemi-
nist conclusion that Leapor has no power to protest? In using theoretical
insights into the functioning of power, how can we prevent the mode of
critique—belief in "the attentive malevolence that turns everything to ac-
count"—from becoming a fatalist conclusion that the power to contain is
omnipotent and resistance impossible?52
Some recent attempts to overcome this problem do not work. The desire
for critical mastery will not be eluded by accounting for one's own position:
self-disclosures have no effect on the critical work to which they are ap-
pended.53 Nor can a feminist literary historian try to be hyperconscious,
more conscious than Gallagher, for instance.54 To avoid enacting dominance
and containment, Bhabha says, we need to rediscover "a 'colonial' counter-
modernity at work in the eighteenth- and nineteenth- century matrices of
Western modernity":55 we need to find those places where the countering of
Enlightenment forms of oppression is visible. Historians of difference must
ask how desires subversive of the existing social order can be represented in
conventional forms that helped to build and sustain that order: we cannot
see the blason and the pastoral as only instruments of the dominant ideol-
ogy; if we do, we will fail to hear in these forms moments of protest or
contestation, just as hegemonic forces always fail to hear protest against
them. We are under an "ethical imperative," David Spurr asserts, to retrieve
the "history of dissent" from colonial hegemony, a project "from which one
is not excused by theoretical objections" to the possibility of other cultures
adequately representing themselves.56
This "ethical imperative"-is not a moral one but rather an imperative
comprising an ethics of reading. Spurr is not advocating, as part of this
ethic, a return to the naive view that historical and/or colonial others can
unproblematically and directly represent themselves within literary and lin-
guistic conventions that have until that moment sustained hegemony. Jean
Howard describes this naive view among literary historians as analogous to
naive feminists' sense of themselves as truly oppositional subjects, described
by Gallagher above: in "the study of women as actors in history," "women's
writing [is] expected automatically to yield evidence of resistance or of an
alternative to patriarchal discourse."57 Gayatri Spivak has uncovered just
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such "an unquestioned valorization of the oppressed as subject" in Fou-
cault and Deleuze's "Intellectuals and Power."58 In this account of class
struggle, a sovereign subject of history mirrors a sovereign historian or theo-
rist: by representing the oppressed as "self-knowing, politically canny sub-
alterns, . . . intellectuals represent themselves as transparent" (275); although
explicitly claiming not to "speak for" subalterns, such rhetorical represen-
tations {Darstellen) do indeed politically represent subalterns {Vertreten) in
the sense of appropriating their voices (275-77).
But if the naive view is epistemologically untenable, so is the allegedly
more sophisticated, fatalist view of seeing historical and/or colonial others
as unable to represent their political agendas within Western, hegemonic
discourses, another approach to be abandoned in this ethics of reading. As
S.P. Mohanty has shown, cultural criticism's belief in the unknowability of
the Other posits epistemologically an extreme relativism that is both philo-
sophically and politically problematic. Grounded philosophically in a now-
defunct postivism,59 such fatalism involves politically the constriction of
diverse interests to "debilitatingly insular spaces" (15): if "you"—i.e., the
Other—cannot represent yourself to me in hegemonic Western discourses,
"I cannot—and consequently need not—think about how your space im-
pinges on mine, or how my history is defined together with yours. If that is
the case, I may have started by declaring a pious political wish, but I end by
denying that I need to take you seriously" (14). The "pious political wish"
that started the intellectual's declaration as to the theoretical impossibility
of representing resistance to hegemony would be the refusal to appropriate
the other's voice. But in fact both the naive theorist who does appropriate
the other's voice by claiming to have "found" it, as if the critic's and the
writer's discourses are transparent, and the sophisticated theorist who claims
not to be able to find such a voice—both of them effect the same foreclo-
sure: the subaltern goes unheard. It is for this reason that Howard wants
"to promote an historical analysis that, on the one hand, refuses naivete
about what produces difference and enables an oppositional subjectivity
and, on the other hand, refuses a fatalism about the possibility of seeing,
even within dominant discourses, the traces of genuine social struggle.60
What is needed is a critic who refuses to represent—to herself stand for—
interests of the oppressed but also refuses to declare those interests illegible,
a critic who takes part in the oppressed group. Only through partisanship,
only by "thinkfing] about . . .  how my history is defined together with
yours"61 can we avoid enacting an epistemologically untenable critical mas-
tery either through proclaiming our own transparency, the naive view, or
our own impermeability, the fatalist one.
For the historian, partisanship must involve granting as much agency to
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the subject of the past as one imagines oneself to have: both subjects are
situated in a context that gives symbolic acts a historically specific signifi-
cance, but both subjects' symbolic actions are not limited to a simple reit-
eration of that context. The literary critic has to be able to envision in literary
traditions and forms the possibility of contradictions and ruptures inter-
rupting their ideological work. Paradoxically, the critic's own ideologically
suspect projection is interrupted rather than facilitated, as one might ex-
pect, by the admittedly partisan effort to grant historical others this limited
kind of discursive agency. To think about how discursive agency can be
recovered through partisanship is precisely not to efface the requisite "cri-
tique of ideological subject-constitution within state formations and sys-
tems of political economy" erased by the naive view;62 rather it is to extend
that critique to one's own discourse. To insist upon the capacity of historical
others to represent themselves in the ironic spaces of what are sexist, classist,
and racist modes of representation, ideally, leads to heightened awareness of
how those conventions determine criticism as well, as has happened here.
That Leapor's feminist and anticlassist critique of the oppression of country-
house laborers can be recuperated as a misogynous depiction of Ursula is a
result of her reliance upon the rhetoric of empiricism as a strategy for
demystification; but to read Crumble-Hall as evidence that protest is inevita-
bly contaminated is to join the gentleman empiricist's camp and partake of its
epistemological blindness by mistaking rhetoric for the real.
Conclusion: Misogyny and Patriarchy
In the picture of the sonnet lady, figure 2,63 we can see once again that the
"experience" used to demystify aristocratic conventions presents us with a
degraded, disfigured female body. The picture portrays in mimetic images
all of the figures used in blason poetry: cupid sits on her brow, her breasts
are globes, her eyes suns, her hair nets and hooks to catch hearts, her lips
coral, her teeth pearls. This picture originally appeared in 1654, in John
Davies's English translation of Le berger extravagant by Charles Sorel. The
extravagant shepherd satirizes Lysis for falling in love with his own rheto-
ric; Anselme draws Lysis this picture to show him how ugly the woman
described by such rhetoric "really" is.64 She is hideous, a monster. The at-
tempt to turn rhetoric into description has a misogynous effect, serving in
Sorel's tale as remedia amoris. This picture illustrates for us that there is a
difference between metaphors and mimetic images, figures and pictures,
language and reality. But it is tempting to see this picture as just a picture of
a monster rather than as a satire on literalizing readers.65
Misogyny is a most effective means for forgetting literariness. Thus, in a
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Figure 2. The sonnet lady, from [Charles Sorel] The extravagant
shepherd; or the history of the shepherd Lysis [trans. John Davies]
(London: T. Newcomb, 1654). Reprinted courtesy of the Division of
Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Ithaca,
N.Y.
recent feminist and Marxist argument entitled "Historicizing Patriarchy,"
Michael McKeon describes and celebrates the very "empirical turn" ana-
lyzed here as it occurs in Mandeville's The Fable of the Bees. "Mandeville,
in 1723," McKeon writes, "unmasks as an acculturation the apparent natu-
ralness of female modesty."66 "The brilliance," he continues, of Mandeville's
analysis of "modesty" in Remark C of the Fable "is characteristic of an age
that may justly be seen as witnessing the birth of the sociological imagina-
tion, which demystifies what appears given by recognizing it as, not natu-
ral, but social or cultural. What must be recognized as well, however, is the
flip side of this insight: its dependence on a knowledge of what is truly
given, without which the demystification loses all coherence (303). McKeon
rightly notices that "what is truly given" for Mandeville is a modern and
oppressive conception of "gender difference" (300). But McKeon misses
the virulent misogyny in Mandeville's "brilliant" analysis of the sociocul-
tural; as in the long tradition of medieval misogyny preceding it, Mandeville's
text identifies "women with the illusory."67 According to Mandeville, women
represent themselves as "virtuous" through the practice of "modesty." But
underneath that veneer, Mandeville says, women are really "Savage
Monster[s]" who will do anything, even employ a "killing wet-nurse,"68 to
protect their reputations: "The same Woman that Murders her bastard in
the most execrable manner, if she is Married afterwards, may take care of,
cherish, and feel all the tenderness for her Infant that the fondest Mother
can be capable of. . . . Common Whores, whom all the World knows to be
such, hardly ever destroy their Children . . . ; not because they are less Cruel
or more Virtuous, but because they have lost their Modesty."69 Mandeville
later expands these views in A Modest Defence of Publick Stews, a pam-
phlet that describes women's bodies as "blown" or spoiled meat:70 the real-
ity Mandeville unmasks is the filthy female mind and body. The objective,
impersonal stance necessary for sociocultural critique requires unmasking
repugnant difference.
McKeon might have noticed the role misogyny plays in "the birth of the
sociological imagination," had he looked at the figures that are used by
Mandeville to represent "what is truly given"—the figure of woman as sav-
age monster. Describing Remark C as "brilliant" imports some of Mandeville's
misogyny into McKeon's own account. Both McKeon's and Mandeville's
texts try to be analytic and devoid of figures. As in the picture of the sonnet
lady, misogyny accompanies and shores up the two texts' claims to be ob-
jective, to accurately depict reality.71 But objectivity has its value: Mandeville's
Remark C is recognizing cultural forms as constructed rather than natural
and eternal. Does demystificatory power such as that found in Mandeville's
text—and McKeon's as well—always require misogyny as its price?
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At a certain moment, Leapor is indeed able to expose interest in oppres-
sive conventions without unconsciously taking on the interests, contrary to
her own, inhering in the empirical method of demystification. Leapor's poem
"Man the Monarch" recognizes and tries to overcome how repugnant gen-
der difference has been marshaled to define monarchy in Sir Robert Filmer's
Observations Concerning the Original of Government, Upon Hugo Grotius
(1652), used with Filmer's Patriarcha to represent the Tory position in favor
of absolutism, and in John Locke's Two Treatises on Government (1690), a
Whig attack on Filmer's work that favors constitutional monarchy.72 Not
surprisingly, although they are opponents, both Filmer and Locke use the
unquestioned naturalness of woman's subordination to man in order to prove
what government can or cannot be. They both say, in effect, We know that
God and/or Nature wants women to be powerless; we can decipher God's/
Nature's intent simply because we know that no edict of God's would grant
power to women. Thus Filmer reiterates throughout his Observation Upon
Grotius that the power of kings comes from the commandment "honor thy
father and thy mother,"73 completely free of any apprehension that this com-
mandment could support a dyarchy rather than a monarchy. Locke calls
him on the use of this commandment by pointing out that the "Apocriphal
Words," "and Mother . . . are always left out."74 But unfortunately, Locke
restores the missing apocryphal words to the commandment upon which
Filmer wishes to base the divine right of kings only in order to show that the
fifth commandment is not about political power: "Honour thy Father and
Mother cannot possibly be understood of Political Subjection and Obedi-
ence" because Mothers could not possibly be granted political power by
God (65, 188). Leapor's "Man the Monarch" fantasmatically reconstructs
the dyarchy that Filmer ignores and Locke pronounces impossible. "Na-
ture" explicitly designs woman to rule with man, Leapor says, until
[Man] view'd his Consort with an envious Eye;
Greedy of Pow'r, he hugg'd the tott'ring Throne;
Pleased with Homage, and would reign alone;
And, better to secure his doubtful Rule,
RolPd his wise Eye-balls, and pronounc'd her Fool.
(2:10)
"Man the Monarch" shows why "mother" got left out of political rule in
the first place.
In addition to the eruption of the words "and mother" back into Filmer's
Upon Grotius and Patriarcha, Filmer's patriarchal system is interrupted by
the notion of matriarchal lineage when he attacks Grotius's radical use of a
rhetorical structure and legal device, the "negative pregnant":
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[Grotius] tells us he "rejects the opinion of them, who everywhere and with-
out exception will have the chief power to be . . . the people's, that it is lawful
for them to compel and punish Kings as oft as they misuse their power." And
"this opinion," he confesseth, "if it be altogether received, hath been and
may be the cause of many evils." This cautelous rejection [by Grotius of the
people's right to revolt against unjust monarchs] qualified with these terms of
everywhere, without exception, and altogether, makes but a mixed negation,
partly negative and partly affirmative (which our lawyers call a negative preg-
nant). Which brings forth this modal proposition, that in some places with
some exception, and in some sort, the people may compel and punish their
Kings.75
Here the negative form is "pregnant," as a mother would be, with the power
to disrupt the monarchical power of Filmer's text: Grotius has not pictured
a democracy, but his negative pregnant leaves space for its possibility; the
revolutionary power of this space is pointed to by the word "pregnant," a
word that brings up the dependence of patriarchy on matriarchs. Interest-
ingly, in the 1679 and 1696 editions of Upon Grotius, there is a misprint:
instead of the current legal term "negative pregnant" (OED), "negative
repugnant" has been substituted; "repugnant" could mean simply "op-
posed," but it could also mean calling forth antipathy or disgust.76 It might
be possible, for either an eighteenth-century or a twentieth-century reader
of Upon Grotius well enough aware that "negative pregnant" is the correct
legal term, to see this misprint as fortuitous: repugnant or aversive descrip-
tions of the female body, one might begin to think, are pregnant with possi-
bilities excluded from conventional discourse.
In "Man the Monarch," Leapor again makes use of blason conventions
to describe the beautiful woman that Nature has made. After making the
being she favors more than men, Nature grieves to see woman become merely
"A Set of useless and neglected Charms" (2:9). Female charms are useless;
but surely, as the blason form being used by Leapor at this moment obstrep-
erously asserts, such charms are not neglected in lyric poetry, where they are
incessantly described as things (coral lips, teeth that are pearls). Some other
kind of female charms, charms not described by the blason, are neglected.
In woman's present dejected state, Leapor says, "Then her pale Lips no
pearly Teeth disclose" (2:9, emphasis added). Notice the difference between
Leapor's teeth and the female teeth that appear in Mandeville's Remark C:
"[T]he Modesty of Women is the Result of Custom and Education. . . .
[Notwithstanding this, the most Virtuous Young Woman alive will often,
in spite of her Teeth, have Thoughts and confus'd Ideas of Things arise in
her Imagination, which she would not reveal to some People for a Thou-
sand Worlds."77 "In spite of her Teeth" is a figure, of course, meaning liter-
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ally "despite her opposition"; Mandeville sees through those teeth to the
filthy thoughts hidden by custom and education. Here misogyny sustains
his demystification, as it sustains Leapor's own feminist demystification
quoted at the beginning of this chapter, "Mira's Picture," in which Mira's
teeth "look decay'd with Posset, and with Plumbs, / And seem prepar'd to
quit her swelling Gums." In "Man the Monarch," Leapor's line works dif-
ferently than it does in Mandeville's Remark C and "Mira's Picture": in the
line "Then her pale Lips no pearly Teeth disclose," woman dejectedly shows
the world no pearly teeth, teeth she may indeed have. An experiential
demystification of the ideal would say that a woman's teeth are not pearls—
they are really decayed with Posset—or that her modesty is not genuine—
she is really a hypocrite. The undecidability of the line, whether it says that
the teeth are or are not pearls, moves us away from an ideal picture without
substituting a picture of decay. Leapor effectively resists the misogynous
pull of such demystifications: woman does not disclose her pearly teeth, but
she does not not have them, either.
In Leapor's poem "Man the Monarch," we find not a negative pregnant—
in which case the line would tell us that her teeth are not "everywhere, with-
out exception, and altogether" pearls—but rather what we might call a
pregnant negative: this mouth contains no pearly teeth; what it does contain
is part of a woman's body that is imperceptible, unknowable, not pictured. If
we take "Teeth" in the figurative sense in which Mandeville uses it, the
oppressed woman's mouth contains no opposition, but it does not not con-
tain it either. The line "Then her pale lips no pearly teeth disclose" is preg-
nant with that which radically disrupts a misogynous and classist empiricism.
Do we have a better way now than the negative pregnant to put Grotius's
formulation of how opposition is possible under democracy? Or a less sex-
ist way than the pregnant negative to write the female body?
In this reading of "Man the Monarch," Leapor impregnates a repugnant
rhetorical structure by using it to depict indescribable, pearly-or-not teeth,
and thereby criticizes an oppressive ideal image without stepping into an
empirical reality that degrades the female body. Leapor is elsewhere: not in
the world where teeth are pearls and not in the world where they are bones,
but in an as yet only ironic space between the two where the female body is
neither idealized nor degraded. The space of negativity, pregnant with dis-
ruptive power that does not slip into yet another empirical positivity, is the
space that feminist, historicist discourse needs continually to recover.
The historicist insight as to the always already co-opted nature of oppo-
sition is crucial in debunking a view of the subject as capable of simply
declaring her own conscious resistance to the misogynous, classist culture
in which she lives, and in debunking oppositional histories that operate
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without attention to the effect of literary conventions on the kinds of ideas
that can be articulated within them. However, the contemporary literary
historian's fatalist vision of a historical text's necessary co-optation is itself
just as much a product of those conventions as is the alleged containment of
past protest. Thus, if it is necessary for historians of difference to avoid
simply seeing assertions of protest as efficacious, it is equally necessary to
avoid seeing such protest as always already undercut by inherently misogy-
nous conventions. This analysis attempts to displace the desire for critical
mastery offered by both views onto a partisan interest in recovering a lim-
ited kind of agency, in discovering the means by which feminist interests
might be articulated within discourses designed to render them inaudible.
Leapor uses the negative pregnant as a figure and as a strategy—a strategy
of denegation—for speaking within hegemonic discourses; similarly, this
essay has tried to be not not oppositional. Both of those tactics are ways of
confronting the problem that misogynous representations surface frequently
in demystificatory discourses such as feminism. These tactics require atten-
tion to figuration: insofar as the oppression of women has been used to
support the emergence of a realist bias in which discourse is seen as prima-
rily designed to accurately picture reality, feminist interests and rhetorical
analysis are allied. In short, feminist literary historians need to find some-
thing else and something more that can be said by the women writers of the
past despite those realist, misogynous conventions—in the very "elsewhere,"
the space opened up by rhetoric, that all literary conventions contain. It
may seem that this argument expects feminists to be able to do very little in
working toward overturning oppressive social structures—mere textual
analysis! As Marge Piercy puts it in her feminist novel Small Changes, "This
waiting has teeth."78
In the three previous chapters, I looked at popular literature that either
uses inartistic means for keeping textual indeterminacy open or flatly tries to
close it down. Insofar as they do none of those things, Mary Leapor's poems
could have been canonized along with the works of Pope and Swift, but they
were not. The next chapter attempts to answer the question, Why not?
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5Misogyny and the Canon
The Character of Women
in Anthologies of Poetry
Alexander Pope opens his "Epistle to a Lady" by quoting Martha Blount,
who says, famously, "Most women have no characters at all." "Character"
can mean personality or moral fiber, but it can also refer to printed letters
on a page, as Pope punningly points out in some verses on his publisher. He
praises the character of the bookseller Bernard Lintot, especially as it ap-
pears on the title page of Lintot's publications:1
His Character's beyond compare;
Like his own Person, large and fair.
[Other booksellers] print their Names in Letters small,
But LINTOTT stands in Capital;
Author and he with equal Grace
Appear, and stare you in the Face.2
If character is print, then Blount's aphorism means that most women have
not published their writings in print. But "character" is also more than a
printed letter of the alphabet to Pope: it is aesthetic value. In introducing
the third volume of the Pope-Swift Miscellanies, Pope insists that there is "a
character in every piece" of poetry included in his collection.3 In his usage
of it, then, the word "character" conjoins issues worrying Pope and his
contemporaries: the proper place for women's writing, the nature of printed
matter, and aesthetic value. With regard to the latter, Pope defines aesthetic
character in order to distinguish Swift's and Pope's poems from those writ-
ten by "[t]he Mob of Gentlemen" who, Pope says in "To Augustus," spread
"Like twinkling Stars the Miscellanies o'er."4 The word "gentlemen" is meant
ironically because coupled with the word "mob": a rabble of hacks, Pope
says, writes characterless poetry.
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Critics have long noticed that Pope and Swift were under pressure to
distinguish themselves from the mob5 once membership in a coterie of gentle-
manly writers no longer safely established their authority.6 "To Augustus,"
like book 4 of The Dunciad, is about "distinction" in the way that Bourdieu
means it: "[s]ocial subjects distinguish themselves by the distinctions they
make."7 What accompanies aesthetic pleasure, John Guillory says, "is the
pleasure of distinction,"s a pleasure felt at the moment of having "the de-
nied experience of a social relationship of exclusion."9 In "To Augustus,"
Pope asserts the aesthetic value of his work over the value of works by a
mob of poetasters and gets pleasure in a sublimated form by ejecting a group
of people from his class.
It may seem that, in "To Augustus" and The Dunciad, Pope successfully
excludes hack writing from the canon and thereby cordons off popular,
mass-produced literature from the realm of "High" literature or "the field
of restricted production" in Bourdieu's terms.10 But not all lists of great
works are canons—Pope's list at the end of "An Essay on Criticism" is
not—even though lists are always exclusive. Pinning the merely mechanical
reproduction of printed characters upon a class of men is part of Pope's
attempt to reassert a distinction between high and low literature based on
membership in a coterie at a moment when that basis is being eroded.11 It is
precisely in order to establish the aesthetic as a realm independent of mat-
ter, to establish an abstract notion of "the literary work" that exists inde-
pendently of any particular material reproduction of it,12 that social and
gender distinctions are marshaled throughout the eighteenth century—not
just by Pope. This chapter will show that the medium of the anthology at its
emergence established canonical poetry and canonical authors in contradis-
tinction to popular literature written by a mob of men and poetry written
by excessively embodied women.13 The anthology repeats over and over
again, in its format and various prefaces, the ideas implicit in Pope's use of
the word "character": the mob writes characterless poetry, and women are
loose, characterless people who do not write great works at all.14 Antholo-
gies bestow authority upon "prominent" writers by canonizing a certain
kind of style that is possible to achieve only by members of an intellectual
class. By imagining promiscuous physicality as female, literary history was
able to enlist gender in the continuous project of conceptually segregating
printed from aesthetic character.
The argument presented here is not that men of the trading classes and
women were excluded from the canon because of what they wrote. Critics
on both sides of the issue of canon reform agree: establishing canonical
literature may have entailed politically motivated exclusions, but the mean-
ing of "great" literature cannot on that account be reduced to the promo-
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tion of a politically conservative agenda.15 Furthermore, such arguments
are sometimes out-and-out misleading: if women writers were excluded be-
cause of an antifeminist, politically conservative bias, then feminist critics
are in the impossible position of having to discover that unknown early
modern women writers had radical political views, which is adamantly not
true.16 Margaret Ezell has successfully shown that women who wrote be-
fore the nineteenth century can be seen as having been "silenced" only if
one believes that only canonical and/or commercially successful texts count
as "public" writing, a view not shared by early modern women writers.17
The problem with seeing early modern women writers as downtrodden by
having been excluded and/or seeing them as responding to being excluded
from the canon is that there was no such thing as a canon at the moment
when seventeenth- and eighteenth-century women were writing.
It is only at the end of the eighteenth century that the word "literature"
begins to designate fictionalized works of art in poetry and prose,18 the
word "canon" begins to be used to designate a list of literary texts,19 and
the notion of literary period comes into existence20—all necessary ingredi-
ents for transforming a list into the canon. Trevor Ross has recently modi-
fied an earlier argument that had pushed canonizing back in time: "something
happened," he says, "in the late eighteenth century to the way works were
valued. "21 Many things happened at that time: by the end of the eighteenth
century, Thomas Warton and Samuel Johnson had written the literary his-
tory necessary for canonizing; and during the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, French, German, and English writers articulated the aesthetic
ideal of "pure poetry" necessary for forming a canon.22
However, investigations into the emergence of the modern notion of can-
onicity cannot afford to confine themselves to the history of ideas alone.
Frank Kermode says about Harold Bloom's book on the canon that "his
preoccupation with agonistic contests has rather obscured Bloom's view of
how tradition works."23 This true statement applies equally to Kermode: to
see canon formation as happening via "spokespersons," as Kermode does
(9), also obscures how tradition works. Matthew Arnold's direct statements
about what constitutes great poetry did much less to establish the canon
than did Thomas Ward's collection of poems in which the essay first ap-
pears: Arnold says in his general introduction that "Chaucer is not one of
the great classics";24 Ward's volumes, like hundreds of other collections,
include much of Chaucer's work; obviously the collections prevail.
Production practices, Thomas Bonnell argues, create the canon: "Print-
ing and publishing were key—[and] not [merely the publishing of] lists [of
valuable writings], but [the publishing of] poetic works, huge collections
that represented the complete works of dozens of poets."25 Bonnell rightly
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asserts that it is crucial to analyze printing practices and marketing tech-
niques when talking about the emergence of the canon. However, the huge
multivolume collections do not present us with the canon as we know it:
they were far too inclusive, containing myriad unknown male poets. As
Guillory puts it, what "we conventionally recognize as 'the canon' [is com-
prised of] only those works included in such survey courses or anthologies
as the Norton or the Oxford."26 There is no canon of great English poetry
until literary history is produced in a particular form by a specific medium:
the anthology properly speaking, which does not come into existence until
the early nineteenth century. The anthology is distinct from miscellaneous
collections published throughout the eighteenth century.27 The miscellany
manages a specific kind of desire, "curiosity"; the canonizing anthology
promotes a new kind of desire for works with aesthetic character.
The figure of gender is crucial in establishing the difference between mere
curiosities and great works of art. Women writers' works appear scattered
throughout the miscellany,28 but when the anthology comes into existence,
women writers are excluded from the canon it creates.29 It is not that com-
pilers of anthologies hated women. Misogyny is not a "natural" feeling; it is
a long-standing but not eternal mode of establishing difference, via affect,
that has been harnessed to perform various kinds of ideological work dur-
ing various periods; it is interesting not in itself but in terms of what gets
displaced onto it. During the eighteenth century, the textual media that frame
literary works figure woman as "matter" in order to establish the condi-
tions necessary for the exchange of great works of art.
Establishing a canon of British poetry requires constructing poetry in a
way that differs from commodifying popular fiction. In order to become
part of a tradition, the poem has to be a commodity written not by a no-
body, as a novel must be,30 but by a somebody: the poet's identity plays a
crucial role in establishing a tradition of national poetry. And yet somehow,
despite being tied to a particular physical body, canonical works must be
exchangeable, words available as if owned by no body. The poet and his
oeuvre need to be identities that are peculiarly embodied and disembodied
at the same time. This chapter will show that women were excluded from
the canon because the female body has been enlisted in a complex mecha-
nism for figuring the oeuvre of great male poets as simultaneously immate-
rial and hypermaterial: monumental.
The first section of this chapter shows that women writers are excluded
from anthologies. The second section shows that what has been defined as,
and even feels like, great poetry can in a very real sense be seen as subli-
mated class warfare.31 The last sections show that abjecting the female body
from the conception of high, canonical literature is what performs the cul-
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tural work, continually necessary, of idealizing the all-too-material canoni-
cal text and thereby maintaining its exchangeability.32 Only by charting this
simultaneous embodiment and disembodiment of the high poet, endowing
him with "character" in the sense of aesthetic value and simultaneously
discounting character as printed matter—only by tracking that process can
we see what transforms a list of poets into a canon. After determining what
stimulates desire for canonical texts, we can begin to decide whether the
canon is worth fighting to preserve in the face of some very substantial
threats to it both from within the discipline and from without.
The Exclusion of Women Writers from the Anthology
and British Poetic Literary History
Alexander Dyce introduces his 1827 anthology of women poets, Specimens
of British Poetesses, by attacking recent publications for excluding women
from literary history. In compiling this anthology of women poets, he says,
"we feel an honest satisfaction in the reflection, that our tedious chase
through the jungles of forgotten literature must procure to this undertaking
the good-will of our country-women."33 Dyce's lament is sadly too true:
women poets were excluded completely from the fifty-eight volumes of writ-
ings to which Samuel Johnson appended his prefaces (1779-81), from John
Bell's multivolume collection (1789-94), from Robert Anderson's (1792-
5), and from Alexander Chalmers's of 1810.34 But the multivolume collec-
tions did not themselves exclude women because it is primarily anthologies
of poetry that established the canon as we know it. The fact of women
writers' exclusion from anthologies and from canonical literary history is
not verifiable statistically. For one thing, late-eighteenth- and early-nine-
teenth-century teaching collections do include women poets, as Ian Michael's
research well shows.35 However, these collections were not attempting to
establish canonical literary history for the bourgeoisie, as were anthologies.
Instead, they were directed toward children, who would gradually move up
to disciplinary anthologies,36 and toward people of modest means, as is stated
explicitly in one of Vicessimus Knox's editions, abridged so as to be "adapted
to the Convenience and Finances of all."37 For another thing, if one does
not distinguish miscellaneous from anthological form, one cannot see the
exclusion of women from canonizing discourse.
Many of the volumes being produced late in the eighteenth century and
early in the nineteenth are in fact still miscellaneous in form. These volumes
are loaded with women authors,38 more of them statistically than ever ap-
pear in early-eighteenth-century miscellanies such as the Dryden-Tonson
collections or the mid-to-late-century collections comprising the Dodsley
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group. But the moment a collection claims to be representing British poetic
literary history, and the moment it simultaneously organizes authors in
anthological form, or at least gets close, women are excluded. The most
fully developed examples are William Hazlitt's Select Poets of Great Britain
(1825);39 The British Anthology; or, Poetical Library (1824),40 which looks
most like the Norton; and John Aikin's Select Works of the British Poets
with Biographical and Critical Prefaces (1820).41 Anthologies concerned to
delineate poetic literary history do one of the following: they exclude women
poets completely, as do Hazlitt and Aikin; they include so few by compari-
son to male poets that they in fact emphasize the absence of women poets
rather than their presence;42 they include women in a section of the collec-
tion that is no longer anthological but miscellaneous in form;43 or, finally,
they include only contemporaneous women poets, proclaiming that no ear-
lier "examples of female genius" could be found.44 Women poets do not
appear in the volumes presenting British poetic history.45 As this chapter
shows, representing women poets as forgotten is integral to the anthology
medium: they took up the burden of representing the material body in order
to help solve the difficult problem of establishing the poet as one who has
an immortal body that transcends time. As can be seen in metaphors used
by collectors to describe the poems they select, gender plays a crucial role in
the process of immortalizing poetry as a body.
The Shift from Miscellany to Anthology Form:
Use of the Body Metaphor
Excerpts of lines of poetry published in rhyming dictionaries before the
eighteenth century were read by members of the merchant and trading classes
in order that they might adopt coterie language and thereby raise their sta-
tus.46 The very early collections functioned like "the schoolboy's gradus"
that John Aikin complains of at the end of the eighteenth century, providing
"tropes and figures" to be used over and over again, "hackneyed combina-
tions of substantives and epithets," as Aikin calls them.47 Since rhyming
dictionaries were simply a source for combinations of words, it mattered
little how correctly an editor quoted the poem being excerpted that con-
tained such combinations. But in the preface to Thomas Hayward's 1738
collection of excerpts of poetry, The British Muse, William Oldys tells us
that this collection, unlike previous ones, is preeminently concerned with
the integrity of what it quotes. Oldys insists upon a poem's integrity by
figuring the excerpt of poetry as a body: the difference between the "sub-
lime" beauties that Hayward has collected, Oldys says, and those collected
by earlier compilers of beauties is that earlier collections "mutilate,"
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"mangle," and "maim" what they quote.48 To "mangle" a passage, if you
remove the body metaphor, is simply to misquote it. The British Muse does
not want to provide us with inaccurately quoted excerpts that other writers
are then free to themselves misquote. If the compilers of rhyming dictionar-
ies did not misquote the passages they compiled, they certainly gave others
the license to do so, to pillage those passages for ideas or phraseology with-
out recognizing the author as the owner of those particular words. The
words of an unmangled quotation are not usable by artisans but are rather
whole entities that deserve to be admired as sublime in their own right.
Like Hayward's British Muse, the large, six- to twelve-volume miscella-
neous collections published from 1748 to 1783, the series of collections
that begins with Dodsley's Collection of Poems (1748),49 differ from, on the
one hand, the coterie-productions produced by Tonson, Lintot, Dryden,
Pope, and Swift—and, on the other, the rhyming dictionaries that taught
people how to become members of such coteries. Guided in design by "gentle-
men,"50 Dodsley's collection contains a large number of poems by and to
peers (approximately half), thus maintaining close associations with elite
culture.51 They present this culture to "the gentry and professional classes"
comprising their readership. Dodsley's volumes and the supplements to them
present aristocratic tastes to class-climbers of the emerging bourgeoisie.52
That is, the editors and writers do not simply perform membership in a
coterie but instead project class struggle onto the aesthetic.
Containing "lords, ladies, gentlemen, and others,"53 the Dodsley group
of miscellanies actually foregrounds those "others"—if not Dodsley himself
(a former servant turned into a gentlemanly publisher), then others such as
the businessman poet Matthew Green (who is in Dodsley and Pearch ex-
plicitly identified as "of the Custom House,")54 as well as Thomas Gray, the
"son of a scrivener."55 If Boswell can be believed, Dodsley took the busi-
nessman Green to epitomize the author collected in his miscellanies,56 thus
again giving center stage to the not-yet-genteel poet. When Gray says that
he is happy to have his elegy appear in the 1755 edition of Dodsley's collec-
tion, volume 4, because of the "company" he keeps in that volume,57 Gray
is talking undecidably about the aesthetic value of the poems alongside his
own (as Suarez presumes) and about the social value of appearing with so
many aristocrats (another possible interpretation). In the company of the
names presented in these volumes, Gray and Green can be seen as perform-
ing their entry into what William Mason called in his discussion of "the
poetical class," a cultural aristocracy.58
One can see in titles of collections published throughout the eighteenth
century a split between, on the one hand, mirthful (often vulgar) and por-
nographic (often aristocratic) collections,59 and, on the other "serious" mel-
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ancholic poetry.60 As an attempt to represent "high" culture,61 Dodsley's
collection focuses on serious, melancholy poetry. Ever since Milton's //
Penseroso, writing "melancholy" poetry is a way of proclaiming oneself a
serious poet. Melancholy poems such as Matthew Green's The Spleen, one
of the most famous of a really astounding number of such poems,62 contain
"digressions" on the desire for fame as a poet; and, if Rambler number 8 is
any indication, ambition can be seen as a primary cause of the disease. If the
desire for fame as an author causes melancholy, it is only by addressing
melancholy that one can become an author. The central figures of these
collections, Elizabeth Carter,63 Thomas Gray, Matthew Green, and William
Collins,64 achieve poetical status through writing to or about melancholy.
These poets are from humble beginnings (Collins's father was a "hatter") or
remain members of the professional classes who get published in Dodsley
along with a number of peers by writing poetry; these volumes, then, are
the place where they perform what is necessary to move up in class. The
"eminent Hands" of the earlier-century Tonson and Lintot collections have
ceded to the "several Hands" mentioned in the titles of the Dodsley group,
not because class has been forgotten but because eminence has been trans-
ferred from a quality in the hands and body one is born with to an achieve-
ment one can make through writing melancholy poetry and thereby tracing
one's poetical lineage back to Milton. Dodsley, Pearch, and Nichols offer, to
members of the emerging middle class, professional immortality through
entering into "the poetical class."
During the thirty years throughout which the Dodsley group begins and
continues to be published, obsessively collecting among themselves every
"fugitive piece" of "merit,"65 we can see a shift in the function of poetry.
Editors since Elizabeth Cooper had begun to realize that printed texts were
not ephemeral if mass produced.66 The editor of one of the Dodsley group
collections, George Pearch, says that he wants to prevent poems from
"perish[ing] into oblivion," thus metaphorically equating poems with liv-
ing bodies.67 In contrast to earlier miscellanies such as Hayward's British
Muse, then, midcentury miscellanies such as the Dodsley group imagine not
excerpts as whole bodies but rather single poems as whole bodies as a way
of proffering poetry as a form of immortality. The voluminous midcentury
collections of contemporaneous writers68 therefore seem to be participating
in the education of the rising middle class—but not only on the side of
consumption, not only by offering that class the stuff it needs to read. In-
stead, these collections are participating in the education of the new men by
stimulating their desire to produce poetry. Promising their productions an
eternal place in a collection is one way of getting them to write and to desire
to assimilate the education that they need to write. "[EJternal life is one of
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the most sought-after social privileges," Bourdieu points out,69 and these
collections promise eternity metonymically, as it were, to poets via preserv-
ing their poems.
The anthology figures not single poems but an author's oeuvre as a whole,
living body, thereby changing the basis upon which one would secure im-
mortality. Henry Headley's Select Beauties of Ancient English Poetry of 1787
is among the first anthologies proper, containing a retrospect of dead poets
classed by period. Headley represents in terms of the body his anxieties
about interfering with a dead author's self-representation by excluding po-
ems from an author's oeuvre: he feels a "melancholy reluctance," he says,
about "thus playing the anatomist"; he does not want to cut up or mutilate,
as an anatomist would, the body of poems that an author has accumulated
during his lifetime.70 Headley excuses what he sees as his own propensity
for including too much poetry by saying that he did not want to consign
authors to "the horrors of perpetual oblivion" (x): "With the 'disjecti mem-
bra Poetae' before me, let me be pardoned then, if I have sometimes, as I
fear I have, listened to the captivating whispers of mercy instead of the cool
dictates of unsentimental criticism: often I have exulted to find an unex-
pected latent beauty, which on a first perusal had escaped me, that might
countenance the preservation of a doubtful passage, which I had just doomed
to its former oblivion" (xi). By worrying about the "disjecti membra Poetae,"
Headley compares poetry to the body of Orpheus.71 Past poetry had been
"doomed" to oblivion before a collector of poetry such as Headley arrived
to resurrect the body. The "captivating whispers" of poetry are not so much
directed at Headley as they are at his readers, who can, from perusing
Headley's collection, now imagine a similar kind of salvation at the hands
of future collectors, should they decide to write. Headley's fully anthological
work whispers to people that they might achieve a new kind of status dis-
tinct from the old status determined for poets by the social relations in
which they existed, and having that status is connected with having a whole
body, unlike the torn-up body of Orpheus. In the headnote to Queen Eliza-
beth (the only woman included in the collection), Headley disparages her
poetry by saying, "[Ljittle else can now be gratified by the perusal of
Elizabeth's poetry than mere curiosity": "Dead Queens rank but with meaner
mortals."72 What collections of poetry whisper, then, which is so captivat-
ing, is the promise to establish an eternal status—a poetic rank—that is
independent of contemporaneous socioeconomic relations, of any material
conditions of existence, those material conditions here associated with a
dead woman's body.
The way the body metaphor functions in Headley's anthology differs
from the way it functions in Pearch's miscellany. Whereas Pearch equates a
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poem with a body, in the passage from Headley's preface it is not clear
exactly what unit of poetry is being equated with a body: it might be a
"beauty," an excerpt of a poem, or a set of poems by a single author, "select
specimens of prominent excellence,"73 as he puts it, or, finally, all the poems
in the collection itself. In the first case, a sentence or two is being envisioned
as a body; in the second it is an author's oeuvre, figured as the Orpheus-like
body of the author himself; in the third, it is the body of "ancient English
poetry" that could be potentially torn up. Headley's collection therefore
adopts the body metaphor used by Hayward, equating lines of poetry with
a body and so making quotations inviolable, but rejects that used by Pearch,
which sees an individual poem as a living body, substituting for the latter
two other equations: body with oeuvre, body with the nation's poetry.
What is at stake in metaphorically equating with the body the correctly
quoted excerpt, the author's oeuvre, and the nation's poetry? More impor-
tantly, how do these three equations shape a mere list of poems into a canon?
This question can be answered by examining two specific examples of poets
whose canonical status has been determined by these body metaphors, Tho-
mas Gray and Matthew Green.
First, why view the excerpt of poetry as a body? Oldys tells us that there
is a difference between a "mangled" excerpt and a correctly quoted or "sub-
lime" one. From the 1740s on, when Oldys was writing his preface, it was
no longer possible for poets to use rhyming dictionaries in quite the same
way. That is, the sublime beauty or excerpt perfectly preserved in a collec-
tion could no longer be directly imported by would-be poets into their own
poetry. By midcentury, or a bit later, straight repetition of a combination of
words had come to be firmly counted as plagiarism—a shift that was felt by
Pope, Roger Lonsdale points out, but actually first catches up to Gray, the
canonical tradition's most aggressively "allusive," "borrowing," or "pla-
giarizing" poet, depending upon one's point of view.74 Guillory points out
that Gray's "Elegy in a Country Churchyard" is itself like a commonplace
book.75 But something saves the poem from being merely mechanical rep-
etition of past poets' words, like a collection of their poetry, and instead
transforms it into one of the quintessentially canonical poems (85-99). Gray's
"Elegy" features in Dodsley's 1755 Collection of Poems (volume 4), along
with Matthew Green's The Spleen.76 We can tell what constitutes the aes-
thetic character of Gray's poem by contrasting it with Green's, which did
not get canonized by later anthologists who selected from among the mass
of poems reprinted by the Dodsley group.
The first thing to be said about the difference between a Gray and a
Green shows us how the first metaphor discussed, excerpt as body, works in
tandem with the third, nation's poetry as body, to characterize canonical
116 Misogynous Economies
literature. Businessmen poets such as Green either ignored their predeces-
sors, whom they did not have time to read, or used a rhyming dictio-
nary—which is to say, quoted words and phrases mechanically, exactly.
Insofar as authors are seen as owners of property,77 to quote exactly is to
rob someone of the riches of their words. But if anthologies of beautiful
whole poems are coming into existence as part of a nationalist project
showing the progress of letters in England up to the present time, authors'
words are not reusable because they are monuments to the past. To "em-
body" an author for literary history will mean to constitute his body out
of words. Quoting an author's words exactly, mechanical repetition, would
reveal them to be disembodied, detached from any one speaker, and would
thus let the "original" speaker die.
Gray's "Elegy" does not copy past poets exactly: it is a commonplace
book written by someone such as Johnson or Hazlitt, who unadvisedly trusted
his own memories for quotations; in some ways, it is almost like a dictio-
nary, using the words from a previous passage but reworking them in a
different syntax and disposition. In 1808 Egerton Brydges insisted that one
could "'trace almost all the ingredients of [Gray's] pathetic and sublime
compositions home to their sources,'" but says that, although the "'par-
ticles' of thought" are borrowed, "'the combination [of them] is his own.'"78
Why does stirring "not quite identifiable literary memories"79 produce the
sublime for Gray's readers? Insofar as those particular words are seen to
embody an author, repeating the words out of sequence, misquoting, would
be like tearing off bits of his body, as indeed Oldys envisions it. Misquoting
literary words is represented as a kind of sparagmos or scattering of an
earlier canonical author's body parts. But there is a third alternative: slight
misquoting—more properly called sublime misquoting—the practice of quot-
ing one word of an author's phrasing in one line, another a few lines later.
What is sublime about slight misquoting is the near miss of completed ag-
gression: the original author is not allowed to die. His words are not simply
misquoted, not scattered, and not thereby proven to be infinitely usable,
infinitely detachable, like the disjecti membra of a dead body. Rather, the
poet's words are used in separate lines: the lines are close enough together
to evoke memory of the older poet's passage, but not so close together that
they either repeat or blatantly misquote, either inhabit or tear up, the past
poet's body.
Businessmen poets who write, as Aikin puts it, "hasty effusions" rely on
rhyming dictionaries; they do not correctly quote past poets, as the compil-
ers of beauties do, but pillage artifacts. Aikin describes the difference be-
tween a canonical and a businessman poet in his discussion of Green, who
is actually, Aikin says, like neither:
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[Green] had not, like a GRAY or a COLLINS, his mind early fraught with all
the stores of classic literature; nor could he devote months and years of learned
leisure to the exquisite charms of versification or the refined ornaments of
diction. He was a man of business, who had only the intervals of his regular
employment to improve his mind by reading and reflection; and his poems
appear to have been truly no more than hasty effusions for the amusement of
himself and his particular circle of friends. . . . But nature had bestowed on
[Green] a strong and quick conception. . . . No man has ever thought more
copiously or with more originality; no man ever fell less into the beaten track
of common-place ideas and expressions. That cant of poetical phraseology,
which is the only resource of an ordinary writer, and which those of a supe-
rior class find it difficult to avoid, is scarcely anywhere to be met with in
[Green].80
Although not a Gray, whose mind is stored with literary memories, Green is
actually better than the average "hasty" writer because original. "Ordi-
nary" businessmen poets repeat the words of past poets exactly; in contrast,
those of a "superior class," viz. canonical poets, pay homage. Green does
neither, and so, despite Aikin's best efforts, does not become a canonical
poet, as determined by his inclusion typically in anthologies.
The difference between Gray and businessmen poets is that, whereas they
use a rhyming dictionary, Gray's mind, by virtue of having the time to read
intensely, has actually become a rhyming dictionary. What the contrast be-
tween Gray and Green shows us is that the difference between Gray and the
businessmen poets is not one of sheer originality: Gray must fill his mouth
with the words of past and present poets, but he must do so without mechani-
cally repeating them for the sake of securing himself in a "superior class."
Such an instance can be seen in some notorious lines in the "Elegy":81
Full many a gem of purest ray serene
The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear:
Full many a flower is born to blush unseen
And waste its sweetness on the desert air.82
Suvir Kaul has connected those lines with a passage comprising Belinda's
lament in The Rape of the Lock: after the "rape," she wishes that she had
"un-admir'd remain'd," gone to a place where she could "keep my Charms
conceal'd from mortal Eye, / Like Roses that in Desarts bloom and die."83
The only actual word repeated in Gray's lines from the "original" is "desert,"
Gray's "blushing unseen" standing in for Pope's "un-admir'd remain'd,"
"Charms conceal'd," and "bloom and die." Gray has obviously made use
of Pope's poetic idea. But he has not repeated mechanically the words of
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Pope's poem: one could not find such an idea digested under the head of
rhyming dictionary: would it appear under "deserts," "blooming," or "ne-
glect/unmerited"? One sees that a few more words of past poets are re-
peated in Gray's stanza if one looks up "gem" in Johnson's dictionary, where
Cowley is quoted: "Stones of small worth may lie unseen by day; / But night
itself does the rich gem betray."84 In relying on Pope and Cowley, Gray
reveals himself as one who has spent as much time with literature as did
Johnson, and who therefore has what are distinctively literary memories.
The aesthetic character of Gray's "Elegy" consists in manifesting that he
has had time to be in intimate relation with past poets, time available only
to members of a leisure or educated class.85
Conceiving of an excerpt as a body, as early miscellanies and anthologies
both do, is a way of denying access to the creation of canonical poetry by
distinguishing between those who will mechanically repeat what they can
get from rhyming dictionaries and those who will artfully sublimate their
borrowings from passages not to be found under the "heads" of rhyming
dictionaries. What is the difference between metaphorically equating a poem
with a whole body, as midcentury miscellanies do, and imagining author's
oeuvre and national literature as whole bodies, as anthologies do?
If a poem is seen as a body, then an author can become immortal by
writing one poem. Collections published during the time when the numer-
ous volumes of the Dodsley group were produced were too radically demo-
cratic, allowing any and every businessman a share of cultural capital,
purchasable with only one or two poems: since an author's poems are some-
times grouped together but also often scattered throughout miscellany col-
lections, a newcomer to the world of literature might not easily recognize
the difference between a Green and a Collins.
Anthologists want to distinguish between poets such as Green, "whose
performances," Aikin says, "have not mass enough to fill a considerable
space in the public eye,"86 and poets having a larger oeuvre because they
have had, by birth or employment, more time to write. Thus Headley at-
tacks Johnson for including the "rabble" who appear in The Works of the
English Poets; he quotes Pope's "To Augustus" in order to distinguish the
mob from canonical poets: "To have shed their twinkling radiance, the mis-
cellanies o'er, was the highest honour many of those, who are [in Johnson's
volumes] adopted as legitimate and established Poets, could affect; to a more
conspicuous and dignified hemisphere they had none of the slightest preten-
sions."87 The rabble of businessmen poets shed a "twinkling radiance,"
emanating from single poems scattered throughout miscellanies. The rabble
kept out of the canon are businessmen like Green, but not simply because
they write single poems. Despite devoting their lives to letters, Gray and
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Collins did not produce a noticeably larger number of poems than Green
did, and in fact the small output of Gray and Collins is scattered through-
out miscellanies. However, because their language reveals that they have
invested huge amounts of time reading literature, they can be seen as creat-
ing an oeuvre, a whole body, and can take their places as "legitimate" poets
who exist in "a more conspicuous and dignified hemisphere." The oeuvre is
a celestial body; its hemisphere is the British canon.
Bourdieu's work documents the rise of an intellectual class distinct from
and at war with the bourgeoisie: whereas upper-middle-class business mag-
nates assert dominance by procuring economic capital, the intellectual class
asserts its ascendency by accruing cultural capital.88 When literature came
into existence, it was quintessentially the bourgeois object insofar as know-
ing literature was seen as a means for rising up into the upper middle class.89
In the face of the maddening tendency among eighteenth-century business-
men to prefer writing poetry to reading it, there came to be a mechanism for
distinguishing bourgeois readers of literature from intellectual producers of
it. One method for keeping the occasional poet out of the class of literati,
for separating high from popular poetry, was the practice among canonical
poets of sublime misquoting that gives to an author a divine body.
Does the preceding account necessarily invalidate analyses of aesthetic
pleasure as independent of economic determination such as Kermode's or
Knapp's? For Guillory, it does not. The "articulation of aesthetic discourse,"
which certainly is a move in a game on the part of one class of "cultural
dispossession" of another class, is not coterminous with nor "identical to
aesthetic experience": "the aesthetic disposition tends to recognize objecti-
fied (that is, culturally certified) [i.e., canonical] forms, but not aesthetic
experience itself, which falls silent before the monuments of culture."90
As shown below, such monuments are built and made available for na-
tionalist identification. Ideals—especially collective ones—are not simply
formed; they take a great deal of cultural work to produce and sustain. The
body metaphor does its real work in enabling the anthology to produce the
author's oeuvre and the nation as ideal images available for identification to
members of the British middle class, to an "imagined community."91 These
two identities were produced by the emergence of two kinds of collections
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, a new kind of mis-
cellany and the anthology proper, each of which manages two antithetical
kinds of readerly desire.
Curiosity versus Identity
Rhyming dictionaries always collected the works of past poets, but most
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early-eighteenth-century miscellanies collect poems by contemporaries, the
collections edited by Elizabeth Cooper and Thomas Hayward being two
exceptions. But by midcentury, there begin to appear miscellaneous collec-
tions that attempt to reproduce books and manuscripts from past ages.
William Oldys's Harleian Miscellany (1744) and Thomas Percy's Reliques
of Ancient English Poetry (1765) are two early examples of antiquarian
collections; George Ellis's miscellaneous collection (1790) and Robert
Southey's Specimens (1807) are later examples.92 Like the early-eighteenth-
century coterie productions, the new, antiquarian kind of miscellany refuses
to metaphorically equate the form of collections with any kind of organic
entity for specific, structural reasons. In the introduction to The Harleian
Miscellany: or a Collection of Scarce, Curious, and Entertaining Pamphlets
and Tracts, Samuel Johnson explains why he, Oldys, and Osbourne decided
not to distribute "the great Heaps of Pamphlets" in Sir Robert Harley's
library "according to their Subjects or their Dates." If we do so, he says,
"we shall preclude ourselves from the Advantage of any future Discoveries;
and we cannot hope to assemble at once all the Pamphlets which have been
written in any Age, or on any Subject."93 The miscellany presents only part
of a collection and presumes, in its structure, that collecting will be contin-
ued.94 The miscellany does not therefore contain a whole body. In his 1807
volume, Specimens of the Later English Poets, itself a miscellany in form,
Robert Southey distinguishes the anthology, or a collection of living flow-
ers, from the "hortus siccus," the miscellany that collects almost everything
printed within a certain period of time in order to gratify the curiosity of
"historians," "philologists," and "antiquarians."95 Because it contains in-
organic matter—it is a "dried bouquet"—the antiquarian miscellany need
not claim to constitute a whole, and so collecting can continue indefinitely.
The continuous collecting of antiquities is driven by a very particular
kind of desire: curiosity. In the preface to Reliques of Ancient English Po-
etry of 1765, Thomas Percy repeats the word "curiosity" constantly, as if it
were a nervous tick. Curiosity is for him a desire of the historian-compiler,96
an attribute of historical knowledge (xviii), an ancient relic such as a poem
(xviii), and a kind of intensity pervading the curious work done examining
ancient customs (xix). Freud would call it "polymorphously perverse."97
What a curious person desires is twofold: first, he or she wants to know
material history. Remember that Headley regrets including Queen Elizabeth's
poetry in his collection because it is inferior in quality to the other poems
but gratifies the reader's "curiosity"98 to know more about history. Southey's
Specimens (1807) is designed, he says, to "exhibit specimens of every writer
whose verses . . . find their place upon the shelves of the collector" because
the works of such "indifferent Poets. . . . characterise their age more truly"
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(iv)—they give us not poetry but history. Headley, Southey, and numerous
critics today say about "minor" women's poetry that it is only good enough
to read out of curiosity about what things were like during the time, but we
can put this another way: what makes a poet "inferior" is being an object of
curiosity. The desire to see women as sexual objects prods critics to see their
poetry as mere curiosities: as can be seen from Matthew Arnold's attempt to
clean off the word "curiosity"99 and Freud's work on the sexual enlighten-
ment of children,100 the curious person desires, second, to see sexual bodies.
In contrast to the curiosity-promoting antiquarian miscellany that can
never be filled, the anthology tries to collect all of literary history envi-
sioned as a whole body. William Hazlitt tells us in his Select Poets of Great
Britain, the first full-blown, fully modern anthology published in 1825,101
that he is intent "to offer the public a Body of English Poetry, from Chaucer
to Burns, such as might at once satisfy individual curiosity and justify our
national pride."102 Although Hazlitt says that his volumes "satisfy curios-
ity," the character of that desire is altered by the change from continuous
collecting to a completed form. The completed form is not only the form of
the nation but also the author's oeuvre.
Unlike the compiler of a miscellany who, even if he or she does print
several poems by one author often scatters them throughout the volumes,103
the compiler of an anthology wants us to have a complete, whole represen-
tation of an author's oeuvre. The anthology must, as George Ellis's preface
to his 1790 collection Specimens of the Early English Poets proclaims, "char-
acterize the manner of the several authors" it prints:104 it must produce a
character that has aesthetic value or a characteristic style, but no material
character—aesthetic character must not be bound to any particular printed
edition of the author's works.
Seeing the text as an ideality separable from any material instantiation of
it is one way of commodifying it. A text reducible to the common value of
human labor in the abstract is simply consumable: like a Harlequin ro-
mance, one reads it and throws it away. But canonical texts are not simply
consumable. As (cultural) capital, they are consumed for the sake of pro-
ducing surplus value, and that value does not accrue to the purchaser but
rather "flow[s] back to its initial point of departure."105 The surplus value
that literary works produce for the author and the oeuvre when that very
author and oeuvre are consumed as commodities is immortality: author
and oeuvre have to be abstracted and monumentalized at the same time.
We can see the attempt to distinguish author from material body even in
the form of the anthology's table of contents. Eighteenth-century miscella-
nies include many kinds of address with multiple elements: Mr., first-name,
Sir, Lady, anonymous, and so forth. But anthologies list patronymics only
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(e.g., "Chaucer," "Spencer," "Shakespeare," "Milton," "Dryden"), unless
the poet is a woman, in which case the first name or "Mrs." is used, or a
peer who for some reason needs to be identified as such, in which case "Sir"
is added: the table of contents of Croly's collection contains all patronymics
except "Sir William Smith," "Charlotte Smith," and "Mrs. Hemans." An-
thologies give us a list of single, last names; one becomes aware of the name
designating a social and material (i.e., historical) body only if the poet is a
woman or an aristocrat whose title it is important to note. By contrasting
embodied and disembodied names, the anthology distances from the great
authors the materiality that threatens to undermine the author's status as
transcendent of time.106
And the anthology has other ways of immortalizing the canonical author
by ejecting materiality. The last editions of Dodsley and Pearch and the first
editions of Nichols, collections in the Dodsley group, provide for the first
time footnotes about the author. From the frontispiece to volume 1 of Nichols,
which is indeed the head of a poet (fig. 3), one might wonder why it does not
contain headnotes. Once footnotes get moved, transformed into headnotes, a
collection has fully achieved anthological form. The editors of anthologies
moved the Dodsley group's footnotes to the head of a selection of an author's
works, now consolidated in one place in the collection, just as one might erect
a tombstone over a body. In fact, the headnotes often quote tombstone in-
scriptions. Further, Dryden's portrait (fig. 3) resembles Samuel Johnson's (fig.
4), which is a portrait of Johnson's head standing on a funerary monument.
The anthology provides a sort of idealized graveyard, the poet's works con-
solidated into a body under a tombstone-like headnote. But that body is not
dead, as is manifested by its organic integrity, its wholeness. Hazlitt explicitly
attacks miscellaneous collections for presenting readers with "a numberless
quantity of shreds and patches" rather than a quantity and quality of works
sufficient to represent an author's whole oeuvre.107 Hazlitt alludes to Hamlet's
epithet for Claudius, "A King of shreds and patches" (3.4.103), which clari-
fies Hazlitt's view: a body of poetic works without an organization and
headnotes connecting them to both national poetic history and to the author
is like an illegitimate king, a king of shreds and patches. The poet's works as
constructed by Hazlitt's anthology must be an imaginary whole just like the
imaginary nation, or the king's second body.108
Once established, the whole body of a poet's works can then be identified
with by "a large and a respectable body of the public," as Headley designates
his readers.109 Numbers of people forming a body will identify with numbers
of authors and their works constituting a body of national poetry. In contrast
to the objective of "grasping" of (sexual) objects, curiosity's end, the
identificatory fusion promoted by anthologies will be "respectable."
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Figure 3. Frontispiece from [John Nichols, ed.] A Select
Collection of Poems: With Notes Biographical and
Historical (London: 1780-82). By permission of the
British Library, 238.e.l5.
We often say that the canonical and bourgeois object, high literature,
had to be moralistic to please the bourgeoisie. But then we also say, contra-
dictorily, that aesthetic considerations are separate from moral ones.110 It is
true that if one compares early-eighteenth-century aristocratic miscellanies
with later anthologies, a middle-class moralism seems to inform the anthol-
ogy-compiler's principles of selection. Unlike Hazlitt's or Headley's collec-
tions, Dryden's Miscellanies contain sexually explicit, seductive poems.111
The bawdy collection Deliciae Poeticae; or Parnassus Display'd, is written
by "Philomusus," and this lover of the female muses is meant not at all in
the transcendent but rather in the physical sense.112 Many miscellanies are
therefore Academy of Compliments volumes,113 designed to further one's
amorous exploits, and many more are entitled The Ladies Miscellany, early
in the century designating collections designed to seduce women,114 only
much later designating those designed to instruct them in virtue.115 Curll's
1718 Ladies Miscellany, Benedict tells us, promises to give readers "many
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Figure 4. Frontispiece from A Dictionary of the English Language, 5th
ed., corr. (London: Strahan et al., 1773). Courtesy of the Langsam
Library, University of Cincinnati.
curious tracts." Fifield D'Assigny's Ladies Miscellany: or, a curious collec-
tion of Amorous Poems (1730) promises us "curious poems on love and
gallantry." In both cases, what arouses curiosity is "prurient poetry."116
For literature to come into existence as an ideal object, the desire to iden-
tify with an ideal body of words must be differentiated from curiosity at
material bodies. Headley, remember, has already given us a clue as to how
that differentiation will be established. He excludes all women poets from
his collection except Queen Elizabeth, and then distinguishes her poetry
with this headnote: "[L]ittle else can now be gratified by the perusal of
Elizabeth's poetry than mere curiosity."117 Gender will be the figure that
distinguishes titillating curiosity (curiosity over the sexual body) and anti-
quarian desire (curiosity over a material past, or dead bodies) from an inter-
est in canonical literature. My claim is this: canonical knowledge is produced
by the abjection of carnal knowledge (in all senses of the term) from the
field of literary pleasure.
Expelling the Female Body and Aestheticizing the Text
A long history of medieval, Jacobean, and Augustan misogyny informs
Hazlitt's seemingly gender-neutral claim, in his introduction to Select Brit-
ish Poets: "To possess a work of this kind ought to be like holding the
contents of a library in one's hand without any of the refuse or 'baser mat-
ter.'"118 Hazlitt has told us that his collection is built upon the same plan as
Vicessimus Knox's Elegant Extracts but that it "has been compressed by
means of a more severe selection of matter" (i). The "'baser matter'" ex-
cluded from a view of Britain's "natural preeminence" (ii) in the field of
poetry is women's writing: Knox's volume of poetry contains women writ-
ers, whereas Hazlitt's does not. The 1809 collection Specimens of British
Poets inserts into the British canon only three poems by women, two women
who are not designated by their real names but by the names Swift calls
them in his poetry: "Stella" (Esther Johnson) and "Vanessa" (Hesther
Vanhomrigh). The presence of women writers who featured in Swift's po-
ems as virtuous points to the absence of Swift's grotesque Celias and
Corinnas. None of Swift's dressing-room poems appear in the collection,
and the frontispiece to volume 2 is a scene from "The Rape of the Lock" by
Henry Fuseli: Pope's clean lady of the boudoir contrasts implicitly with Swift's
disgusting female figures who are deliberately pointed to as absent. Cru-
cially, the filthy female body of immoral women is absent from anthological
space.
Even Colman and Thornton's Poems by Eminent Ladies calls attention
to the physical embodiedness of the women poets represented in their col-
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lection, who, they say, "are a standing proof that great abilities are not
confined to the men, and that genius often glows with equal warmth, and
perhaps with more delicacy, in the breast of a female."119 The principle of
genius becomes more embodied for poetesses than poets in the offhand re-
mark "perhaps with more delicacy," which calls attention to the physical
difference between male and female breasts. This remark rivets the abstract
interiority metonymically designated by the word "breast" in the case of
men to physical mammary glands, the weight of a whole poetic tradition
working to incarnate the female Tetin.
After apologizing for the omission of women poets from his volumes
covering the earlier periods of poetic literary history, Hall celebrates the
fact that he is able to include "many" women poets in the volume covering
his own century. Later, twentieth-century anthologies forget the women poets
who for Hall were timeless and transcendent. Croly's 1828 collection leaves
out Mary Leapor, who is contained in Southey's 1807 Specimens; Samuel
Hall's 1836 collection leaves out Charlotte Smith, contained in Croly's 1828
collection; twentieth-century canonizing anthologies forget Mary Tighe al-
together. Through these publishing practices, women's poetry is being meta-
phorically equated with perishable bodies that are seen as living only during
or slightly after the women's actual lifetime. Each anthology kills off through
forgetfulness the previous period's women poets, poets declared "eternally"
great by their own generation. In that way, women keep taking on the body
and dying with it so that male poets can have eternal life.
What hollows out the image of the poet, allowing it therefore to be in-
habitable by every member of the nation, is the absence of body, the fact
that indeed headnotes are like tombstones marking what is and is not a
body. The anthology must be an idealized graveyard: tombstones, the
anthology's headnotes, must forever signify a body of words that is not
decaying. The anthology renders the image of the poet, and with it, the
image of the nation immortal by attaching bodily remains to the figure of
woman and then walling women out. Given the tradition of misogyny, it is
not surprising that women would be called upon again to perform the task
of representing mortal flesh. It is because women are equated with the ma-
terial that a forgetting of and disgust with women poets underwrites canon
formation itself.
Canonicity and Character: The Ethics of Revision
The foregoing analysis of the character of canons answers a question posed
by Frank Kermode: What gives canonical poetry its "consuming rel-
evance"?120 Certainly, what counts as "high literature" is determined by
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denying various social groups access to processes of production and there-
fore to cultural capital. Moreover, misogyny helps to construct figuratively
the canonical object in such a way as to make it a fit object of desire. Exclu-
sions based on class and gender may not play a part in those conscious or
unconscious considerations that go into valuing literature, but they do play a
part in constructing for the early modern subject the desire to consume high
literature and therefore in structuring the media that determine what is avail-
able for consumption. If indeed such exclusions ground the possibility of can-
onizing, then canon reform is not possible. That is, "opening" the canon up
to those excluded from it can only mean that the canon as such will disap-
pear.121 The current teaching collections that have added things to the canon,
in other words, present us not with a new canon but with something else.
Lawrence Grossberg says that cultural studies is not about canon re-
form, that it is work carried on in ignorance of a canon.122 Critics are wor-
ried about abandoning canonical knowledge, along with its requirement
that we correctly quote past poets as a way of knowing them, in the face of
forces such as information technology123 and the rise of a professional-mana-
gerial class that wishes to abolish bourgeois forms of capital.124 Nonethe-
less, it may be that the discipline of cultural studies is constituting a new
kind of cultural artifact, the object of a new kind of desire. Stephen Greenblatt
has described that new desire as the "wonder" that will replace "the spirit
of veneration" with which canonical works are usually approached. The
quintessentially bourgeois object, available for nationalist identification, will
be given up for love of an object imbricated in a resonating nexus of texts,125
or even better, for love of "the complex social practices that shaped, and
still shape, the absorbent surface" of the canonical text.126
Cheryl Walker has argued that feminists need to hang onto the concep-
tion of author, an ideal "character."127 But, as shown above, women poets
cannot have the character of the canonical author because that character is
erected as an ideal by abjecting from it the body figured as female. But if a
new desire reshapes our disciplinary object and with it the discipline itself,
then my counterargument contains good news for those of us who wish to
read and teach women poets, to have them as an object of academic desire.
If we will soon no longer desire venerable cultural monuments, then it is a
good thing, is it not, that early modern women poets have no canonical
character at all?
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6Transcending Misogyny
Anna Letitia Barbauld
Writes Her Way Out
Until 1994 Anna Letitia Barbauld appeared in twentieth-century teaching
anthologies of Romantic poetry only in a headnote to the Rime of the An-
cient Mariner.1 David Perkins quotes a passage from Coleridge's Table Talk
dated 31 May 1830:
Mrs. Barbauld [1743-1825, poet and essayist] once told me that she admired
the Ancient Mariner very much, but that there were two faults in it,—it was
improbable, and had no moral. As for the probability, I owned that that might
admit some question; but as to the want of a moral, I told her that in my own
judgment the poem had too much; and that the only or chief fault, if I might
say so, was the obtrusion of the moral sentiment so openly on the reader as a
principle or cause of action in a work of pure imagination.2
Barbauld here serves to epitomize the anti-romantic, didactic reader, antici-
pating the Victorian reading of Romantic writers that moralized Wordsworth
and devalued those to whom it could not ascribe moralistic intent.3 But it
was not only Barbauld's allegedly anti-aesthetic, straight-laced moralism
that irritated her contemporaries. Charles Lamb actually cursed her in 1802,
P.M. Zall tells us: "Damn them! I mean the cursed Barbauld crew, those
Blights and Blasts of all that is Human in man and child."4 Preferring John
Newbery's Goody Two Shoes (1766) to Barbauld's Hymns for Children,
Lamb attacks Barbauld and her "crew" for their soul-killing rationalism.
And finally, Henry Crabb Robinson records his profound irritation with
Barbauld for not sufficiently distinguishing Wordsworth from "all sorts of
pretended poets. Mrs. Barbauld prefers to all others the idyll—the return of
a brother who finds his brother and friends all dead."5 Presumably, the
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poems by "pretended poets" that Barbauld prefers resemble Wordsworth's
"The Brothers": they are poems about how one's life depends upon partici-
pation in a community.
The qualities that make Barbauld unfit to judge and thus also produce
"great art," then, qualify her to be a Dissenter: moralism, rationalism,
and anti-individualism (a communitarianism of some sort). Thus, the crit-
ics among Barbauld's contemporaries are quite possibly discriminating
against her as much on religious as on artistic grounds: even if they believe
themselves to be sympathetic to the principles of Dissent, Coleridge, Lamb,
and Robinson do not want Barbauld's dissenting principles to mix with
art.6 What is most disconcerting about such a mixture, as is especially
visible in Robinson's comment, is that, because of her adherence to ratio-
nalist principles of equality, Barbauld does not have a properly "reveren-
tial attitude" toward texts and authors. That attitude has been called "a
legacy of Romantic aestheticism": indeed, reverence stimulates the desire
to consume the literary canon that emerged, as the previous chapter shows,
precisely during the time in which Barbauld established her career as an
author, the period we know as Romantic.7 Chapter 5 demonstrates that
poets attempting to write "serious" literature during the eighteenth cen-
tury most often wrote melancholy poetry, imitating and competing with
Milton's "II Penseroso"; that the aura of canonical literary works comes
from a sense of sublimity produced by (as expressed in chapter 5) the near
miss of completed aggression when one poet uses a previous poet's words
in a scattered way so as to appear to be almost stealing them but not
quite; and that the abjection of women poets subtends the idealizing pro-
cess that renders canonical texts and authors transcendent of place and
time. This chapter shows that, because of her particular religious beliefs,
Barbauld is able to reject the melancholy affect, the aggressive individual-
ism, and the disgust with women's bodies that produce a Romantic rever-
ence for male-authored texts.
Such a rejection is bad, of course, insofar as it ultimately renders her
poetry—as far as canonizing anthologies are concerned— perishable and
noncanonical. It is good insofar as it enables her to write great poetry, as
defined by the introduction to this book, without imagining herself as dis-
embodied: disgust with women's bodies, the bodies and texts of women
writers, was not merely a mechanism carried on by editors and introducers
of canons, but it was endemic to cultural production of the period;8 it threat-
ened a woman writer's relation to her own words. Barbauld probably did
not look at canon-producing male authors and consciously decided not to
do what they did, and she may or may not have consciously thought about
her culture's attitude toward women's bodies and texts. However, Barbauld
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did in fact develop an aesthetic of her own, contrary to the emerging domi-
nant one of high Romanticism, because of her religious beliefs as a Dis-
senter—in particular because she was intellectually engaged with Joseph
Priestley. Her aesthetic is independent of her consciously held beliefs:
Barbauld's religious views were not identical to Priestley's notoriously ma-
terialist ones. However, the sense of beauty impelling her literary produc-
tion is discernibly influenced by materialism and dissent. Barbauld's
knowledge of Priestley's materialist views gave her access to a fantasy un-
derlying and stimulating her poetic productivity in the face of ideologies
designed—if not to shut it down—then at least to devalue it as ephemeral
cultural material.
In "To Mr. S.T. Coleridge," "To Lord Byron," and "[A Rebuke to Robert
Southey,]" then, Barbauld is not simply a scold, as "rebuke" in the title
given by others to the latter poem implies. An anti-Victorian aestheticism
that stringently distinguishes religious views from poetic truth has blinded
us to a crucial feature of poetic production among those for whom morality
and poetry were not mutually exclusive. In "high romantic poetry," male
poets establish their voices as transcendent and eternal, Susan Wolfson says,
through erecting a gender hierarchy in which the feminine is seen as imma-
nent and worldly.9 Through a sense of her own superior religiosity, a sense
of having greater purity of soul than Byron and thus of being more worthy
than he is to translate or imitate Hebrew poetry, Barbauld is able to over-
turn that hierarchy and to establish herself as equally transcendent. She is
able to do so because, for Barbauld, a soul's purity does not come despite
but because of its connection to the body—to materiality, coded as feminine
in a culture attempting to perform a secular version of the transubstantia-
tion ritual (see the introduction, pp. 6-7).
This chapter elucidates Barbauld's beliefs about the purpose and effects
of poetry, her Christian views as discernible from treatises and poems, and
finally the crucial sense of superiority she was able to establish based on
those views. She attacks high Romantic poets primarily for being melan-
choly, herself refusing melancholia because she was, to use her own words
for it, "sure" and "secure" in the knowledge of salvation. Instead of pro-
moting endless mourning, she wants to impart to her readers a sense of the
certainty of salvation. Her attacks on Coleridge, Byron, and Southey con-
sist in attempts to bring them into a community of the saved. Hers is a
superiority, then, that does not depend upon beating others out in a compe-
tition, but, on the contrary, upon building up a community of superior be-
ings. The sense of superiority that enables Barbauld to establish her own
authority as a poet is part of a religious system of beliefs that includes a
purposeful aesthetic: poetry saves souls.
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There is no such thing, any good Kantian critic would say, as a func-
tional aesthetic: the aesthetic is, by definition, disinterested. Barbauld's Chris-
tian beliefs, one wants to say, are anti-aesthetic, are about life rather than
art, ethics rather than aesthetics. However, her system is better seen as an
aesthetic that provides an alternative to that which grounds production of
the canon. Looking at her system as offering a possible alternative allows us
to see features of the Romantic aesthetic that produced, features otherwise
invisible.
Barbauld sees her poetry as superior in three ways to that written by
male Romantic poets. First, it does not promote the melancholy, to which
she objects, on both religious and political grounds, because she sees it as
the internalization of feudal, courtly relationships. Second, her poetry is
speaking on behalf of a community rather than an individual. And finally,
the fantasy underlying her poetic production is that there are no souls apart
from bodies.10 Because transcendence does not involve escaping but rather
refining the material, being a woman poet—and thus, according to the ste-
reotype, more sensual, more embodied, more material than men—does not
disqualify her for greatness. To elucidate Barbauld's ideas as an Enlighten-
ment thinker is not necessarily to condone them. It is not necessary to be-
lieve that poetry is part of God's plan for salvation, nor that community can
be established on the basis of communion (a dangerous belief, in light of
twentieth-century fascism!)—it is not necessary to believe these ideas in or-
der to appreciate what they did for Barbauld as a writer. It is her vision of
God as overturning all hierarchies, and her fantasy that spirit is not distinct
from matter but rather matter refined, that enables Barbauld to establish
herself as simultaneously female and transcendent and thereby to assume
an authoritative poetic voice.
As seen in chapter 4, Mary Leapor makes use of conventional literary
forms to launch her critique of social oppression, the critique potentially
disarmed insofar as we misread her use of conventions as traditional rather
than innovative. Although Barbauld too relies on conventional forms such
as the meditative descriptive poem and Juvenalian satire, she judges both
her own poetry and poetry written by others (Robinson's "pretended po-
ets") in accordance with an alternative to various idealist Romantic aesthet-
ics:11 hers is a dissenting aesthetic.12 Barbauld's dissenting aesthetic enabled
her to write her way out of the trap, depicted in the previous chapter, of
being an immanent, material, only-historically-significant woman poet. But
the way out only works to promote her own sense of poetic authority, not
to procure for her canonical status. That is, Barbauld wrote her way out of
sexist oppression for herself but not into the canon, which of course was
out of her control. Regardless of her aesthetic principles, the dialectic of
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abjection and idealization carried on by miscellanies and anthologies ren-
dered her body of words specifically female, and thus mortal.
Poetry and Salvation
In his Memoirs, Joseph Priestley takes credit for having instigated Barbauld's
writing career when he was a tutor at Warrington Academy: "Mrs. Barbauld
has told me that it was the perusal of some verses of mine that first induced
her to write anything in verse, so that this country is in some measure in-
debted to me for one of the best poets it can boast of."13 Priestley's influence
on Barbauld extends to his theology, to his vision of an end to "the corrup-
tions of Christianity" through enlightenment: "The gross darkness of that
night which has for many centuries obscured our holy religion, we may
clearly see, is past; the morning is opening upon us; and we cannot doubt
but that the light will increase, and extend itself more and more unto the
perfect day."14 Exactly how this all-conquering empire of light will accom-
plish this task, Priestley says in the preface to his first volume on air, is by
putting an end "to all undue and usurped authority in the business of reli-
gion, as well as of science." In the same preface, Priestley also says that for
tyrants to "patronize polite literature [is to cherish] an enemy in disguise."15
Thus, Priestley believes that reform would be accomplished by radical level-
ing and that poetry was part of that process.
It was certainly odd to see poetry and science as allies at this time, but as
M.H. Abrams points out, many of the Dissenters opposed mainstream Ro-
mantic thought on precisely that issue. In his Essay on the Application of
Natural History to Poetry (1777), John Aikin (Barbauld's brother) insists
that "nothing can be really beautiful which has not truth as its basis."16
And so in his attack of "the cursed Barbauld crew," Lamb says that because
of Barbauld's books for children, "Science has succeeded to Poetry no less
in the little walks of children than with men."17 If there is something scien-
tific about Barbauld's poetry and prose, it comes from the participation of
her writings in the program Priestley imagines. For Priestley, "all truth had
religious value."18 He is interested in refining religious thought as one would
gold: "the thorough examination of everything relating to Christianity . . .
has been the 'refiner's fire' with respect to it."19 "Refining fire" is one meta-
phor that Barbauld might have obtained from Priestley, either in his juvenalia
or in his conversation, although as shown below, she reworked it to develop
her own aesthetic system. It is important to note here that Barbauld partici-
pated at Warrington in conversations with people who saw poetry as hav-
ing revolutionary potential in furthering truth and therefore in improving
religion and morality.
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Melancholia: Internalized Feudalism
Coleridge once said, "the generation of the modern worldly Dissenter was
thus: Presbyterian, Arian, Socinian, and last Unitarian,"20 and he saw Priestley
as the author of modern Unitarianism. Although possibly not yet a sub-
scriber to Socinianism during his time at Warrington, Priestley, like most of
Warrington Academy, was Arian,21 the distinction between the two consist-
ing, Ira Brown says, in beliefs about Christ: Arians saw Christ as divine but
not deity, whereas Socinians saw Christ as human (Brown, 14 n. 10).
Barbauld reveals that she has at least moved into Arianism by the time she
wrote her pamphlet addressed to Gilbert Wakefield on the value of public
worship (1792). There is a hint in Barbauld's "Answer to Wakefield" that
she might also be a Socinian insofar as she seems at moments to equate
Christ with other great religious thinkers, thus emphasizing his humanity.22
However, in The Georgian Chronicle, Betsy Rodgers quotes Lucy Aikin's
letter to Dr. Channing, conveying memories of the religious atmosphere at
Warrington and providing the name "Free Dissenters" for the religious atti-
tudes at Warrington:
Long before my time, however, my kindred—the Jennings, the Belshams, my
excellent grandfather Aikin, and his friend and tutor Doddridge—had begun
to break forth out of the chains and darkness of Calvinism, and their man-
ners softened with their system. My youth was spent among the disciples or
fellow-labourers of Price and Priestley, the descendents of Dr. John Taylor,
the Arian, or in the society of that most amiable of men, Dr. Enfield. Amongst
these there was no rigorism. Dancing, cards, the theatre, were all held lawful
in moderation: in manners, the Free Dissenters, as they were called, came
much nearer the Church than to their own stricter brethren, yet in doctrine
no sect departed so far from the Establishment.23
No matter what her particular form of dissent—whether it be Arian or
Unitarian—Barbauld opposes Calvinism in doctrine no less than manners
by asserting her belief in a radically egalitarian God. The Calvinist idea of
God, "so incompatible with . . . justice and benevolence," she says in her
"Answer to Wakefield," must come from seeing "the Deity" as "likened to
an absolute monarch," most of whom are tyrants (2:464): "These features
of human depravity have been most faithfully transferred to the Supreme
being.... That error can neither be salutary nor harmless, which attributes
to the Deity injustice and cruelty. . . . Let those who hold such tenets con-
sider, that the invisible Creator has no name, and is identified only by his
character; and they will tremble to think what being they are worshiping"
(2:465-66). Calvinists worship the devil, Barbauld implies. For God to have
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the character of God, he must be completely just and not cruel. She attacks
people like Price for debasing themselves to God because she sees the im-
pulse to do so as the same impulse that drives a courtier to debase himself to
a king (2:467): the true God would not promote a tyrant's inequities. She
says that Price is "not to think that virtue is one thing here, and another in
Heaven" (2:467-68). The "standard of moral feeling" must not be "totally
different from those ideas of praise and blame, merit and demerit, upon
which we do and must act in our commerce with our fellow creatures"
(2:469). That is, we must treat everyone justly as our equal and so must feel
in our relationship with God that we are treated with the same justice. Cal-
vinistic beliefs that one is either saved or not independently of anything, at
the arbitrary whim of God, come from living under an unjust government,
the system of absolute monarchy. Depraved ideas of human commerce pro-
moted by monarchy "have been sublimed," she says, "into all the tremen-
dous horrors of Calvinistic faith" (2:465).
What are those horrors exactly? They were minutely detailed in what
Priestley calls in his Memoirs "books of experience" (Brown, 6): religious
conversion narratives. In a collection of Methodist pamphlets of this type,
these conversion narratives have a conventional plot: a religious person be-
comes obsessed with the idea that he is not saved, falls into the deepest
melancholia, contemplates suicide, and then is saved by the "experience" of
God's grace descending to let him know that he is indeed saved for eter-
nity.24 Priestley himself underwent such a depression and because of that
abandoned the Calvinistic doctrine of his parents (Brown, 6-7). Barbauld
attacks Price and other Christians for indulging in the self-hatred promoted
by the Calvinist notion that we are all vile sinners, but some of us, the elect,
will be saved, no matter what we do: "Above all, it would be desirable to
separate from religion that idea of gloom which in this country has but too
generally accompanied it. . . . [T]he cause must be sought, partly in our
national character, which I am afraid is not naturally either very cheerful or
very social . . . and partly to the colour of our religious systems. . . . [N]o
one, I will venture to assert, can believe in ["the insufficiency of virtue to
escape the wrath of God"] . . . and yet be cheerful" (2:463-64).
It is for failing to banish such horrors from their thought that Barbauld
attacks many prominent male poets. "The idea that all [human beings] are
vile," Barbauld says, leads to "the debasing terrors of a [Samuel] Johnson,
or of more blameless men than he" (2:468). It is precisely because of her
antipathy for melancholia that Barbauld opposes Wakefield's desire to re-
place public worship with private: "The metaphysical reasoner, entangled
in the nets of sophistry, may involve himself in the intricacies of contradic-
tory syllogisms till reason grows giddy . . . ; but when he acts in the presence
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of his fellow-creatures, his mind resumes its tone and vigour, and social
devotion gives a colour and body to the deductions of reason. Berkeley,
probably, never doubted of the existence of the material world when he
quitted his closet. Some minds, . . .  through a timorous and melancholy
spirit remain always in a perplexed and doubting state, if they rest merely
on the conclusions built upon their own investigation" (2:444-45). Hume's
Treatise of Human Understanding follows the same plot pattern as the one
appearing in this quotation: a metaphysical reasoner falls into skepticism
and despair, emerges from his study, engages with people, feels the passions
attendant upon human interaction, and cannot even remember the specula-
tions that led him to doubt and despair. In Hume's account of overcoming
despair as well as in Barbauld's description of it, interactions with people
give one's apprehension of the world the "colour and body" necessary to
make material existence convincing.
Barbauld sees Coleridge as falling into the same dangers as Berkeley and
Hume. Thus, in her poem "To Coleridge," Barbauld tells Coleridge that
"sickly hesitation and blank fear / [and also] Indolence" haunt the grove of
"deep philosophy."25 She warns him: "Not in the maze of metaphysic lore /
Build thou thy place of resting; lightly tread / The dangerous ground, on
noble aims intent" (133, lines 34-36). She ends her poem by exhorting him
to participate in "Active scenes":
And fair exertion, for bright fame sustained,
For friends, for country, chase each spleen-fed fog
That blots the wide creation—
Now Heaven conduct thee with a Parent's love!
(133, lines 40-43)
That Barbauld believes Coleridge's hesitation and indolence to come from a
kind of Calvinistic self-hatred is implied by the language of the poem, which
is identical to the language of her attack on Calvinism in her pamphlet
advocating public prayer. The poem addressed to Coleridge opens, in
Dantesque fashion, by telling us that
Midway [up] the hill of Science, after steep
And rugged paths that tire th'unpractised feet
A Grove extends, in tangled mazes wrought,
And fill'd with strange enchantment: . . .
. . . . unearthly forms
Glide thro' the gloom, and mystic visions swim
Before the cheated sense.
(132, lines 1-9)
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Calvinism's "gloom," Barbauld says in the "Answer to Wakefield," "dark-
ens" religion with "superstition" (2:468-69), a superstition that can be eradi-
cated only by replacing Romantic ideas with radically egalitarian ones: "The
age which has demolished dungeons, rejected torture, and given so fair a
prospect of abolishing the iniquity of the slave trade, cannot long retain
among its articles of belief the gloomy perplexities of Calvinism" (2:470).
Calvinism is tempting, Barbauld says in her poem to Southey. She tells him
that she too enjoys indulging in Romantic melancholy:
How does my pensive soul, in these lone scenes,
Remote from mortal tread, delight to dwell
Where I on Nature, and on Nature's God,
In calm repose, can meditate profound!
(195, lines 37-40)
But, as in the case of Berkeley, Hume, and Coleridge, she admonishes Southey
for staying alone, for not emerging at least on Sunday and worshiping publicly:
Nor would I, Southey, for the world forgo
This dearest privilege to man allow'd,
Due, as the Sun each Sabbath day shall shine,
To meet, with kindred man, the Parent God.
(196, lines 80-83)
Barbauld believes herself to be better fit to engage a poetic program than
either Coleridge or Southey because of her ability to renounce the pleasures
of melancholy: "Tho' sweet as fabling poets ever sung, / Mine ear thy war-
bling Philomel [will] forgo I . . . I To raise with man a nobler strain of
praise" (196, lines 62-65).
For Barbauld, poets who indulge in melancholy and represent that indul-
gence in their poems lead people astray: "The idea that all are vile . . . is an
idea as consolatory to the profligate, as it is humiliating to the saint" (2:468).
And it is for such profligacy, it seems, that she enjoins Byron not to translate
biblical ideas as he has attempted in Hebrew Melodies: "Touch not the harp
of Jesse's son, I... I Those springs to thee are closed" (170, lines 1, 9).
Community
It is clear that, for Barbauld, melancholy can be cured by coming out of the
closet and joining with people to worship God. But in what sense can her
poetry be seen as part of public worship whereas poetry by Coleridge,
Southey, and Byron cannot? Or how is her poetry unaffected by melan-
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choly? Barbauld's poems, she believes, participate in community, while po-
etry of the high Romantic male poets does not. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, poets wrote their own versions of "II Penseroso" in order to stake
out a place in the canon, to proclaim their genius. As Adam Phillips puts it,
"The Romantic concept of genius—the apotheosis of originality—was itself a
kind of elegy for a lost community."26 Coleridge, Southey, and Byron repre-
sent melancholy solitude; she represents a way out of melancholia and back
into community. How does she avoid the trap of solitary genius?
First, she insists that good poems must participate in a community. Pub-
lic worship is important, she says, because people's feelings constitute "one
common flame." In public worship one finds "the electric fire of correspon-
dent feeling" (2:419-20): correspondence comes from people—not, as in
Wordsworth's "glad preamble," from the breeze. Barbauld defines "Social
Worship" (2:448) as a group of people who are communing their thoughts
and feelings to each other. Her poetry attempts to be such a flame: in
"Corsica," she tries to paint a picture of Paoli and the heroic liberators of
Greece that will inspire imitation, which Barbauld represents as kindling a
fire: "What then should Britons feel? should they not catch / The warm
contagion of heroic ardour, / And kindle at a fire so like their own?" (21,
lines 15-17). Poetic kindling will inspire heroic action. A poet cannot write
without such fire, she says to Byron: "Forbear—til time shall bring the hour
/ Thy softened heart shall feel a power / To touch thy lips with fire" (170,
lines 13-15). A softened heart, a heart not hardened by sin, will write po-
etry that arouses the fire of correspondent feeling, will make people want to
stop sinning. But how does poetry help people to stop sinning?
Barbauld wants her poems to cure the English people's Calvinistic mel-
ancholia. In her pamphlet on public worship, remember, Barbauld attacks
Price for public self-debasement. "When," she asks, "will Christians permit
themselves to believe that the same conduct which gains them the approba-
tion of good men here, will secure the favour Heaven hereafter?" (2:466-
67). Such security is necessary to avoid committing the sins of either
profligacy (if I am not saved no matter what I do, who cares if I sin?) and of
falling into melancholy despair and isolation. So her poetry attempts to
promote security, as can be seen in two of her hymns. One of them, speak-
ing to people who are "the salt of the earth," ends with "your reward is
sure" (128, line 64); another ends "Sinner, come! for here is found I... I
Rest eternal, sacred, sure" (122, lines 17-20).
In an early poem, Barbauld represents herself as coming out of timidity
into this security. In "An Address to the Deity," a very young Barbauld
represents herself "trembling" and having a voice too "feeble" to write this
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poem (4, lines 2-3). But then, suddenly, "As by a charm, the waves of grief
subside" (4, line 13):
Thus shall I rest, unmov'd by all alarms,
Secure within the temple of thine arms,
From anxious cares, from gloomy terrors free,
And feel myself omnipotent in thee.
(5, lines 69-72)
To be free to write poetry, and to be free from sin, one must imagine that
God is both just and imitable (2:466). One must feel secure and feel a sense
of one's own power because of that justice. Thus she says in her "Answer to
Wakefield" that public worship abolishes "the invidious distinctions of
wealth," teaching "the poor man" that he is fundamentally equal: "He rises
from his knees, and feels himself a man. . . . Every time social worship is
celebrated, it includes a virtual declaration of the Rights of Man" (2:448).
And such is true for women reading her "Address to the Deity" as well:
Barbauld feels herself "omnipotent in thee" as a fledgling poet because she
knows that a just God eradicates hierarchies, whether of class or gender. Her
claim to omnipotence is a virtual declaration of the rights of woman. Barbauld
is consequently sure that she is saved, and secure against melancholy.
As to melancholy feelings, solitude is necessary for moments of peni-
tence when one indulges in "those humiliating feelings," Barbauld says,
but one must not get addicted to such feelings. The passion for self-hu-
miliation should not be cultivated, whereas joy should. Joy will impel a
person to "seek for fellowship and communication": "The flame indeed
may be kindled by silent musing; but when kindled it must infallibly spread.
. . . Joy is too brilliant a thing to be confined within our own bosoms"
(2:428). For Barbauld, people must dwell on the fact that they are saved,
cultivate or "kindle" joyous feelings, and then be driven to spread those
feelings publicly like fire.
A moment in one of her poems in which she stimulates joy, and with it
communicative, anti-melancholic desire, is also a moment when she describes
the kind of community her poems seek to build. "Corsica" prophesies of
the troubles in Greece that "virtue [will] triumph" (25, line 146), which
unfortunately does not come true. The poem recognizes the error of her
prophecy: "So vainly wish'd, so fondly hoped the muse" (26, line 184). But
then, the poem says, such hopes were not so fond or foolish after all:
Not with the purple colouring of success
Is virtue best adorn'd: th'attempt is praise.
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There yet remains a freedom, nobler far
Than kings or senates can destroy or give;
Beyond the proud oppressor's cruel grasp
Seated secure; uninjur'd undestroy'd;
Worthy of Gods; The freedom of the mind.
(26, lines 195-201)
Here mental freedom is more than just the expression of an Enlightenment
ideal. Barbauld sees her poem as "a prayer for [the] success" of the Greek
rebels, whose actions are themselves a type of "praise." To act justly is to
imitate God and so to praise him. Through the power of poetry as "a con-
tagious fire," her readers will be inspired to imitate Paoli's heroism, know-
ing that actions taken in the world to promote justice are rarely if ever
successful. Her readers are thus members of a community that looks very
Kantian to me: they live in a kingdom of ends. It does not matter what
happens when one performs heroic actions designed to imitate divine jus-
tice—in fact, the result cannot matter, or there would be other reasons for
acting than the desire for justice itself. Members of this community do not
care about the ends; they act for the sake of the action itself, which is both
an enactment of justice and itself a prayer of praise.27 Instead of offering
melancholy words in private, people must offer their public actions as a
prayer. Barbauld's poem is a call to the action that is public prayer.
Barbauld was able to distinguish her poetic voice from Coleridge's, Byron's,
and Southey's, then, because her verse promoted and took part in public-
ity.28 Her poems attempt to cure melancholia in readers, rather than to in-
duce it, and to give them a sense of "security." Relieving themselves of
melancholia means seeing God as both just and imitable. Melancholic po-
etry imagines a despotic God and, like the Calvinist religion on which mel-
ancholy poetry is based, it inures people to injustice:
We often boast . . . of the purity of our religion, as opposed to the grossness
of the theology of the Greeks and Romans; but we should remember, that
cruelty is as much worse than licentiousness, as a Moloch is worse than a
satyr. . . . When will [Christians] cease making their court to their Maker by
the same servile debasement and affectation of lowliness by which the vain
potentates of the earth are flattered? When a harmless and well-meaning man,
in the exaggerated figures of theological rhetoric, calls himself the vilest of
sinners, it is in precisely the same spirit of false humility in which the courtier
uses degrading and disqualifying expressions when he speaks of himself in his
adulatory addresses to his sovereign. (2:466-67)
In contrast to debasing oneself before God, which teaches one political self-
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deprecation, having self-confidence, feeling that sinlessness is possible to
achieve, she believes, will enable readers to participate in a community of
people who all act in accordance with justice.
It has been argued that the reverence eighteenth-century critics such as
Thomas Warton felt for the authors they began to canonize displaced pas-
sions generated by feudal social structures onto the structure of literature as
a discipline.29 High Romantic literature was produced in the wake of Warton's
canonizing efforts so that poets were conscious, for the first time in literary
history, of writing poems that would reach posterity in the form of a canon.30
Barbauld argues that Romantic melancholy poetry, deriving its sublimity
from one's passionate self-debasement or annihilation before a greater power,
promotes feudal, politically retrograde passions.31 In contrast, her poems,
like public worship, are a "virtual declaration of the rights of men." Ac-
cording to Barbauld's aesthetic, all great poetry—Wordsworth's "The Broth-
ers," for instance—draws readers into participating in a community of ends
according to passionately loved principles of equality and justice. In deni-
grating Romantic melancholy, Barbauld rejects feudal forms of self-prostra-
tion transferred by eighteenth-century literary critics and Romantic poets
to the aura surrounding canonical works.
The Transcendent (Female) Body
But establishing her poetic voice as distinct from high Romantic poets was
not enough to transform Barbauld's poetic voice from "feeble" to strong.
There was during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a mi-
sogynous movement to separate women from great poets. This movement
was not explicitly an attempt to quash women's genius, nor merely a re-
sponse to the high visibility and popularity of women poets documented by
Marlon Ross and Stuart Curran.32 As shown in chapter 5, establishing a
canon of male authors whose works were conceived of as transcending time
required pinning historical specificity and materiality on women. Vicessimus
Knox explicitly recognized in 1793 that there was a systematic attempt to
exclude women poets in general, and Barbauld in particular, from the first
disciplinary anthologies, that is, from anthologies that attempted to estab-
lish the canon as we know it, Hazlitt's Select British Poets being a prime
example.33 As noted in chapter 5, Hazlitt claims to have revised Knox's
Elegant Extracts by removing from it inferior poetry, which he calls "baser
matter," and Barbauld's poetry is one of his excisions.34
But Barbauld's religious ideals protect her from herself seeing her own
poetry as basely embodied. The blason tradition of poetry, itemizing parts
of women's bodies, works to embody women. As we have seen in chapter 4,
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women poets such as Mary Leapor were able to put embodying blason and
antiblason poetry to feminist uses. Barbauld puts the form to religious uses
that have feminist effects. During the Restoration, blason poetry often took
the form of love songs. Barbauld's poem "The Origin of Song-Writing,"
gives us a sense of how she will deploy the genre. The poem describes Cupid
as having disobeyed his mother Venus and the female Muses. Venus in-
structs the Muses:
Teach him to spell those mystic names
That kindle bright immortal flames;
And guide his young unpractis'd feet
To reach coy learning's lofty seat.
(47-48, lines 51-54)
The phrase "spell . . .  mystic names" recalls Barbauld's "Address to the
Deity," in which God helps her to overcome melancholy and effectively
write poems by teaching her to "read his awful name, emblazon'd on high /
. . . / [and to see] the mystic characters . . . / Wrought in each flower, inscrib'd
in every tree" (5, lines 57-60). Basically, then, Venus wants the Muses to
teach Cupid to write poems the way that God has taught Barbauld to write
poems.
Unfortunately, Cupid—"the sly insidious child"—steals the Muses' power
but abjures the goal of "kind[ling] bright immortal flames":
Now no more the slacken'd strings
Breathe of high immortal things,
But Cupid tunes the Muses lyre,
To languid notes of soft desire.
(48, lines 61-64)
It is tempting to see Barbauld as here insisting that songs are about physical
love, whereas hymns are about spiritual. But elsewhere Barbauld defends
writers who use the language of passionate love to address or speak about
God: "Love borrows the language of Devotion, for the votaries of that pas-
sion are fond of suing those exaggerated expressions which suit nothing
below the divinity; and you can hardly address the greatest of all Beings in
a strain of more profound adoration than the lover uses to the object of his
attachment."35 What is wrong with the language of love is not that it ex-
presses physical desire, but that it is addressed to the wrong being: one
should express one's undying love only to God. The distinction between
what Cupid ought to write about and what he does write about, then, is not
the distinction commonly made between spirit and flesh, but rather a new
142 Misogynous Economies
one: "The Origin of Song-Writing" differentiates hard, disciplined, con-
trolled desire—desire actively directed to God—from a desire that is "soft"
or "languid"—desire passively suffered, directed to the wrong object.
At first glance, it seems as though Barbauld is inveighing in her hymns
against having any physical feeling at all. For instance, in hymn 8, a voice
from "a crowd of Pilgrims" cries out:
We purge our mortal dross away,
Refining as we run;
But while we die to earth and sense,
Our heaven is begun.
(124, lines 33-36)
This stanza sounds fairly puritanical, as if one's job were to forgo physical
appetite and seek spiritual reward. But "dying to earth and sense" is for
Barbauld, I would argue, less a matter of forgoing the physical than it is of
refining it. Barbauld's songs, for example song 4 ("When gentle Celia first I
knew"), are cautionary tales about what happens to people who have not
trained themselves to desire the right thing. After forgoing a passion for
Celia that has been shaped by "Reason and taste" for a passion for Chloris
springing from unrefined appetite, the speaker despairs: "Oft shall I curse
my iron chain" (43, lines 3, 25). The poem ends with his friends watching
him drift out to sea, lost, until he finally commits suicide or, as the song
says, "And foundering yields to fate" (44, line 42). This song is designed to
frighten the reader away from the melancholy passion that Cupid offers,
back toward the rational love of a just God. But combining "reason" with
"taste" as missing controllers of passion suggests that reason does not sup-
plant or oppose the sensual but rather refines it.
That religious sentiment refines rather than extinguishes sensuous pas-
sion is suggested by the flame imagery pervasive in her work: in hymn 6,
"Pious Friendship," she tells us that the "union sweet [of] according minds"
is a "generous flame within" that "Refine[s] from earth and cleanse[s] from
sin" (90, lines 2, 7-8). In contrast to refining (hard, disciplined) passion, the
lovers in the songs who passively accept rather than actively form their own
physical appetites are enthralled to cruel lovers. Worshiping God does not
involve forgoing physical passion, but it does require forgoing completely
passive physical pleasure, including a masochistic desire to grieve uncon-
trollably. Sheer appetite is sinful, then, only because it puts one person in
thrall to another, encouraging the psyche to revert to a melancholy, masoch-
istic, feudal subservience. Barbauld's theology includes the notion that good
spiritual love does not supplant sinful physical appetite, but, on the con-
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trary, represents desire in its highest, most refined form. In "An Address to
the Deity," when God tells her his name, she suddenly "feel[s] that name my
inmost thoughts controul / And, . . . / . . . the waves of grief subside" (4,
lines 11-13). God's name reworks her passion so that, instead of the mas-
ochistic sublime thrill of "gloomy terrors," she "feel[s]" the intensely pas-
sionate exultation of being "omnipotent in thee" (5, lines 71-72). Wisdom
is not separate from pleasure, even from physical pleasure, but an outgrowth
of it.36 For Barbauld, spirit is not distinct from matter, but a form of it—and,
specifically, passion formed by God's name: words, poetry.
It is interesting to speculate that some of Barbauld's views may have their
origin in Priestley's infamous materialism, derived, apparently, from his
understanding of David Hartley's Observations on Man. Willey tells us that
Priestley adopted Hartley's "necessitarianism" but warns against confusing
it with Calvinist notions of predestination.37 In Calvinism, nothing one does
while alive will affect the state of the soul after death; that state is predeter-
mined. The doctrine of necessity, under which scientific laws are laws, would
seem to preclude willful action as well: elements impinging on one's mind in
the environment cause one to think, feel, and (re)act a certain way. Accord-
ing to Priestley, "the doctrine of necessity" insists upon "the necessary in-
fluence of motives to determine the choice."38 But for Priestley, Willey says,
although "[people's] conduct follows necessarily from their motives," the
motives themselves are not determined by environment alone: "you can
supply [people], by persuasion, with even better and better motives."39 Learn-
ing rhetoric, or the art of persuasion, helps one to form good word bodies
that impinge upon the senses graphically or aurally, stimulating people to act.
Barbauld's "Address to the Deity," as shown above, describes things in
the world as God's writing:
I read his awful name, emblazon'd high
With golden letters on th'illumin'd sky;
Nor less the mystic characters I see
Wrought in each flower, inscrib'd in every tree;
In every leaf that trembles to the breeze
I hear the voice of God among the trees;
(5, lines 57-62)
Barbauld expresses a similar idea in "A Summer Evening's Meditation":
. . . he, whose hand
With hieroglyphics elder than the Nile,
Inscrib'd the mystic tablet; hung [the stars] on high
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To public gaze, and said, adore, O man!
The finger of thy God.
(81, lines 31-35)
McCarthy and Kraft see such passages as stating "a traditional idea of na-
ture as the 'writing' of God, as in Sir Thomas Browne's Religio Medici (1635):
'The Finger of God hath left an inscription on all his works.'"40 Signifi-
cantly, "An Address to Deity," where Barbauld first expresses the idea that
nature is God's writing, is perhaps the second poem she wrote, inspired by a
sermon Priestley gave to ministers at Wakefield. In it, he says that a "truly
and perfectly good man . . . lives, as it were, constantly seeing hint who is
invisible. He sees God in every thing, and he sees every thing in God... . His
whole life will be, as it were, one act of devotion."41 Devotion consists in
reading the world properly as the words of God, a material incarnation of
divine spirit.
As mentioned above, Barbauld admonishes "metaphysical reasoner[s]"
such as "Berkeley" and Coleridge to go into church for public worship where
divinity is incarnate in the congregation: there, "slow hesitating doubts vanish
in a moment"—there one cannot doubt "the existence of the material world"
(2:445), which leads one to doubt the existence of God as well. Those people
who are capable of "abstruse reasoning" are in fact on the same level as
"the multitudes" whom Barbauld urges the metaphysical thinkers to help:
"As for the multitude, . . . so much do they require the assistance of some
object within the grasp of their senses, that it is to be doubted whether they
could be at all persuaded of the existence of a spiritual invisible power, if
that existence was not statedly acknowledged by some act which should
impress the reality of it upon their minds, by connecting it with places,
persons, and times" (2:445-46). It is God who provides the material places,
persons, and times, but only proper education and self-discipline stimulate
the reading capacities necessary for seeing material reality as God's words.
It is precisely that kind of capacity that is cultivated by Barbauld's Hymns
in Prose, designed for children: "God is in every place; he speaks in every
sound we hear, he is seen in all that our eyes behold: nothing, oh! child of
reason, is without God: let God, therefore, be in all thy thoughts."42
Just as Priestley and Barbauld believe that the spirit of God is nothing
separate from the material incarnations that constitute God's writing,
Priestley sees the spirit of people as nothing separate from their bodies. In
his "Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit," Priestley argues against dualism.
One cannot possibly imagine what heaven and hell consist in without sen-
sation, and one cannot imagine sensation without a body, he argues, so it is
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much more consistent to imagine the indelible union of body and spirit than
to believe that the spirit hops from one body to another, from mortal to
immortal. Barbauld's "Summer Evening's Meditation" instantiates such an
idea, since her "soul," "longing to behold her maker," meditates on God by
moving through the universe in a very physical way, passing planets named
as landmarks (83, lines 111-12). Her "contemplation" is rather like Jodi
Foster's voyage in Contact, with Barbauld's special effects deployed rhetori-
cally rather than visually as she ascends to the edge of the universe. She
evokes a physical sense of God's "presence," aurally available as the "tongue
in every star that talks with man / And wooes him to be wise" (81-83, lines
18, 101, 49-50). Barbauld imagines her own death at the end of the poem,
"the hour [that] will come," as a moment "[w]hen all these splendours"
imagined earlier in the poem "bursting on my sight / Shall stand unveil'd,
and to my ravish'd sense / Unlock the glories of the world unknown" (84,
lines 119-21). Barbauld will die not by shedding her sense, not by sailing up
out of the body that allows her to have sensations. Rather, death for her is
ravishment, sensation brought to the highest degree of pleasure.
It is the pleasure offered by beautiful, truthful words—like the pleasure
offered by the sights and sounds of astounding natural objects that are God's
words—that for Priestley and Barbauld forms the glue holding together spirit
and body, meaning and matter. "[E]very body," Priestley says, "as solid and
impenetrable, must necessarily have some particular form or shape; but it is
no less obvious, that no such figured thing can exist, unless the parts of
which it consists have a mutual attraction, so as either to keep contiguous
to, or preserve a certain distance from each other. The power of attraction,
therefore, must be essential to the actual existence of all matter, since no
substance can retain any form without it."43 Physical desire or "attraction"
holds material particles together into a form, and it is this desire that we call
"soul," although, according to Priestley, it is nothing independent of mat-
ter. Every "figured thing," be it the stars (according to Barbauld, God's
"lamps" that speak wisdom with their "tongues"),44 the words of a poem,
or the body or face of a human being (its "figure"), has soul because of (and
not despite) its physical attractiveness.
For Barbauld, the way that one monitors one's words, just as one chan-
nels the body's physical desires, via "reason and taste," determines the soul's
state, which consists in the quality and degree of attractiveness and ravish-
ment (pleasure given and pleasure received). As shown in the previous chapter,
anthologies of great poetry produced during the Romantic period exclude
women writers almost completely. But teaching anthologies designed for
young children and the poor such as William Enfield's The Speaker and
Knox's Elegant Extracts did contain women writers.45 The reason for this is
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expressed in pedagogical essays as well as anthologizing practices. Women
writers were seen as best at using language not for intellectual or spiritual
gratification but for sensual enjoyment that young children could indeed
appreciate, just as they enjoy baby talk and cooing sounds made by their
mothers. According to Richard Lovell Edgeworth, children enjoy "the beau-
ties of . . . Barbauld" when young; they can thus learn to like poetry at an
early age and later move on to seriously thoughtful and rational readings.46
Given the difference between the contents of teaching collections and can-
onizing anthologies, discussed in the previous chapter, edited by Hazlitt,
Campbell, and Aikin, this culture expected children to graduate from read-
ing poetry that pleases physically (that is beautiful in sound), a feature of all
verse including that written by women and inferior male poets, to poetry
that stimulates one intellectually and spiritually, as does poetry written by
the great male masters. Because Barbauld does not believe that the sensual
and the spiritual are separate, she does not subscribe to this division of
labor. Insofar as the spirit is refined by refining sensations, by redirecting
one's attractions in accordance with "reason and taste," inculcating bad
taste is spiritually dangerous. For that reason Barbauld wrote her Hymns in
Prose for Children (1781): children should not read "verse till they are able
to relish good verse";47 they should not be physically stimulated until able
intellectually to actively determine the direction of their physical pleasure.
The belief that body and spirit are not distinct entities enables Barbauld
to claim for women higher moral authority as sensual beings, deeply—even
physically—affected by language that they read and write. Women are ca-
pable of being governed by reason, she says in "On Female Studies," and,
because they are trained to be virtuous, they are diverted from developing
tastes that will misguide their souls: "the broader mirth and more boister-
ous gayety of the other sex are to [women] prohibited."48 Although most
writers, including Wollstonecraft, see sensibility's connection to physical
sensuousness as putting it "on the brink of vice" if not "curbed by rea-
son,"49 Barbauld does not see physical passion as antithetical to spiritual
growth; for her reason is not "a curb" on passion but a directional device,
directing women away from the bawdy (bad taste) and toward great art (good
taste). She aligns a rationally and tastefully directed sensibility with a chastity
that nonetheless unabashedly procures inordinate amounts of pleasure:
[T]he purity and simplicity of heart which a woman ought never, in her freest
commerce with the world, to wear off, her very seclusion from the jarring
interests and coarser amusements of society, fit her in a peculiar manner for
the worlds of fancy and sentiment, and dispose her to the quickest relish of
what is pathetic, sublime, or tender. To you, therefore, the beauties of poetry,
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of moral painting, and all, in general, that is comprised under the term of
polite literature, lie particularly open, and you cannot neglect them without
neglecting a very copious source of enjoyment. ("Female Studies," 41-42)
She is not saying, "stay simple, pure, and secluded so that you save your
soul by not being tempted by bodily desires." She is saying, "stay simple,
pure, and secluded so that your bodily desires do not get corrupted by being
sexualized and your pleasure reduced." "Polite literature," more attractive
than the bawdy jokes one hears in "commerce with the world," provides "a
very copious source of enjoyment." Cultivating the mind, she says, "will
open to you an inexhaustible fund of wonder and delight" ("Female Stud-
ies," 43). And Barbauld speaks here not only of the passive pleasures of read-
ing and acquiring knowledge. She directs women to "love and cultivate" their
native language: "know all its elegancies, its force, its happy turns of expres-
sion, and possess yourself of all its riches" ("Female Studies," 42).
Because for Barbauld sensibility is not a spiritual liability, a force to be
curbed or contained, because for her it is good to seek as much pleasure as
one can get, women have the advantage in cultivating their souls: "But of
all reading, what most ought to engage your attention are works of senti-
ment and morals. Morals is that study in which alone both sexes have an
equal interest; and in sentiment yours has even the advantage" ("Female
Studies," 43). Thus Barbauld's belief in the materiality of the soul trans-
forms women's sensitivity from a vice into a virtue and allows her to see her
own writing as, if more sensuous than writing by men, not on that account
less serious, less spiritually significant, less capable of saving souls.
However, the adequation Barbauld makes in her theology between re-
ceiving and giving pleasure, between attraction and ravishment, produces
what often look like antifeminist ideas in her writing, as in the paragraph
ending the first letter of "On Female Education": "[A well-educated woman]
will seem to know everything by leading every one to speak of what he
knows; and when she is with those to whom she can give no real informa-
tion, she will yet delight them by the original turns of thought and sprightly
elegance which will attend her manner of speaking on any subject" ("Fe-
male Studies," 43). Such advice looks masochistic, as does the line in her
poem "To a Lady, with some painted Flowers" that scandalized Mary Woll-
stonecraft, "Your best, your sweetest empire is—to please" (77, line 18).
These passages could in fact be passionately advocating the very ideal of
feudal subservience that she protests against in Coleridge and Southey, the
masochistic passion of courtly service now mapped onto gender. And it is
indeed the case that economic rationalists such as Adam Smith, liberal theo-
rists such as Locke, and rational Dissenters, all present theories that founder
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when confronted with "the economic problem" of masochism. Barbauld
wants to deny that people are necessarily attracted to masochism, for which
she condemns melancholy poetry, and perhaps her repressed masochism
returns here. But in "On Female Education," pleasing men with your words
is represented as coeval with being pleased by them. And "To a Lady" makes
the activity of pleasing men not an arduous task requiring self-debasement,
but women's "sweetest empire," only the sweetest of perhaps many em-
pires. Pleasing is represented as a way of getting pleasure, but the tasks
involved in pleasing also procure pleasure on their own. Barbauld's require-
ment that women please, antifeminist though it is,50 does not actually par-
ticipate in a masochistic affective economy, rather, it rewrites that economy
in a way that is radically egalitarian: one gets pleasure by pleasing others in
ways that please oneself. In her poem "On a Lady's Writing," Barbauld
describes a woman's physical bearing—her body, her manners—as identical
with her writing: "the same graces o'er her pen preside / That form her
manners and her footsteps guide" (70, lines 5-6). Refining the figure one
makes in society and figuring spiritual truths in one's poetry are identical
tasks. Being an admirable figure and making great poetic figures are the
same, and both accomplishments give pleasure to viewers and readers as
much as to oneself.
To imagine the physical beauty of the female body as just like the beauti-
ful words of the poet is to see materiality as transcendent and to reconceive
women's writing: no physical necessity consigns it in advance to the cat-
egory of "baser matter"; women's writing can become the passionate but
spiritually efficacious utterances of the "virtuous few" whom she describes
in her hymn "Ye are the salt of the earth." One of the people she describes
as "Salt of the Earth" is Lafayette; others are the Polish people who, fight-
ing for freedom in 1794, were defeated by Russian troops. But some are
female: they are "Angels of love" who tend the sick in hospitals and the
dying in prisons. All of these people, male and female, are encompassed by
the word "you" in the hymn that addresses them. These people are also
great writers:
Whene'er you touch the poet's lyre,
A loftier strain is heard;
Each ardent thought is your's alone,
And every burning word.
Your's is the writing on the wall
That turns the tyrant pale.
(127-28, lines 25-28, 35-36)
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The "writing on the wall" that great writers repeat is a repetition of God's
own mystic and burning words—the spiritual fire whose physical form is
attraction to and attractiveness of bodies (natural objects, words, people).
These contagious, fiery words say that all people are radically equal. Ty-
rants will pale at such news because, of course, they are not behaving as if
people were equal. And some poets, whose strain is not as lofty—perhaps
Coleridge, Southey, Byron—write verse in a melancholic mood that is based
on a sense of inequality, of one's own vileness. The radical equality of all
people includes female as well as male people: gender indeterminacy in this
hymn comes from Barbauld's vision of the radical equality of women whose
attachment to words is simultaneously physical and spiritual, and who there-
fore can be as writerly as anyone else.
Abjection
As chapter 5 has shown, anthologies and miscellanies of poetry collectively
abject women for the sake of establishing male writers as transcendent. One
Romantic writer discusses indirectly the poetic productions—"performances"
as they are called throughout the eighteenth century in introductions to
collections of poems—that must be rendered transcendent through the pro-
cess of abjection. Charles Lamb's "On the Tragedies of Shakespeare" (1811)
is an essay notorious for exemplifying Romantic sentiment against theatri-
cality. However, while arguing that Shakespeare's texts need to be read rather
than seen in performance, Lamb mentions in passing how much he detests
the kind of memorization of Shakespeare's soliloquies made possible by
"Enfield Speakers and, such kind of books."51 In his essay, Lamb ruminates
on the difference between a text written by an author and the innumerable
productions of that text in print, between the ideal "text" and its material
instantiations: just as audiences might prefer one performance by an actor
to any other performance, or indeed to silently reading words on the page,
Lamb fears that readers might desire a particular reproduction of a text but
not others. Lamb wants readers to desire the abstract "text" rather than its
embodiment as a commodity not produced by an author, but rather by pub-
lishers and printers. He is also simultaneously worried that these commodi-
ties are not consumable, that desire might come to rest in any one of them
and end circulation. Lamb assaults anthologies like William Enfield's The
Speaker, connecting them with the performances his essay disdains:
How far the very custom of hearing any thing spouted, withers and blows
upon a fine passage, may be seen in those speeches from Henry the Fifth, etc.,
which are current in the mouths of school-boys from being to be found in
150 Misogynous Economies
Enfield Speakers, and such kind of books. I confess myself utterly unable to
appreciate that celebrated soliloquy in Hamlet, beginning "To be or not to
be," . . . it has been so handled and pawed about by declamatory boys and
men, and torn so inhumanly from its living place and principle of continuity
in the play, till it is become to me a perfect dead member. (113)
How exactly is Lamb figuring here the reproductions of "To be or not to
be" in anthologies and in readers' mouths, two related kinds of performances
or productions? Is the soliloquy imagined to be an embryo aborted from the
play figured as a female body, or is it here imagined to be the phallus and
the play castrated by its reproduction in various kinds of print? Undecidably
both. The body that emerges when Lamb is discussing the canonization of
Shakespeare through anthologies is maybe male, maybe female. Here we
see the collapse of the distinction between abstract, ideal text and printed or
performed material instantiations of it, a distinction mapped onto sexual
difference, which is also collapsing via the process of abjection:52 the body
here cannot quite be pinned on women and thereby ejected from the ideal-
ized "text." Lamb spends the rest of the essay trying to disembody the text
by insisting that the reader is a completely bodiless entity when reading. But
here, as he looks at what anthologies do, their precarious albeit practical
methods for sustaining texts as abstractions begin to break down. That
breakdown is signaled by the eruption into his essay of an indeterminately
gendered, abject body. Only the virulent, sadistic kind of misogyny will
reestablish the distinction between male ideal text and female printed mat-
ter, described above in chapter 5). Cursing the Barbauld crew will help,
especially if one sees Barbauld as a "bare" "bald" female body: Coleridge,
Southey, and Lamb called Barbauld "Mrs Bare-bald" and "Mistress Bare
and Bald" in retaliation for a bad review of Lamb's John Woodvil that the
three erroneously attributed to Barbauld.53 Gender indeterminacy has to be
violently resolved so that embodiedness, materiality, and mortality can be
pinned on women. Sadism directed by early Romantics at Barbauld served
the purpose of shoring up unstable distinctions.
The Fantasy Underlying a Dissenting Aesthetic
Gender indeterminacy can be violently resolved through virulent misogyny;
left unresolved, it produces the literariness that allows for multiple points
of identification within a work, stimulating readerly play. What makes
Barbauld's poems "To Mr C[olerid]ge" and "A Summer Evening's Medita-
tion" great poetry is a certain ambiguity about the material, produced in
accordance with the dissenting aesthetic adumbrated above. In her poem to
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Coleridge, Barbauld tells Coleridge that those who remain "enchanted" by
the grove of metaphysics do so in order to escape mortality:
. . . . Here each mind
Of finer mold, acute and delicate,
Rests for a space, in fairy bowers entranced;
And loves the softened light and tender gloom;
And, pampered with most unsubstantial food,
Looks down indignant on the grosser world,
And matter's cumbrous shapings.54
(132-33, lines 25-32)
Barbauld is here accusing idealists and metaphysicians (and Coleridge) of
distinguishing themselves from matter through engaging in their spiritualiz-
ing, subtilizing melancholia. But she calls this melancholy enchantment "un-
substantial food." Cox suggests that "unsubstantial food" contrasts with
maternal nourishment and is therefore perhaps gendered male.55 Since the
food described is food for the soul, Barbauld's phrase says that melancholia
is spiritually insufficient. But she is also calling it unsubstantial, i.e., not
material. Melancholia is spiritually insufficient because not worldly, not
material enough. But then Barbauld continues: "Youth belov'd / . . . / be this
Circe of the studious cell / Enjoyed, but still subservient" (133, lines 32, 37 -
38). The studious cell is a Circe—a woman who enthralls you by gratifying
sensual desires. Is melancholy loitering in the wood of metaphysics an at-
tempt to distance oneself from or immerse oneself in the physical? Is it mas-
culine and transcendent, or feminine and immanent? Undecidably both.
"A Summer Evening's Meditation" similarly establishes a rich kind of
gender ambiguity. Like Coleridge's ruminations in "Frost at Midnight" writ-
ten some twenty-one years later, Barbauld's meditations are stimulated by a
"stranger," but Barbauld's stranger is not a piece of ash on the grate; rather,
it is internal:
At this still hour the self-collected soul
Turns inward, and beholds a stranger there
Of high descent, and more than mortal rank;
An embryo God; a spark of fire divine,
Which must burn on for ages, when the sun,
(Fair transitory creature of a day!)
Has clos'd his golden eye. . . .
(82, lines 53-59)
This fire is not exactly immaterial—it is rather unformed matter, an em-
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bryo. But this spark is contrasted with the sun, matter that will ultimately
burn out because only material. It is significant that this ephemeral burning
matter is gendered "he," though there is a classical precedent, given the
connection of the sun with Apollo. God is gendered "he" as well, so both
divine and material fires are masculine. What Barbauld finds when she goes
to the outer reaches of the universe out of "longing to behold her Maker"
(83, line 111) is "The desarts of creation, wide and wild; / Where embryo
systems and unkindled suns / Sleep in the womb of chaos" (83, lines 95-
97). It is seeing this womb that stimulates the speaker's astonishment, the
sublime awe that checks her flight. Is God female, a womb full of embryos?
God may be "he" or "she," but, in any case, it is God for whom she "rip-
ens," God who will "ravish" her (84, lines 119,121). The image of a womb
that ravishes gives this poem its power and depth.
The same kind of gender indeterminacy that operates here makes Lamb's
essay on Shakespeare's tragedies great literature as well, but the two textual
moments spring from different sources. Barbauld's education as a Dissenter,
and in particular that education received from Priestley, informs a fantasy
underlying her poetry and prose. The fantasy that materiality refines itself
into transcendence allows her to value women's bodies and women's words
as simultaneously material and transcendent. Although probably not con-
nected to any consciously held materialist theology on Barbauld's part (that
is, she may have seen Priestley's doctrines as extreme), a fantasy of sublime
materiality promotes the gender ambiguity in these poems that sustains their
literariness, that enables them to offer a play of identifications (see the in-
troduction, pp. 12-14). The playful ambiguity in Lamb's text, though pro-
moting great writing, is rendered intolerable to him by the nature of his
ideological task: to distinguish an author's text in the abstract from any
material production of it, be it a printed book or a theatrical performance.
Because this play is intolerable, Lamb must pay—or I should say that women
in general (Barbauld in particular) and schoolboys (or lower-class men try-
ing to learn to speak well in order to raise their status—these people must
pay, since it is Lamb's misogyny and his classism that allows him to disavow
such ambiguity: women poets are bare and bald; declamatory boys and
men handle and paw words, embodying them in a thoroughly disgusting
performance; great, transcendent male poets like Shakespeare have no truck
with either.
An Alternate Aesthetic, Rejected
It is her vision of religious faith as overcoming gendered hierarchies, ex-
pressed indirectly in her hymn "To the Salt of the Earth," and her sense of
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her own work as superior to Southey's and Coleridge's because based in joy
rather than melancholy, community rather than solitude, that enables
Barbauld to produce poetry. We need to read her concern with the state of
writers' souls, then, less as narrow-minded morality antithetical to the spirit
of poetry and more as a principle of poetic production. Through her rela-
tion to God, Barbauld is able to assume an embodied but nonetheless tran-
scendent poetic voice. Not sharing her aesthetic views, however, literary
history has excluded her from the canon until 1994.
The previous chapter argued that seeing poetry written by male poets as
transcendent depends upon the abjection of woman. Disciplinary antholo-
gies that do not contain women poets, together with antiquarian miscella-
neous collections and teaching anthologies that do contain women,
collectively perform abjection: antiquarian collections pin historical speci-
ficity onto female poets; teaching collections such as Knox's Elegant Ex-
tracts, insofar as they are informed by pedagogical theory in which children
should be taught to love poetry by first being exposed to the most beautiful
because most sensuous kind, pin the materiality of language on women; by
excluding women poets found in the other two kinds of collections, disci-
plinary anthologies encourage their readers to project their own mortality
onto the women poets found elsewhere, thereby constituting a canon of
immortal (male-authored) verse.
Priestley, as we have seen, saw Barbauld as one of Britain's greatest po-
ets, as did her brother John Aikin. John Guillory sees Barbauld herself as
"at the vanguard of the anthologizing movement by which English litera-
ture was given a canonical form" because he sees Enfield's Speaker as "the
Adamic ancestor of the Norton Anthology."56 But, in addition to the fact
that The Speaker was deliberately designed to teach elocution, which the
Norton is not, the tables of contents of Norton anthologies before 1993
resemble much more closely William Hazlitt's Select British Poets or John
Aikin's Select Works of the British Poets than they do any of the collections
used in schools.57 Sadly, even Barbauld's staunchest supporter, her brother,
who encouraged her to publish the notoriously maligned poem "Eighteen
Hundred and Eleven" because of its brilliance—sadly, even he did not in-
clude her poetry in his anthology of canonical verse.58 The need to embody
and materialize women poets and thereby render them immanent is struc-
tural and so strong that it can prompt Arthur Symons to respond in the
following way to Wordsworth's statement that the only poem he ever en-
vied anyone for writing was Barbauld's "Life": "The last lines . . . are not
less than an inspiration, a woman's . . ."59 Symons has to locate her lines
physically in her body, to limit their scope so that they are seen not as stimu-
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lating universal feelings, the provenance of canonical verse, but instead evoke
sentiments that are only "a woman's."
Melancholy poetry, a poetic type antithetical to Barbauld's own poetic
practice, dominates the canon.60 But her critique of that kind of poetry, that
it may instill in its readers a politically dangerous passion for subservience,
has been revived in a powerful way recently by critics during a moment
when women poets such as Barbauld and Leapor are being rediscovered,
and the canon, sustained by a misogynous structure, is breaking down. Terry
Eagleton, for example, persuasively argues that the aesthetic promotes bour-
geois hegemony.61 However, such criticism will not have its intended salu-
tary effect if we see it as applying to "the aesthetic" rather than to one
aesthetic theory among many.
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Conclusion
In the preceding chapters, I have shown that there was, during the course of
the eighteenth century, a shift in the affective economies informing both
reading and writing practices. Early writers such as Dryden, Swift, Pope,
and Otway try to keep open the play of textual indeterminacies. One way to
preserve literariness is to ensure that readers and auditors will be induced,
willingly or not, to identify with multiple positions in the text. In early-
eighteenth-century satire, misogynous portraits that implicate the misogy-
nous voyeur (satiric persona and reader) in what are allegedly only the
disgusting woman's crimes make satiric persona, reader, and satiric object
all at moments identifiable with each other, thereby keeping the play of
identifications in the text mobile and indeterminate. In early she-tragedies,
excessively pathetic portraits of a raped and murdered female figure at-
tempt to dissuade the audience from disidentifying with her, despite her
sufferings. Both satire and she-tragedy, then, fuel a sadomasochistic reading
economy in which the reader identifies with both active and passive posi-
tions in a scene of humiliation.
As the century progresses, however, we see more virulent forms of mi-
sogyny in the structures of texts and in reading practices. Later texts try to
prevent readers from identifying with the figure of woman in misogynous
representations, and indeed, an emerging belief that women are essentially
different from men abets the process. Lillo's London Merchant and
Mandeville's Modest Defence of Publick Stews both contain misogynous
representations that sadistically immolate the figure of woman, Mandeville's
text going so far as to turn her into a rotting carcass. These texts encourage
a sadistic reading economy, in which we wholly disidentify with and
deanimate a female figure who is seen as wholly other because literally re-
ferring to female anatomy. Eighteenth-century literature has not been com-
pletely successful at inculcating such reading practices, but they everywhere
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contaminate our reading processes. As the attempt to recover Mary Leapor's
work shows, even feminist literary critics wishing to recover women's pro-
test within conventional discourses that circumvent dissent sometimes read
as misogynists.
I hope to have shown that the fate of misogyny and literature are inter-
twined. As I have argued in chapter 6, misogyny and literature have since
the inception of the discipline of English literature been connected, and they
are still connected. We can see that connection in the disciplinary changes
currently under way: the dismantling of the canon and of literary sexism go
hand in hand. But this book has shown that misogyny and literature are
connected in another crucial way as well. What makes misogyny virulent is
the refusal to understand language's fundamental literariness. Misogynous
texts use the figure of woman to abject sexual desire and materiality from
the realms of both proper business and great literature. That abjection works
only insofar as the texts in which it occurs are not read as literary but as
referential discourse. The misogyny that forecloses on the literariness of
texts consists in imagining that representations of women are about a real-
world referent rather than about the sometimes conflicting functions that
representations must serve: ideology, demystification, abjection for the sake
of erecting ideals. As readers, we can recover these contradictions only by
being willing to see gender as a figure, not a thing. Recovering literariness
and denaturalizing sexism turn out to be compatible tasks.
I will end this book by pointing to a passage from Swift's Gulliver's Trav-
els in which, I believe, he insists that two kinds of oppression—sexism and
classism—are connected to newly emerging attitudes toward language. Swift
connects oppression to the belief that language performs fundamentally anti-
rhetorical tasks. Gulliver is visiting the Grand Academy of Lagado, the school
of languages, where he finds projectors who are working on "a scheme for
entirely abolishing all words whatsoever. . . . An expedient was . . . of-
fered," Gulliver says,
that since words are only names for things, it would be more convenient for
all men to carry about them such things as were necessary to express the
particular business they are to discourse on. And this invention would cer-
tainly have taken place, to the great ease as well as health of the subject, if the
women in conjunction with the vulgar and illiterate had not threatened to
raise a rebellion, unless they might be allowed the liberty to speak with their
tongues, after the manner of their forefathers; such constant and irreconcil-
able enemies to science are the common people.1
Swift treats Gulliver ironically here, himself taking the side of "the common
people." Science has determined that words must refer to things. Women
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and the poor, he implies, ought to rebel against such so-called "progress."
But why should it be specifically "women in conjunction with the vulgar
and illiterate" who rebel against progress, rather than everyone? Swift saw
a connection between reducing language's figurative power, on the one hand,
and misogyny and class oppression on the other. From Swift's vignette, and
from the evidence and arguments presented in this book, it is possible to
say: dismantling misogyny and preserving literary play depend upon each
other. I hope further to have convincingly shown here that misogyny is not
necessary. If the disgust aroused by representations of women's bodies is in
any sense a "real" feeling, it is nonetheless not disgust at women. Disgust
allegedly aroused by women's bodies comes in fact from the stench of social
inequity.
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Mifflin, 1939), 111-220; the quotation is from act 4, scene 1, lines 159-69.
67. Ian Donaldson, The Rapes of Lucretia: A Myth and Its Transformations
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 17, quoting Michel Lieris, L'Age d'homme
(Paris, 1939), 142-43.
68. See Ferguson, "Rape and the Rise of the Novel."
3. Engendering Capitalist Desire
1. My account thus fits in with that of "the grotesque body" (Peter Stallybrass
and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression [Ithaca: Cornell
Univ. Press, 1986]). Stallybrass and White show how the bourgeoisie "carved
out a domain between the realm of kings and the world of the alley-ways and
taverns, . . . by forcing together the high and the low as contaminated equiva-
lents, somehow in league with each other and part of a conspiracy of exchange
and promiscuity" (109). This process creates "the grotesque body," "a hybrid
creature trying to straddle the world of popular fairground culture and the
'higher' world of humanistic ethics and ideals" (112). Augustan poetry is simul-
taneously repelled and fascinated by this body (108-13), which it usually repre-
sents as female (109).
2. As to Mandeville's feminism, see Frederick B. Kaye, "The Influence of
Bernard Mandeville," Studies in Philology 19 (1922): 85, reprinted with origi-
nal page numbers in Studies in the Literature of the Augustan Age: Essays Col-
lected in Honor of Arthur Ellicott Case, ed. Richard C. Boys (New York: Gordion
Press, 1966); and Gordon S. Vichert, "Bernard Mandeville's The Virgin
Unmask'd," in Mandeville Studies, ed. Irwin Primer (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1975), 1-10.
3. Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1973), 30.
4. Laura Brown, "Reading Race and Gender: Jonathan Swift," in Eigh-
teenth-Century Studies, 23.4 (summer 1990): 429.
5. The notion that consumerism comes from woman's desire to be fash-
ionably dressed, found everywhere in the early-eighteenth-century works, is
in no way supported by historical fact. Swift attacks Irish women for import-
ing silk: "It is to gratify the vanity and pride, and luxury of the women, and of
the young fops who admire them, that we owe this insupportable grievance of
bringing in the instruments of our ruin," viz. "the importation of all unneces-
sary commodities," ("A Proposal that All the Ladies and Women of Ireland
should appear constantly in Irish Manufactures" [1729], in Prose Works, ed.
Herbert Davis [Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951], 12:126, cited and dis-
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cussed in Brown, "Reading Race and Gender," 431). Similarly, Addison cel-
ebrates trade as a means of adorning women (Laura Brown, Alexander Pope
[Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985], 8-22). Nonetheless, we do not know who
the consumers were nor, by any stretch, what kind of desires provoked "the
consumer revolution."
In "The New Eighteenth Century," (New York Review of Books 31.5 [29
Mar. 1984]: 42-48). Lawrence Stone explores various possible ways of account-
ing for the birth of the desire to buy, including "the rise of new concepts of
individualism and materialism," "the herd instinct to imitate," and the "Veblen
model of conspicuous consumption" favored by McKendrick (45; see also Neil
McKendrick, John Brewer, and J.H. Plumb, The Birth of a Consumer Society:
The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England [Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 1982]). Stone makes some very Mandevillean conclusions about
consumerism: "Fashion drove the market. It altered from year to year, almost
from month to month, so that suppliers, Josiah Wedgwood for example, were
obsessed with the need to keep up with the fickle winds of change in taste" (45).
Stone's comment is indebted to The Fable of the Bees; Stone thus quotes
Mandeville to back up his ideas about fashion ("Luxury employed a million of
the poor, and odious Pride a million more. Envy itself and vanity were ministers
of industry" [Bernard Mandeville], The Fable of the Bees, ed. F.B. Kaye, 2 vols.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 1:25, hereafter cited in the text and the notes
by volume and page number]). But Stone does not associate "fashion" or "fick-
leness" with women and feminine fops, as Mandeville and other eighteenth-
century writers do: "We do not know," Stone points out, "exactly who bought
or what really impelled them to do so" (45).
6. The poem portion of the Fable was first published in 1705 under the title
The Grumbling Hive. It was republished in 1714 "with a prose commentary of
about two hundred pages appended" (Kaye, "Influence," 84) and renamed The
Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices Publick Benefits. The Fable was reprinted
and expanded in 1723, 1724, 1725, 1728, 1729, 1732, and 1733. See Kaye,
"Influence," 84-86, and Kaye's introduction to Mandeville, The Fable of the
Bees, ed. Kaye.
7. Hirschman has written about how the eighteenth century revised Chris-
tian categories of sin (avarice, pride, and luxury) into productive social virtues.
My account of this scapegoating process fits in well with his discussion of how
eighteenth-century writers tried to distinguish between sinful passions and mer-
cantile interests. See Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Po-
litical Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1977).
8. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, facsimile ed. (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1971), 485, quoted in the appendix to Mandeville, The
Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, 2:414.
9. There is considerable debate over whether Mandeville was a mercantilist
on the one hand (T.A. Home, The Social Thought of Bernard Mandeville: Vir-
Notes to Pages 65-66 179
tue and Commerce in Early Eighteenth-Century England, [New York: Colum-
bia Univ. Press, 1978], 66, 70, 106 n. 56, 107 n. 74; Jacob Viner, introduction
to Bernard Mandeville, A Letter to Dion, Augustan Reprint Society no. 41
[1732; reprint, Los Angeles: Clark Memorial Library, 1953], 11-14), or a pro-
ponent of economic liberalism, laissez-faire economics, or economic individu-
alism on the other (Kaye, "Influence," 105-7; Albert Schatz sees Mandeville as
the first to formulate economic individualism), or finally whether his ideas exist
somewhere in between the two positions (Nathan Rosenberg, "Mandeville and
Laissez-Faire," Journal of the History of Ideas 24 [1963]: 183-96). See M.M.
Goldsmith, Private Vices, Public Benefits: Bernard Mandeville's Social and Po-
litical Thought (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), 123—24; Christopher
J. Berry, review of Private Vices, by Goldsmith, History of Political Thought
8.1 (spring 1987): 174-75. Goldsmith views Mandeville as a proponent of "the
spirit of capitalism." Everyone agrees that, mercantilist or protocapitalist,
Mandeville was in favor of trade, and in favor of the consumerism or "private
vice" that stimulated it; it would be possible, however, as Kaye suggests, to see
Mandeville as a philosophical "rigorist," a moral absolutist who condemns on
moral grounds all worldly commerce ("Influence," 95-98).
10. By "abject," I do mean miserable and degraded. However, I also mean to
refer to the work of Julia Kristeva as described in the introduction to this book.
11. Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1977) [he violence et le sacre (Paris: Bernard Grasset,
1972)]. As against what Girard calls our "'anti-differential' prejudice" (50 [78]),
our egalitarian belief that the desire to level distinctions incites people to vio-
lence, Girard argues that the leveling of hierarchies is as much the cause of
violence as its result: "it is not [cultural] distinctions but the loss of them that
gives birth to fierce rivalries and sets members of the same family or social
group at one another's throats" (49 [77]); "perfect equilibrium invariably leads
to violence" (51 ["l'equilibre c'est la violence" (80)]). For more information
about the sacrificial crisis and the scapegoating event that ends it, see chapter 2.
12. [Bernard Mandeville], A Modest Defence ofPublick STEWS, Augustan
Reprint Society no. 162 (1724; reprint, Los Angeles: Clark Memorial Library,
1973), xii, cited hereafter by page number in the text and the notes. For the
attribution of this originally anonymous text to Mandeville, see F.B. Kaye, "The
Writings of Bernard Mandeville: A Bibliographical Survey," Journal of English
and Germanic Philology 20 (1921): 455. In "The Authorship of A Modest De-
fence ofPublick Stews, Etc." (Neophilologus 18 [1933]: 200-203), J.H. Harder
maintains that the Defence was written by "Lawrence Le Fever." As Richard I.
Cook rightfully points out, '"Lawrence Le Fever' . . .  sounds suspiciously like
another of the punning pseudonyms ('Luke Ogle, Esq.' is another) which were
attributed to the Modest Defence in its subsequent editions" ("'The Great Le-
viathan of Leachery': Mandeville's Modest Defence ofPublick Stews [1724],"
in Primer, Mandeville Studies, 23). It is surely the joke of this name, Lawrence
Le Fever, to which Defoe refers when he argues against "tolerating Fornica-
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tion," a view held, he says, by "several warm Gentlemen" ("Some Consider-
ations upon Streetwalkers," University Microfilms, British Museum, Moore no.
485, p. 4, emphasis added; Defoe's treatise was written to answer Mandeville
[Richard I. Cook, introduction to Mandeville's Defence, viii n. 6]). It is for that
reason that R.S. Crane refutes Harder's contention (critical note in Louis I.
Bredvold, "English Literature, 1660-1800: A Current Bibliography," Philological
Quarterly 13 [1934]: 122-23). This history of attribution comes from Cook,
"Leviathan," 23 n. 4.
13. Cook translates the name as "Lover of Whores" ("Leviathan," 27). That it
is meant to be translated is further suggested by the name appended to Mandeville's
1711 treatise on hypochondria, "Philopirio." Mandeville says in the preface, "In
these Dialogues, I have . . . brought my self upon the Stage;... I changed [my name]
for that of Philopirio, a Lover of Experience, which I shall always profess to be" (A
Treatise of Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions, xi; quoted in G.S. Rousseau,
"Mandeville and Europe: Medicine and Philosophy," in Primer, Mandeville Stud-
ies). Notice that even when Mandeville is stating explicitly that his views are
identical to those of his persona, he leaves room for ambiguity: he shall "always
profess to be" a "Lover of Experience," but is he one?
14. "Mandeville is perfectly serious in his mercantilist contention that the
government ought to set itself up in the brothel business. But serious though he
may be, Mandeville is also perfectly aware of the comic potentialities of writing
about a subject like prostitution from within a framework of such typically
mercantilist preoccupations as quality controls, cost estimates, and product dis-
tribution" (Cook, "Leviathan," 29-30). Kaye agrees with Cook that Mandeville's
proposal to legalize and officially govern "stews," to make them public, is "se-
rious," but on different grounds (see Kaye, introduction to Mandeville, Fable,
l.lix-lx, lxxv; Cook, "Leviathan," 25).
15. Cook has given the history of Mandeville's Defence (introduction to
Defence, i-iii; "Leviathan," 22-23). The idea of state-regulated prostitution first
appears as a comment ("Remark H") in The Fable of the Bees: if the state
would allow men to consume "Courtezans and Strumpets," England could then
preserve the virtue of its "honest Women" (1:95). In 1723 Mandeville appended
his infamous "Essay on Charity and Charity-Schools" to The Fable of the Bees.
Kaye dates 1723 as the beginning of Mandeville's notoriety ("Influence," 87-
88): the Grand Jury of Middlesex County condemned The Fable as a public
nuisance. Mandeville published A Modest Defence one year later, in 1724. As
Cook points out, Mandeville repeats verbatim in a self-vindicating article in the
London Journal (10 Aug. 1723; reprinted in The Fable of the Bees, 1:385) the
grand jury's charge, that he wrote "with a Design to debauch the Nation."
16. See note 9.
17. "The question of Mandeville's sincerity," Irwin Primer notes, "is still a
lively issue" (introduction to Mandeville Studies, xiii). On the problem of
Mandeville's seriousness, see Gordon Vichert, review of Private Vices, by M.M.
Goldsmith, Eighteenth-Century Studies 20.2 (winter 1986-87): 227; Kaye, "In-
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fluence," 101; Jacob Viner, introduction to A Letter to Dion, 5, 9-11; and
Cook, introduction to Defence, v. In A Modest Defence, Mandeville commends
"publick" over "private whoring" because it might deter "[t]he murdering of
Bastard Infants... which, besides the Barbarity of it, tends very much to dispeople
the Country. And since the Prosperity of any Country is allow'd to depend, in a
great measure, on the Number of its Inhabitants, the Government ought [to
intervene]" (4-5). Is he serious—is Mandeville a real Modest Proposer? As Cook
points out, this treatise precedes "A Modest Proposal" by five years (introduc-
tion to Defence, v).
18. Henry Abelove, "Some Speculations on the History of Sexual Intercourse
during the Long Eighteenth Century in England," Genders 6 (fall 1989): 127.
Abelove examines inadequate attempts to account for the population explosion
of the eighteenth century and shows that the questions we usually ask about
fertility are "ideologically determined," partaking of "that essentialism which
so disempowers us both as historians and as political beings" (127). Abelove
suggests that population growth occurs because "the particular kind of sexual
expression which we moderns often name tendentiously 'sexual intercourse'
became importantly more popular at that time in England, and so much more
popular that by means of that enhanced popularity alone, without any assis-
tance from a decline in mortality, England's population could have doubled in a
relatively short span" (126-27). Traditional historians are unable to account
for the rise in fertility because they "defensively transform something that ought
to be a problem in the history of sexual behavior into a problem in the history
of nuptiality," and are consequently unable to correlate it with factors which
would enable more people to marry, but "the new popularity of intercourse so-
called [i.e., cross-sex genital intercourse for the sake of reproduction] does cor-
relate rather well with a dramatic rise in virtually all indices of production, a
rise which the textbooks call the onset of the Industrial Revolution and which
as we know distinguished late eighteenth-century England" (128).
19. Abelove, "Speculations," 128.
20. Cook, "Leviathan," 24.
21. Ibid., 3.
22. Chastity is both something used to buy and something to be bought: it is
both currency ("Our Business is to contrive a Method how [men] may be
gratify'd, with as little Expence of Female Virtue as possible" [62]), and com-
modity (as when Phil Porney suggests "the Importation of foreign Women" to
meet renewed demands [65]).
23. Again, the text overtly argues these things while tropologically under-
mining them (in more ways than I have had time to discuss here). I have tried to
show that this rhetorical undermining could in a crisis situation actually shore
up and sustain the text's logical claims (see note 18). Since for us such distinc-
tions (distinctions between a capitalist and sexual pursuits, between innocuous
business practices and the alienating effects of commodifying women) have al-
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ready been established, such visible undermining serves mostly, it seems to me,
to make Mandeville's text unreadable: since we do not know whether to weight
the tropological or the logical, since both are too prominent, we do not know
what he is trying to argue.
24. William Wycherley, The Country Wife (1675), ed. Thomas H. Fujimura
(Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1965); George Lillo, The London Merchant
(1731), ed. William H. McBurney (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1965).
Both plays will be cited in the text by act, scene, and line number.
25. Actually, Diderot's comment is more threatening than that, telling spec-
tators that they truly must feel their emotion augmented by identifying with
others in the audience or be seen as harboring "a secret vice": "Celui qui ne sent
pas augmenter sa sensation par le grand nombre de ceux qui la partagent, a
quelque vice secret; il y a dans son caractere je ne sais quoi de solitaire qui me
deplaire." He who does not feel his emotion intensified by the large number of
people who share in it has some secret vice; there is something in his character,
some sort of reclusiveness, that displeases me ("Entretiens sur le fils naturel,"
Oeuvres Esthetiques de Diderot, ed. Paul Verniere [Paris: Gamier Freres, 1965],
122). Diderot's Entretiens was published the same year as Edmund Burke's
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the
Beautiful and David Hume's essay "Of Tragedy" (1757), both of which worry
over the degree of "aesthetic distance" that viewers of tragedy have when watch-
ing misery befall others.
26. Katharine Eisaman Maus, "'Playhouse Flesh and Blood': Sexual Ideol-
ogy and the Restoration Actress," ELH 46 (1979): 595-617.
27. Thomas Laqueur, "Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of Reproduc-
tive Biology," Representations 14 (spring 1986): 1—41.
28. Jonathan Dollimore, "Subjectivity, Sexuality, and Transgression: The
Jacobean Connection," in Renaissance Drama: Renaissance Drama and Cul-
tural Change, ed. Mary Beth Rose, New Series 17 (Evanston, 111.: Newberry
Library Center for Renaissance Studies, 1986), 53-81.
29. E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1975).
30. Bob Bushaway, By Rite: Custom, Ceremony, and Community in En-
gland 1700-1880 (London: Junction Books, 1982); Stallybrass and White, Poli-
tics and Poetics of Transgression.
31. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, 256-57.
32. Terry Castle, Masquerade and Civilization: The Carnivalesque in Eigh-
teenth-Century English Culture and Fiction (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ.
Press, 1986).
33. Kristina Straub, Sexual Suspects: Eighteenth-Century Players and Sexual
Ideology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992), 127.
34. It is probably important to note here that masking was an upper-class
phenomena; according to Thompson, blacking among the lower classes devolves
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into machine-breaking and rioting as the century progresses and as customary
behaviors are more systematically suppressed (by the development of a police
force, for instance).
35. Lisa Jardine, Still Harping on Daughters: Women and Drama in the Age
of Shakespeare (Sussex, England: Harvester Press, 1983), 20-21.
36. Jean Howard, The Stage and Social Struggle in Early Modern England
(New York: Routledge, 1994), 101.
37. Pat Rogers, "The Breeches Part," in Sexuality in Eighteenth-Century
Britain, ed. Paul-Gabriel Bouce (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1982).
38. Straub, Sexual Suspects, 128-29.
39. Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1977), 121-27.
40. In both "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd" {Past and Present
50 [Feb. 1971]: 76-136) and Whigs and Hunters, E.P. Thompson argues that,
during the early 1700s, popular rebellions such as price fixing and blacking
directly challenged the new system of laws protecting proprietary rights with
customary laws, secured "by Rite," as Bob Bushaway puts it. See also Helen
Burke, "The London Merchant and Eighteenth-Century British Law," Philo-
logical Quarterly 73.3 (summer 1994): 348.
41. Karl Kroeber, British Romantic Art (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press,
1986), 15.
42. On Millwood as exemplary of rhetoric, see Stephanie Barbe Hammer,
"Economy and Extravagance: Criminal Origin and the War of Words in The
London Merchant," Essays in Theatre 8.2 (May 1990).
43. Harry William Pedicord quotes the billings in advertisements ("Masonic
Theatre Pieces in London 1730-1780," Theatre Survey 25.2 [Nov. 1984]: 158-
59). Pedicord says that the play was produced 204 times, Hammer says 230
("Economy and Extravagance," 99 n. 4).
44. Tejumola Olaniyan, "The Ethics and Poetics of a 'Civilizing Mission':
Some Notes on Lillo's The London Merchant," English Language Notes 29A
(June 1992): 33-34.
4. Misogyny and Feminism
1. Mary Leapor's poetry appears in Poems Upon Several Occasions, [vol.
1] (London: J. Roberts, 1748); Poems Upon Several Occasions: The Second
and Last Volume (London: J. Roberts, 1751), 2:296-97; her poems will be
referred to in the text by volume and page number, as here. A large selection of
Leapor's poems appears in George Colman and Bonnell Thornton, eds., Poems
by Eminent Ladies, particularly Mrs. Barber, Mrs. Behn, Miss Carter . . ., 2
vols. (London: R. Baldwin, 1755); a smaller selection appears in Roger Lonsdale,
ed., Eighteenth Century Women Poets: An Oxford Anthology (Oxford Univ.
Press, 1989).
Leapor was popular enough during the eighteenth century to have her works
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listed at the Bath lending library forty years after her death (A Catalogue of
Meyler's Circulating Library, in Orange-Grove, Bath;. . . [Bath, Eng.: Meyler,
Printer, 1790?], 38, item 1305). Lately, she has received a great deal of critical
attention: see Donna Landry, The Muses of Resistance: Laboring-Class Women's
Poetry in Britain, 1739-1796 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990); Rich-
ard Greene, Mary Leapor: A Study in Eighteenth Century Women's Poetry (Ox-
ford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993); Betty Rizzo, "Molly Leapor: An Anxiety for
Influence," Age of Johnson 4 (1991): 313-43; Margaret Anne Doody, "Swift
among the Women," Yearbook of English Studies 18 (1988): 68-92 (later pub-
lished in Critical Essays on Jonathan Swift, ed. Frank Palmeri [New York: G.K.
Hall, 1993], 13-37); and Jocelyn Harris, "Sappho, Souls, and the Salic Law of
Wit," in Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany,
ed. Alan C. Kors and Paul J. Korshin (Philadephia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press,
1987), 232-58. As Martin Wechselblatt has pointed out to me, it is amazing
that Leapor has received so much critical attention without a modern edition of
her works being available. The Works of Mary Leapor: A Critical Edition, ed-
ited by Richard Greene and the late Ann Messenger, is forthcoming from Ox-
ford University Press (2000). It is possible to gain access via the World Wide
Web to a selection of Leapor's poems, including the full text of Crumble-Hall,
at http://miavxl.muohio.edu/~leaporm/leapor.htm.
2. Greene, Mary Leapor, 152-53.
3. On Duck, see Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1973), 32; on Collier, see Landry, Muses of Resistance, 59-
60; on the counterpastoral, see John Goodridge, Rural Life in Eighteenth-Cen-
tury English Poetry (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995); and John Barrell,
The Dark Side of the Landscape: The Rural Poor in English Painting (New
York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980).
4. At roughly the same time that Petrarch wrote his sonnets, the Pleiade
wrote their hymnes-blasons praising parts of women's bodies. The first collec-
tion of blasons, written by Clement Marot, Maurice Sceve, Saint Gelais, and
others, was called Blasons anatomiques du corps feminin (written in 1536, col-
lected in 1543) precisely because each poem described one body part, a foot, a
breast, or a tooth, Marot's "Le Beau Tetin" being only the most famous. The
French collection of blasons is reprinted by Albert-Marie Schmidt in Poetes du
XVIe Siecle (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), 291-364. For some reason, Schmidt leaves
the word "anatomiques" out of the title.
5. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H.
Nidditch (1689; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 2.1.1, 104. The Es-
say will hereafter be cited in the text by book, chapter, section, and finally page
number, as here, or by title of the part of the Essay referred to and page number.
6. Locke's Essay thus, as Charles Taylor points out, radically redefines "ex-
perience," "transposing] first-person experience into an objectified, impersonal
mode" (Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity [Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1989], 163).
Notes to Pages 85-86 185
7. Michel Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, ed.
Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 38.
8. The term "histories of difference" comes from Joan Scott's analysis of
the problematic reliance on "experience" of those historians engaged in iden-
tity politics ("Experience," in Feminists Theorize the Political, ed. Joan Scott
and Judith Butler [New York: Routledge, 1992]: 22-40). My discussion might
be seen as examining a less visible, and so perhaps more insidious, reliance—
among poststructuralist historians eschewing identity categories—upon "expe-
rience" as the ground for performing criticism (see Diana Fuss, Essentially
Speaking: Feminism, Nature, and Difference [New York: Routledge, 1989],
129 n. 2).
9. Max Horkeheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment,
trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1993), 4.
10. Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, ed. Ian
Campbell Ross (1759-67; reprint, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983), 70.
11. Thomas Sprat, History of the Royal Society, ed. Jackson I. Cope and
Harold Whitmore Jones (London, 1667; reprint, St. Louis, Mo.: Washington
Univ. Studies, 1958), 113.
12. See Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision (London: Verso,
1986), 105. Naomi Schorr talks about how "femininity [has been] constituted
[out] of the refuse of masculine transcendence" ("This Essentialism Which Is
Not One," Differences 1 [summer 1989]: 40)—and refuse cannot be taken too
literally.
13. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979); Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason:
Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1979).
14. Taylor, Sources of the Self, ix, 144.
15. Barbara Maria Stafford, Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlight-
enment Art and Medicine (Boston: MIT Press, 1991), 362.
16. Ibid., 84.
17. A science that grew up with empiricism, physiognomies so literalizes the
rhetoric of the blason tradition as to physically mimic the metaphoric contem-
plation of body parts in the objectifying practices of phrenology and dissection.
This practice, like all empiricisms, has its demystificatory moment, as is obvi-
ous from Johann Caspar Lavater's description of the purpose of the art: "To
pierce through all these coverings, [the coverings of 'rank, condition, habit,
estate, dress'] into [a person's] real character, to discover in these foreign and
contingent determinations, solid and fixed principles by which to settle what
the Man really is" (Lavater, Essays on Physiognomy [1792] I, I, 24-25, quoted
in Stafford, Body Criticism, 95). Physiognomies is progressive insofar as it pos-
its a universal human essence as disconnected from "rank, condition, habit,
estate, dress."
18. Bette London is the only reader of Frankenstein, I believe, to have recog-
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nized Victor as a mad blasonneur ("Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, and the Spec-
tacle of Masculinity," PMLA 108.2 [1993]: 261-62).
19. Doody, "Swift among the Women," 68.
20. For an intense debate over the universality of Swift's scatalogical vision,
see the Forum in PMLA 91 (1976): 464-67.
21. Donald T. Siebert, "Swift's Fiat Odor: The Excremental Re-Vision," Eigh-
teenth-Century Studies 19 (1985): 21, 24.
22. Laura Brown notices that the female body is absent from the dressing-
room poems and convincingly argues that these satires are attacks on cultural
corruption, for which women's clothes are a synecdoche ("Reading Race and
Gender: Jonathan Swift," Eighteenth-Century Studies 23 [1990]: 425-43, later
published in Laura Brown, Ends of Empire: Women and Ideology in Early Eigh-
teenth-Century English Literature [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1993],
170-200). Margaret Doody notices Swift's curiously empowering relations with
women friends and writers ("Swift among the Women").
23. Gentleman's Magazine 54 (1784): 807, quoted in Greene, Mary Leapor,
14-15.
24. Paul de Man, "The Resistance to Theory," in The Resistance to Theory
(Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986), 11.
25. Marjorie Levinson, "The New Historicism: Back to the Future," in Re-
thinking Historicism: Critical Readings in Romantic History, ed. Marjorie
Levinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 20.
26. "Materialism" means simply "the proposition that the origins of all forms
of existence, including human activity, can be explained in terms of physical
being" (Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean, Materialist Feminisms [Cambridge,
Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1993], 3). Competing forms of materialism are prolifer-
ating (see David Simpson, introduction to Subject to History: Ideology, Class,
Gender, ed. David Simpson [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991], esp. 15-
18). There is a movement among feminist critics to confine applications of the
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timents of Young Readers (London: J. Rivington et al., 1814); and Choice Se-
lections and Original Effusions; or Pen and Ink Well Employed. By the Daughter
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of a Clergyman (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1828) are
all examples of miscellanies that contain numerous women poets.
39. William Hazlitt, Select British Poets, or New Elegant Extracts from Chaucer
to the Present Time (London: William C. Hall, 1824)—suppressed; William Hazlitt,
Select Poets of Great Britain (London: Thomas Tegg; Glasgow: R. Griffen; Dublin:
R. Milliken; Paris: M. Baudry, 1825).
40. The British Anthology; or, Poetical Library, 8 vols. (London: John Sharpe,
1824).
41. John Aikin, Select Works of the British Poets with Biographical and
Critical Prefaces (1820) (Philadelphia: Thomas Wardle, 1831).
42. Thomas Campbell's Specimens of the British Poets, 7 vols. (London:
John Murray, 1819), contains 238 male poets, most of them complete unknowns,
and three women poets. In the 1809 anthology Specimens of the British Poets
from Lord Surrey to Cowper, 2 vols. (London: W. Suttaby, B. Crosby, Seateherd
and Letterman, 1809), three poems by only two women are included within the
huge panorama of British literary history. Some examples of twentieth-century
collections of this sort are Russell Noyes, ed., English Romantic Poetry and
Prose (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956), containing 50 male writers to 2
women; James Stephens, Edwin Beck, and Royall Snow, eds., English Romantic
Poets (New York: American Book Co., 1935), containing 25 men to 1 woman;
Cecil A. Moore, ed., English Poetry of the Eighteenth Century (New York:
Henry Holt, 1935), 52 to 1; and finally, Thomas Ward's collection, in which
volumes 3 (the eighteenth century) and 4 (the nineteenth century) contain 2 and
4 women, respectively, out of upwards of 50 poets per volume.
43. John Bullar, comp., Selections from the British Poets (London: Thomas
Baker, 1822). Joseph Ritson's English Anthology, 3 vols. (London: T. and J.
Egerton, 1793), is not fully organized in the anthological format that sustains
canonical literary history, despite the claims of Ritson's title and preface; it is half
miscellany and half anthology, a hybrid form that does indeed include women.
Like Bullar's, the 1969 collection edited by Geoffrey Tillotson, Paul Fussell, and
Marshall Waingrow, Eighteenth-Century English Literature (New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1969), includes women writers (albeit only three) but confines them to one
specific section of the text called "A Miscellany of Poems."
44. I am quoting S.C. Hall's headnote to Mary Tighe, The Book of Gems.
The [Modern] Poets and Artists of Great Britain, 3 vols. (London: Saunders
and Otley, 1836, 1837, 1838; London: Fisher, 1838, 1845; London: Whittaker
and Co., 1838; London: H.G. Bohn, 1844, 1846, 1848, 1853), 2 vols. (Lon-
don: Bell and Dandy, 1866; London and Paris: Fisher and Son, 1840, 1844).
See also George Croly, The Beauties of the British Poets (London: R.B. Seeley,
W. Burnside, 1828); [John Frost, ed.], Select Works of the British Poets in a
Chronological Series from Falconer to Sir Walter Scott (Philadelphia: Thomas
Wardle, 1838).
45. There are throughout the period collections of women's poetry: [George
Colman and Bonnell Thornton, eds.], Poems by Eminent Ladies, 2 vols. (Lon-
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don: R. Baldwin, 1755); Dyce, Specimens of British Poetesses; Frederic Rowton,
The Female Poets of Great Britain (1853), facsimile ed., ed. Marilyn Williamson
(Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1981). However, Colman and Thornton,
Rowton, and Dyce are presenting the history of women writers, not British
literary history itself.
46. Coiro, "Milton and Class Identity," 184; Marotti, Manuscript, Print,
214-15. The Academy of Compliments volumes published throughout the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries function like rhyming dictionaries
and are similarly laden with "errors." On seeing multiple material versions as
not erroneous but something else, see Donald F. McKenzie, Bibliography and
the Sociology of Texts, The Panizzi Lectures (London: British Library, 1985);
De Grazia and Stallybrass, "The Materiality of the Shakespearean Text."
47. John Aikin, prefatory essay, The Spleen and Other Poems, by Matthew
Green, ed. John Aikin (London: T. Cadell Jr. and W. Davies, 1796), vii.
48. Oldys, William, "Preface, Containing an Historical and Critical Review
of all the Collections of this Kind that were ever published," in The British
Muse, or A Collection of Thoughts, Moral, Natural, and Sublime of our En-
glish Poets: Who Flourished in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, comp.
Thomas Hayward (London: F. Cogan and J. Nourse, 1738), vii-ix.
49. [Robert Dodsley, comp.], A Collection of Poems. By Several Hands. In
Three Volumes (1748)—extended to four volumes in 1755 and to six volumes
in 1758 (reprinted in various forms in 1748-49,1751,1760,1763,1765,1766,
1770,1775, and [a new ed.] 1782)—and then "supplemented" by Francis Fawkes
and William Woty's Poetical Calender (1763), 12 vols., (reprint, 1764);
Richardson and Urquhart's single-volume Collection of the Most Esteemed Pieces
of Poetry that have appeared for several years, with variety of originals, By the
late Moses Mendez, Esq., and other contributors to Dodsley's collection (1767,
1770); George Pearch's Collection of Poems in Two Volumes (1768)—extended
to 4 volumes in 1770 (1775, 1783); and finally John Nichols's eight-volume
Select Collections of Poems (1780-82; 1784). My view here of the connection
among these collections differs slightly from that of Harold Foster, who does
not see Nichols as a supplement to Dodsley (Supplements to Dodsley's Collec-
tions of Poems [Oxford: Oxford Bibliographical Society, 1980], vii). On the
contents of the many versions of Dodsley, see Robert Chapman, "Dodsley's
Collection of Poems by Several Hands," Oxford Bibliographic Society Publica-
tions, vol.1, pt. 3 (1933): 269-316. The imitations of Dodsley's format extend
beyond the works listed here through piracy: the notorious Alexander Donaldson,
over whose publications the court battle for perpetual copyright was eventually
lost (Rose, "Author as Proprietor"), printed in 1768 and 1772 A Select Collec-
tion of Poems, from the most Approved Authors. Volume 1 virtually duplicates
volume 1 of Dodsley (second edition, 1748) and Pearch (1783). Thus, when
Donaldson writes in the advertisement, "The Publisher takes this opportunity
for returning his thanks to the Gentlemen who favoured him by selecting the
Materials for this Collection," he is actually thanking Dodsley for "allowing"
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Donaldson's piracy, satirically goading "the Executors" of Dodsley and Pearch's
copyright estate to stop him from using their material.
50. [Robert Dodsley], "Advertisement to the Former Editions," in A Collec-
tion of Poems in Four Volumes. By Several Hands (London: G. Pearch, 1783), 1.
51. Michael F. Suarez, S.J., "Trafficking in the Muse: Dodsley's Collection of
Poems and the Question of Canon," in Tradition in Transition: Women Writ-
ers, Marginal Texts, and the Eighteenth-Century Canon, ed. Alvaro Ribeiro,
S.J., and James G. Basker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 306. See also
Benedict, Modern Reader, 160.
52. While Michael Suarez posits that most purchasers of the Dodsley collec-
tion were aristocrats ("Trafficking in the Muse," 306-7), it is important to
realize that such a fact made the book marketable to emulators of aristocrats as
well: it was recommended, Suarez tells us, in Directions for a Proper Choice of
Authors to form a Library (1766), a pamphlet surely not addressed to peers
and established gentlemen who already had a library and who could gain knowl-
edge about the most important works of high culture recently produced through
their acquaintances; this pamphlet is addressed to class climbers. That Dodsley's
collection was purchased by would-be aristocrats, or even those who wish to
vicariously experience a rise in status, is borne out by comments such as
Chatterton's (in a letter) that the collection could be found "'in every library'"
(Suarez, "Trafficking in the Muse," 298).
53. This list actually appears in the title of another miscellany compiled by
Matthew Concanen in 1728, a collection of those who wish to respond to the
"Miscellanies [written and compiled] by Pope and Company" because of hav-
ing been "abused in those volumes," A Compleat Collection . . . . (London: A.
Moore, 1728).
54. Green is so identified in vol. 1, first edition (1748), table of contents; in
vol. 1 (1782), p. 128; and in vol. 5 (1782), table of contents and p. 171.
55. See the note in the 1782 edition of Dodsley, Collection of Poems, 2:275.
56. James Boswell, The Life of Johnson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992),
653.
57. Quoted in Suarez, "Trafficking in the Muse," 300.
58. William Mason, The Poems of Mr. Gray. To Which are Prefixed Memoires
of his Life and Writings by W. Mason, M.A. (York: A Ward, 1775), 335, quoted
in Suvir Kaul, Thomas Gray and Literary Authority: A Study in Ideology and
Poetics (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1992), 40; see also 47 n. 20.
59. Courtney Craig Smith has analyzed miscellaneous collections known as
"drolleries"—often having that word in their titles—published between 1655
and 1682. Politically threatening to the Interregnum and the Protectorate, and
prosecuted as such, these lewd volumes were produced, Arthur Marotti points
out, by "a Royalist cosmopolitan coterie"; their audience was, according to
Smith, "'those who were not regularly accepted into the inner circles of the
court but considered themselves the social superiors of the city merchants and
tradesmen" (Smith, "The Seventeenth-Century Drolleries," Harvard Library
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Bulletin 6 [1952]: 48-49; quoted in Marotti, Manuscript, Print, 268 n. 122).
Choyce Drollery and Sportive Wit, published in 1656, were "burned by order
of the authorities" (Marotti, Manuscript, Print, 268); other drolleries published
that year were Parnassus Biceps and Wit and Drollery, and two years later, Wit
Restor'd. Courtney Smith says of these collections that they were "compiled by
the Cavaliers for the sake of registering protest against the Puritans. . . . Until
the Restoration brought relief, they were the 'subversive propaganda' of an
'occupied' people who had lost out in the field, yet were unwilling to submit to
the rule (or the preaching) of the 'Saints.' Even with the Restoration, the char-
acter of the drolleries did not change, except that the protest became more
social than political" (Smith, "Drolleries," 45, quoted in Marotti, Manuscript,
Print, 271).
60. It is precisely the contrast between high, serious and low, vulgar, fun
poetry that prompts the title "Pills to purge melancholy" for collections of songs.
H[enry] P[layford], Wit and Mirth: an antidote against melancholy compounded
of ballads, songs, and catches, 3d. enlarged ed. (1682); [Henry Playford], Wit
and Mirth: or Pills to Purge Melancholy (1699); part 2 (1700); 2d ed. (1705);
vol. 4 (1706); 3d ed. (1706-7); vol. 4, 2d ed. (1709); vols. 2-4, 3d ed. (1712);
vol. 1, 4th ed., vol. 5 (1714); vol. 6 (1720); Thomas D'Urfey, Wit and Mirth; or
Pills to Purge Melancholy (1719,1720); Wit and Mirth; or, Tom D'Urfey's Pills
to Purge Melancholy (1791); Buck's Delight, or Pills to Purge Melancholy (for
1799) (1798,1799).
61. Benedict, Modern Reader, 160; Suarez, "Trafficking in the Muse," 306.
62. Although only a small percentage of poems in the collection are devoted
to melancholy or are about it, are poems on death (monodies, elegies, and in-
scriptions) or pensive odes (e.g., to fancy, night, indifference), Eleanor Sickels
has rightly suggested that Dodsley somehow grants melancholy poetry promi-
nence (The Gloomy Egoist [New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1932], 7): the
third poem in the first edition of the first volume is Matthew Green's long poem
The Spleen, and Dodsley himself considered that poem to be a sort of center-
piece (Boswell, Life of Johnson, 653); the first poem in the 1755 edition of
volume 4 is Gray's "Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard"; and the poems
that close Dodsley's collection, appearing just before his final postscript in the
sixth volume of 1758, are William Mason's "Ode. On Melancholy"—which
features Gray in it—and two more odes by Gray. Others include Thomas
Warton's "The Pleasures of Melancholy" (Dodsley, Collection of Poems, 1755,
vol. 4), "Ode to Melancholy" by Elizabeth Carter (Pearch, Collection of Po-
ems, 1768, vol. 1), "Ode to Melancholy" by Richard Shepherd (Pearch, Collec-
tion of Poems, 1768, vol. 1), "Ode to Melancholy" by John Oglivie (Pearch,
Collection of Poems, 1768, vol. 2), and two imitations of Milton's pair
("L'Allegro" and "II Penseroso") by John Gilbert Cooper (Dodsley, Collection
of Poems, 1748, vol. 3) and Frances Greville (Pearch, Collection of Poems,
1768, vol. 1), as well as numerous elegies, inscriptions, and pensive poems.
63. Elizabeth Carter is the most frequently represented woman poet in the
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collection of "school anthologies" analyzed by Ian Michael (Teaching of En-
glish, 198); many of the items that Michael calls "anthologies" I would term
"miscellanies" based on the distinctions made below.
64. That William Collins's poetry is central to these collections is shown by
the fact that all of his works (except a sonnet written as a child, a "Song" of
dubious attribution, and "An Ode on the Popular Superstitions of the High-
lands of Scotland," written in 1750 but not published until 1788) appeared
first in these volumes before—and after—an edition of his works was published
by John Langhorne in 1765. Dodsley's second and all subsequent editions of
vol. 1, from 1748 on, contain three of Collins's odes, which are printed again in
the 1749 volume called "volume IV" (which subsequent volume 4s do not re-
semble), and the 1755 vol. 4 contains his "Epistle to Hanmer" and "Song from
Cymbeline"; the Pearch collection prints every known poem by Collins not in
Dodsley; Fawkes and Woty's Poetical Calender prints all of Collins's works,
including those poems found in Dodsley.
65. Dodsley, Collection of Poems, 1758, 6:376.
66. [Elizabeth Cooper, comp.], The Muses [sic] Library; Or a Series of En-
glish Poetry, from the SAXONS, to the Reign of CHARLES II (London: J.
Wilcox, T. Green, J. Brindley, and T. Osborn, 1737; reissued by T.J. Wilcox,
1738); 2d ed. with new title, The Historical and Poetical Medley: or the Muses
[sic] Library (London: T. Davies, 1738; reissued 1741), viii; Elizabeth L.
Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe (New York: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1983), 115.
67. George Pearch, A Collection of Poems in Four Volumes, 1775, 1:5.
68. Every once in a while, a dead poet will appear in one of these collections.
The rule changes, however, with Nichols's later collection: in order to find works
not yet published, Nichols is forced to go back to poets publishing before Dodsley
began collecting in 1748.
69. Bourdieu, Distinction, 72.
70. Henry Headley, comp., Select Beauties of Ancient English Poetry 2 vols.
(London: T. Cadell, 1787), l:xi.
71. Robert Folkenflik pointed out to me that Headley quotes here from
Horace's Satires, book 1, satire 4 (Horace: Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica,
trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classics, rev. ed. [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1929], 1.4.62, pp. 52-53). Horace is here alluding, of course, to the
story of Orpheus.
72. Headley, Ancient English Poetry, 2:160-61
73. Ibid., l:ix.
74. Lonsdale considers 1757 a major moment in the process of reconceiving
borrowing as plagiarism, the date when Bishop Hurd's "Letter to Mr. Mason
on the Marks of Imitation" was published ("Gray and 'Allusion': The Poet as
Debtor," in Studies in the Eighteenth Century IV, ed. R.F. Brissenden and J.C.
Eade [Canberra: Australian National Univ. Press, 1979], 42, 44). Lonsdale
wonders whether "Gray's virtual creative silence after this date" (44) might
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indicate that he himself was aware of "his apparently compulsive acquisitive-
ness" (53).
75. Guillory, Cultural Capital, 87-88.
76. The Spleen originally appeared in an earlier edition of Dodsley, vol. 1 of
the first edition (1748), and in every edition thereafter.
77. Rose, "Author as Proprietor"; and Woodmansee, "The Genius and the
Copyright" (see note 12). Both articles appear in their books: Mark Rose, Au-
thors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1993); Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market:
Rereading the History of Aesthetics (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1994).
78. Egerton Brydges, Censura Literaria, 10 vols. (London: Longman Hurst,
Rees, and Orme, 1805-9), 7:317-18, quoted in Lonsdale, "Gray and 'Allu-
sion,'" 47.
79. Lonsdale, "Gray and 'Allusion,'" 48.
80. Aikin, prefatory essay to The Spleen, v-vii.
81. On the discussion surrounding them, see Guillory, Cultural Capital, 9 1 -
96.
82. The Poems of Thomas Gray, William Collins, Oliver Goldsmith, ed.
Roger Lonsdale (New York: Norton, 1972), 127, lines 53-56.
83. Lines 155-58, quoted in Kaul, Thomas Gray, 125.
84. Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (1755), 5th ed.,
corrected (London: Strahan et al., 1773). Lonsdale's notes to Gray's "Elegy"
cite the passage from "The Rape of the Lock," but not the passage from Cowley.
Since the "Elegy" was published in 1751, Gray would not have gotten his
"memory" of Cowley's poem from reading Johnson's Dictionary (1755), but
rather from reading the same things Johnson read.
85. Bourdieu, Distinction, 71-72.
86. Aikin, prefatory essay to The Spleen, iv.
87. Headley, Ancient English Poetry, l:xxxii.
88. Nicholas Garnham and Raymond Williams, "Bourdieu and the Sociol-
ogy of Culture," in Media, Culture, and Society: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard
Collins, James Curran, Nicholas Garnham, Paddy Scannell, Philip Schlesinger,
and Colin Sparks (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1986), 124-55, 126;
Bourdieu, Distinction, 282.
89. Guillory, Cultural Capital, 45-46; John Guillory, "Literary Critics as
Intellectuals: Class Analysis and the Crisis of the Humanities," in Rethinking
Class: Literary Studies and Social Formations, ed. Wai Chee Dimock and Michael
T. Gilmore (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1994), 137-38.
90. Guillory, Cultural Capital, 335.
91. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin
and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991).
92. [William Oldys, comp.], The Harleian Miscellany: or a Collection of
Scarce, Curious, and Entertaining Pamphlets and Tracts, with an introduction
by Samuel Johnson (London: T. Osbourne, 1744); Thomas Percy, Reliques of
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Ancient English Poetry (1765), 5th ed. (London: Rivington, Longman, Hurst,
Rees, Orme, Brown, 1812); [George Ellis, comp.], Specimens of the Early En-
glish Poets (London: printed for Edwards, 1790); Robert Southey, Specimens
of the Later English Poets, 3 vols. (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees and Orme,
1807).
93. [Samuel Johnson], "Origin and Importance of Small Tracts and Fugi-
tive Pieces," in Miscellaneous and Fugitive Pieces, [ed. Thomas Davies], 2 vols.,
2d ed., corrected (London: T. Davies, 1774), 9 (a reprint of the introduction to
[Oldys], Harleian Miscellany).
94. Volumes 1 and 2 of the Harleian Miscellany were published in 1744,
vols. 3-6 in 1745, and vols. 7-8 in 1746; vol. 1 was reprinted in 1753; a reprint
of the whole collection in twelve volumes was produced between 1808 and
1811, and a reprint in ten volumes between 1808 and 1813.
95. Southey, Specimens, iv.
96. Percy, Reliques, vii.
97. Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), in
Standard Edition of the Works of Sigmund Freud, James Strachey, gen. ed., 24
vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-66), 7:123-245. According to Nicholas
Thomas, who has analyzed the desire in eighteenth-century explorers, the eigh-
teenth-century curiosity of collectors is infantile in structure (Nicholas Tho-
mas, "Curiosity: Colonialism in its Infancy," in his Entangled Objects: Exchange,
Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1991], 127). For a detailed description of eighteenth-century curi-
osity, see Barbara Benedict, "The 'Curious Attitude' in Eighteenth-Century Brit-
ain: Observing and Owning," Eighteenth-Century Life 14.3 (Nov. 1990): 59-98.
98. Headley, Ancient English Poetry, 2:161.
99. Matthew Arnold, "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," in
Essays in Criticism: First Series, ed. Sister Thomas Marion Hoctor (Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968), 17.
100. Freud, "On the Sexual Theories of Children" (1908), in Standard Edi-
tion, 9:205-6.
101. Patey, "The Eighteenth Century Invents the Canon," 26.
102. Hazlitt, Select Poets, i (emphasis added).
103. Thus, Collins's poems appear in volumes 1 and 4 of Dodsley's 1748-49
collection, and Samuel Johnson's works, listed anonymously, are spread out in
volumes 1, 4, and 9 of Fawkes and Woty's Poetical Calender (Foster, Supple-
ments, 55).
104. Ellis, Early English Poets, iii.
105. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ben
Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 249; for a more complex discussion
of the relation between Capital and canonical literature, see Reider, "Wordsworth
and Romanticism in the Academy."
106. Southey, Specimens, iv.
107. Hazlitt, Select British Poets, ii.
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108. Ernst Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Politi-
cal Theology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957). That Kantorowicz's
model of the king's two bodies is relevant here was suggested to me by John
Stevenson. See also Bourdieu, Distinction, 72.
109. Headley, Ancient English Poetry, i.
110. Bloom, Western Canon, 4, 23; Knapp, Literary Interest, 40-41.
111. See [John Dryden], The Annual Miscellany: For the Year 1694. Being
the Fourth Part of Miscellany Poems (London: Jacob Tonson, 1694): "The En-
joyment" (164-71); "Apollo's Grief: For having kill'd Hyacinth by Accident...
By my Lord R." and "Song [Where is he gone whom I Adore,] by my Lord R."
(192-94).
112. Deliciae Poeticae; or, Parnassus Display 'd (London: John Nutt, 1706).
113. A New Academy of Complements [sic]: or the Lover's Secretary was
published throughout the century: 1715 (4th ed.), 1721, 1726, 1741, 1743,
1750, 1754 (14th ed.), 1766 (18th ed.), 1784 (17th ed.), 1788 {New Cam-
bridge Bibliography of English Literature, vol. 2 (1660-1800), ed. George
Watson [New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971], 349).
114. [H. Curll, printer], The Ladies Miscellany (1718,1720,1732); [H. Curll,
printer], The Altar of Love (1727, 1731); The Ladies Miscellany: or a Curious
Collection of Amorous Poems and Merry Tales (1730); "Sir Butterfly Maggot,
Kt.," in The Gentlemen's Miscellany (1730, 1731); [A. Moore, printer], The
Beau's Miscellany. Being a new and curious collection of amorous tales, divert-
ing songs, and entertaining poems (1731, 1736); "T. G.," The Flowers of
Parnassus; or the Ladie's Miscellany, an annual published two years (1735,
1737); The School of Venus: or the Lady's Miscellany, 2d ed. (1739); A New
Academy of Compliments (1748, 1772, 1789); "E. W.," The Lover's Manual:
being a choice collection of poems from modern authors (1753), reprinted as
The Muses Library, and young gentleman [sic] and ladies polite instructor (1760);
"G. Gaylove," A Select Collection of Original Love Letters, to which are
subjoin'd poems by eminent ladies (1755) (perhaps a parody of Colman and
Thornton's collection, intent to elucidate their motives in gathering their collec-
tion?). All of this information comes from the NCBEL, 2:356ff.
115. Poems for Ladies, selected under the inspection of a lady (1777); [Oliver
Goldsmith, named on the 1770 title page], Poems for Young Ladies. In three
parts. Devotional, Moral, and Entertaining (1767, 1770, 1785, 1792), "that
innocence may read without a blush"; The Ladies Poetical Magazine (an an-
nual (1781-82; reprint, 1791); G. Wright, The Lady's Miscellany: or pleasing
essays, poems, stories, and examples (1793, 1797) (NCBEL, 2:387ff).
116. Benedict, Modern Reader, 112.
117. Headley, Ancient English Poetry, 2:160-61.
118. Hazlitt, Select British Poets, ii.
119. Colman and Thornton, Poems by Eminent Ladies, iii.
120. Frank Kermode, An Appetite for Poetry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1989), 192.
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121. The sixth edition of the Norton claims to be opening up the canon
through its changes, and many more women authors are included. But in fact,
except for those few authors already canonized, such as Mary Shelley, women
are still excluded from those parts of the Norton that are organized anthologi-
cally. Instead of intermingling with canonical authors, women and writers who
were not members of the literary elite appear in sections separate from the sec-
tions containing "great authors." These sections are called "Literary Modes of
the Early Seventeenth Century," "Poetry: Augustan Modes," "Romantic Lyric
Poets" (as if Wordsworth, whose works appear in the main Romantic literature
section were not a Lyric poet???), and "Victorian Issues." M.H. Abrams, gen.
ed., The Norton Anthology of Poetry, 2 vols., 6th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton,
1993), vol. 2.
122. Introduction to Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson,
and Paula A. Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), 12-13.
123. Alan Liu, "Program Introduction," in The Canon and the Web:
Reconfiguring Romanticism in the Information Age, current web site http://
humanitas.ucsb.edu/liu/canonweb.html.
124. Guillory, "Literary Critics."
125. Stephen Greenblatt, "Resonance and Wonder," in Learning to Curse:
Essays in Early Modern Culture (New York: Routledge, 1990), reprinted in
Literary Theory Today, ed. Peter Collier and Helga Geyer-Ryan (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 79.
126. De Grazia and Stallybrass, "The Materiality of the Shakespearean Text,"
283.
127. Cheryl Walker, "Feminist Literary Criticism and the Author," Critical
Inquiry 16 (1990): 551-71.
6. Transcending Misogyny
1. For the absence of Barbauld and other Romantic women poets from
twentieth-century anthologies, see their tables of contents, available through
two web sites: Laura Mandell, "Twentieth-Century Anthologies," http://
miavxl.muohio.edu/~update/20thc.htm; Harriet Kramer Linkin, Laura Mandell,
and Rita Raley, "The Anthologies Page," The Romantic Circles Project, http://
www.muohio.edu/anthologies. See also Alan Richardson, "British Romanticism
as a Cognitive Category," Romanticism on the Net 8 (1997), http://www-
sul.stanford.edu/mirrors/romnet/. In 1993 three of Barbauld's poems made it
into the sixth edition of the Norton Anthology, M.H. Abrams, gen. ed. (New
York: Norton, 1993), 863-65, in a section not of major but rather of minor
Romantic poets. In 1994 Barbauld was first featured as a major Romantic writer
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